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Abstract
Karl Barth and H. Richard Niebuhr both attempted to understand the Second
World War in theologically realistic fashions. Barth has been termed a "critically
realistic thinker" in recent scholarship, as he uses both realism and idealism to argue
against anthropocentric theology and ethics, including traditional just-war theories.
He maintains that God must always be primary, the one who determines good and
evil; therefore theology and ethics must always be theocentric not anthropocentric.
Good is, according to Barth, that which God commands. This leads him to argue for
a divine-command ethic in which God speaks to concrete persons in concrete
situations.
H. Richard Niebuhr, who belonged to the Christian Realists in the United
States, argues from a very similar theological basis as Barth, but ends up with an
ethics of responsibility rather than a divine-command morality. According to
Niebuhr, human beings are responders, who respond in answer to prior action upon
them. The primary question for ethics is therefore what is happening, to what must I
respond in this situation and how ought I respond to it. In attempting to determine the
fitting response, one must also attempt to understand what the response to my
responding action will be. This model assists in understanding the events that lead
up to and occur during war and can help to build a more stable peace.
Both Barth and Niebuhr attempted to understand the particular events of the
Second World War in a theological and Christian way. Their insights provide
assistance in our response to situations that may require the governmental use of
force, i.e. military action, peacekeeping missions and humanitarian missions. The
world situation, however, has changed since World War II; there are now more
armed conflicts between non-State groups, such as civil and ethnic wars. Therefore,
both Barth and Niebuhr's ethics ofwar from that time require some modification to
deal with current events. Barth's theological rejection of anthropocentrism remains
the framework for any Christian ethic dealing with contemporary uses of military
force, but his divine-command morality leaves little room for moral debate and
discussion, especially in a multi-cultural setting. H. Richard Niebuhr's ethics of
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response provides a model for ethical decision-making which allows for moral
discourse amongst various persons of different cultures and religions. It also helps us
to understand the situations to which governments may have to respond with force.
Yet Niebuhr's ethics, with its emphasis on the question of what is happening in a
given situation, has difficulty in providing assistance for contemporary decision
making concerning the use of force. By bringing Barth and Niebuhr into dialogue
with each other concerning the Second World War, we can see how a theology of
hopeful realism aids us in forming a model for Christian ethical decision-making
concerning the use of force in the current situation. This hopefully realistic model,
based on interpreting God's activity in history, takes the situation seriously yet is
able to respond to that situation with Christian hope. It does this by understanding
human beings not as rational beings who seek logic and rationality in all their
experiences but as symbol users who strive to understand themselves and their world
by means of symbols, or patterns, from their past. For Christians, Jesus Christ is
central to the symbols they use. This then provides for the use of Trinitarian symbols
to understand the ethical problem presented by war.
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Introduction
The Second World War was a defining moment for modern culture. Many
Europeans and Americans, including churches and theologians, struggled to interpret
and engage World War II. Many of these interpretations moved in a realistic
direction, rather than in a naively idealistic one. This movement toward realism was
not limited to theology, but included literature, journalism and the arts and can be
seen in the writing of the time from many different countries, such as the literature of
Thomas Mann, a German who lived in exile in the United States', and the poetry of
# 2the Czech Miroslav Holub". That war was understood not as an opportunity to
demonstrate a nation's greatness, but as a necessary evil. The phrase that was so
prevalent during the First World War, that this was the war to end all wars, was not
much used during the Second. It was a tragic event brought about by human failing
or, in theological terms, human sinfulness.
We will look at two important theologians who interpreted and engaged
World War II: Karl Barth and H. Richard Niebuhr. Their contexts and, therefore their
understandings of the war were very different - Barth was Swiss and Niebuhr
American; their theological and philosophical inheritances were radically different.
Barth was raised in German liberal theology and counted Adolf von Harnack and
Wilhelm Hermann amongst his teachers; Niebuhr completed his Ph. D. at Yale on
Ernst Troeltsch; he was also decisively influenced by the American pragmatism of
William James. Yet their interpretations also have remarkable similarities: both
attempted to interpret the war in a realistic, rather than idealistic way; both were very
suspicious of liberal idealism and attempts to interpret war in ways that concentrate
on human actions and moral ideals rather than on God. They both saw this
interpretation as anthropocentric rather than theocentric. They both therefore centred
their interpretation ofWorld War Two on divine action and human response. This,
they argued, made for a genuinely theological ethic.
1
See, for example, (Mann 1938) and (Mann 1944).
2 See especially (Holub 1990)
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The reason for examining these two theologians ethics ofWorld War Two is
that they both understood the war in a realistic fashion, while remaining distinctively
Christian. H. Richard Niebuhr belonged to the Christian Realist school in the United
States. Barth's theological realism has been well documented in recent literature,
most notably in Bruce McCormack's Karl Barth \s Critically Realistic Dialectical
Theology. However, his ethics have been criticised as nothing more than some sort
of intuition, allowing for no moral argument. We will look at that argument below.
H. Richard Niebuhr appreciated Barth's theocentric base, yet built a radically
different ethics on it. Niebuhr's ethics ofresponse builds on Barth's theological
anthropocentrism and takes the situation seriously for ethical decision-making.
Unfortunately, Niebuhr died before he was able to complete his ethical system,
leaving only his The Responsible Self4 which is less theological than philosophical.
James Gustafson, in his introduction to this book, laments the fact that Niebuhr did
not have the opportunity to publish his thoughts concerning "The Principles of
Christian Action" and "Christian Responsibility in the Common Life,"5 which would
have contained more ofNiebuhr's specifically theological thought. Both Barth and
Niebuhr agreed that God must remain subject in theology and ethics and developed
their theology and ethics, albeit in different ways, on the understanding of divine
action as primary and human action as secondary.
This centre of divine action and human response led both of them to analyse
the actual concrete circumstances and events in order to form their ethical responses
to World War Two. This in turn gave both Barth and Niebuhr a distinctive
perspective on the classical understandings ofwar - the just war theory and
pacifism.6 These theories were rejected by both, albeit for somewhat different
reasons. For Barth, the just war is rejected as being anthropocentric; we, with or
without divine assistance, try to determine the proper course of actions ourselves.
God may provide the criteria, but they are meaningless unless we apply them to the
current situation. Pacifism, on the other hand, is rejected by Barth as being too





5 See (Niebuhr 1963), 6-41.
6
For a historical analysis of Christian responses to war, see (Bainton 1960)
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because it cannot provide the necessary means to interpret human experience during
wartime, especially the fact that it is the relatively innocent who suffer most during
wartime. It was not the Nazi leadership who suffered as a result of the war; it was the
relatively innocent in cities like Dresden and Hamburg, or London and Coventry,
who had to endure the war's brutality. Niebuhr also rejects pacifism, which he
classifies into two types: firstly, a separatist pacifism, which argues that the world is
so evil, and war is the ultimate expression of that evil, so that Christians must totally
separate themselves from it. Niebuhr rejects this because it is firstly impossible to
separate one self from the world; secondly, he rejects it because it necessitates the
assumption that God also has rejected the world, an idea which is, according to
Niebuhr, unchristian. The second type, idealistic pacifism, which claims that war is
immoral and we must be moral and therefore reject war as an option in international
(and national) relations. This view, however, fails to take seriously the problem of
sin in the world and does not account for the fact that, as a result of a nations
unilateral rejection ofmilitary conflict, greater social injustice may result.
By looking at both Niebuhr and Barth's interpretation of World War Two, we
will gain a better understanding of a theologically realistic ethic which takes the
circumstances seriously yet remains distinctively Christian. This, in turn, will serve
to help us formulate a hopeful realist Christian ethic, which takes into account all of
the relevant information about any situation from as many sources as possible, yet
remains theocentric rather than anthropocentric. The situation has changed
dramatically since World War Two, so that as both Barth and Niebuhr realised, their
ethics from that time must also be revised if they are to be relevant to today.
This study deals almost exclusively with the Western Theatre ofWorld War
Two. The main reason for this is that both Barth and Niebuhr wrote predominantly
about Europe; for Barth in Switzerland the explanation for this is obvious; Niebuhr,
on the other hand, as an American was involved in fighting in both the European and
Pacific Theatres. However, his father immigrated to the United States from Germany
and his connections were all with Europe. He did write about the Manchurian Crisis,
which we will discuss this below. Otherwise, the scope of this paper is exclusively
Europe.
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We also will not be dealing extensively with the problems presented by the
Holocaust.7 This is a very important area ofwork, which would require a large
expansion of the present project in order to begin to do it justice. We will look briefly
at both Barth and Niebuhr's understanding of the Holocaust in terms of their ethics
concerning war. There have been several studies of BartlTs relationship to Judaism.
For the most part, I have limited this work to Barth's writing from 1920 to
1945 with occasional references to his later work. The single major exception to this
is his discussion ofwar in volume III.4 of the Church Dogmatics, which was
published in 1951, although portions of it date back to before 1945. As Barth's later
writing built on the foundation of his earlier writings, most notably the Church
Dogmatics, the arguments presented here are consistent, with some minor
modifications, with Barth's later work. Niebuhr, on the other hand, did not publish as
much during this period and only published his major systematic works after the war,
so that we will look to all of his writing, including his later writings such as The
Responsible Self, which was published in 1963. Similarly to Barth, Niebuhr remained
relatively consistent in his position throughout his career, so that this does not
present a problem for this argument.
The first chapter looks at Christian Realism as a distinctive theological
movement in the United States and discusses Barth's relationship to it. The point is
not to show that Barth was a Christian Realist, but rather that he and the Christian
Realists shared certain points in common with each other, most notably in their
rejection of the liberal theological tradition in favour of a theocentric theology and
ethics. The next two chapters will look at Barth and Niebuhr's understandings of the
Second World War. As theology and ethics cannot be separated from each other, we
will discuss their theology in general before moving to their ethics ofwar. We will
be attempting to gain a clear understanding of their thought without critiquing it at
this point. Chapter 4 will then critique their positions and demonstrate how each
person's thought can compliment the others. In essence, I will argue that one can be
true to Barth's theology while rejecting his divine-command ethics for Niebuhr's
ethics of response. The final chapter will then build on the fourth chapter to argue for
7 There are many good books available concerning the issues presented by the Holocaust. Two
important texts are: (Jones 1999) and (Rubenstein and Roth 1987).
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a hopefully realistic ethics ofwar that is realistic in understanding the situation
while, at the same time, hopeful because ofGod's activity in history.
The citations are given in the main text in English. Where the translation has
been significantly modified, this is noted in the reference. The German word Mensch
and other gender-exclusive terms have been translated inclusively as person and
other gender-exclusive terms have also been translated inclusively. For Niebuhr (and
other English language quotations) the citations have not been modified.
It is important to note that when the name Niebuhr occurs in the text, it is
referring to H. Richard Niebuhr and not his better-known brother, Reinhold. Where
this is unclear, I have included the first name.
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Chapter 1: Christian Realism, Karl Barth and H.
Richard Niebuhr
The First World War caused a radical change in theology. Nineteenth
century theology, especially in Europe, had been dominated a liberal optimism
concerning human ability to bring about the kingdom of God on earth. As William
James stated in 1907: "Optimism has always been the regnant doctrine in European
• 8
philosophy." The war shattered this belief and posed serious questions to theology.
Two responses to the crisis, which were to have lasting influence on the theological
thought that followed, were Neo-orthodoxy9 and Christian Realism. Neo-Orthodoxy
was largely a European movement in theology, centred in the German-speaking
world. Christian Realism, on the other hand, was mainly a North American
movement whose adherents included, in addition to H. Richard Niebuhr, Reinhold
Niebuhr, Walter Horton, John Bennett, Henry P, van Dusen and Samuel Calvert.
Barth was one of the most prominent leaders ofNeo-Orthodoxy, which was a broad
movement encompassing a variety of very different thinkers including, at various
times, Emil Brunner, Rudolf Bultmann, Friedrich Gogarten and Paul Tillich. We will
look primarily at Barth's relationship to Christian Realism (including H. Richard
Niebuhr) and through that, the relationship between neo-orthodoxy and Christian
Realism. We will then be in a better position to discuss Barth and Niebuhr's ethical
thought concerning the Second World War.
In order to discuss Christian Realism, we must first define what it is and then
discuss Karl Barth's relationship to it. The first section will therefore be a very brief
discussion of realism followed by a discussion of Christian Realism. Karl Barth and




Neo-orthodoxy is one of several titles used to describe the theological movement in continental
Europe following World War One and which included such varied persons as Karl Barth, Emil
Brunner and Rudolf Bultmann. This movement was not very united in its outlook and broke apart in
the 1930's but its adherents shared several characteristics, which will be discussed below.
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Barth has, to some extent, classified his theology as realistic, although his is a unique
type of realism.10
Both Christian Realism and Neo-Orthodoxy developed in the nineteen-
twenties and -thirties as a response to the catastrophe of the First World War. Before
the war, theology was dominated by an optimistic Liberalism that argued that
humanity was improving itself and would continue to do so, thereby building the
kingdom of God on earth. Johannes Weiss wrote in 1892:
The real difference between our modern Protestant world view and that of
primitive Christianity is, therefore, that we do not share the eschatological
attitude. ... We no longer pray "may grace come and the world pass away,"
but we pass our lives in joyful confidence that this world will evermore
become the show place of the people of God.11
There was thus an agreement between human desire and action and the divine will
and action so that human action, dependent upon God's grace, would bring the
kingdom of God on earth into being. One component of this optimism was an
epistemological confidence that grew out of the Enlightenment. Christian Thomasius,
writing in the seventeenth century, stated:
The truth is therefore nothing other than the correspondence of human
thoughts with the created things external to those thoughts.
You do not have to ask here if understanding corresponds to the things or if
the things correspond to the understanding; this harmony is rather so created,
that neither is the guiding principle of the other. The harmony of both is
presupposed, other than the fact that the external things are the starting point
of this process.
This is so because the things are created so that they can be comprehended by
human beings and the understanding is so created that it can comprehend the
1 9
external things.
Science provided the link between human desires and the divine will. Liberal
theology was tremendously optimistic about human potential and ability to transform
the world into the kingdom of God. It was divine grace that gave us this capacity, we
10 For the clearest example of this, see (McCormack 1995). We will discuss this below. There have
also been recent example of this in German Barth studies, including (Spieckermann 1985), a book that
was crucial for McCormack; see also (Beintker 1987), especially chapter IV. Section 5: "Barth's




(Thomasius), 128 (Section 62).
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merely had to use this God-given ability to build God's kingdom on earth. Up until
the war, the kingdom ofGod was understood to be the very obtainable goal of the
historical process of human development. The Church and world were working
together toward the same goal - building the kingdom of God on Earth - and we
were well on the way to achieving this goal. Adolf von Harnack wrote in 1894:
Before proceeding to deal with the problem itself, I must call attention to a
fact that may well inspire us with hope and gladness. Throughout the whole
civilized world questions are now being discussed concerning economic
arrangements and the relations between capital and labor; this in itself proof
that much social work has already been accomplished. It is not long since
culture, rights and human dignity were the monopoly of some few thousands
amongst all the inhabitants of Europe, while the great masses of people lived
dreary lives under tyrannous oppression, possessing neither rights nor
education, their whole existence being one long misery. Today, on the
contrary - at least in our own country, and among other kindred nations - all
citizens are equal in the eyes of the law; all enjoy the same legal protection;
slavery and serfdom are things of the past; a fair amount of knowledge and
education are within the reach of all; and labor is respected. Liberty, equality
and fraternity are in many ways no mere empty words, but the real
framework of our individual and social life, the pillars of the building we are
raising. All this has been accomplished in the lifetime of a few generations,
and it is absurd to question the fact of progress, amidst improvements so
obvious and immense.13
Walter Rauschenbusch could be even more direct at the conclusion of his
Christianity and the Social Crisis:
Perhaps these nineteen centuries of Christian influence have been a long
preliminary stage of growth, and now the flower and fruit are almost here. If
at this juncture we can rally sufficient religious faith and moral strength to
snap the bonds of evil and turn the present unparalleled economic and
intellectual resources if humanity to the harmonious development of a true
social life, the generations yet unborn will mark this as a great day of the
Lord for which the ages waited, and count us blessed for sharing in the
apostolate that proclaimed it.14
The First World War and the events that followed in the United States shattered these
illusions about human potentiality. There was a very active progressive movement in






Woodrow Wilson was one of the representatives of this movement, which expressed
itselfmost forcibly in their support for a League ofNations.15 In the aftermath of this
loss of hope, several movements within theology sprang up. Christian
fundamentalism, which had been present in American theology since the early
nineteenth century, gained more adherents. Atheism also made inroads in both
Europe and America. Existentialism also can trace its roots back to this period. Many
Christians became active in the ecumenical movement as a way to prevent further
outbreaks ofwar. Two theological responses to this crisis were Christian Realism
and Neo-orthodoxy; Christian Realism grew out of both the pragmatism of William
James and John Dewey and the theological realism of theologians like Walter
Marshall Horton and Douglas Clyde Macintosh; and Neo-orthodoxy, lead by Karl
Barth and Emil Brunner, amongst others.
There is much debate not only about what the movement that sprung up in
Germany after the First World War ought to be called, but also, indeed, whether or
not this was a single movement at all. A discussion about these issues lies well
beyond the scope of this work, but for our purposes we will call this movement Neo-
orthodoxy and operate under the assumption that all of the theologians associated
with this movement were responding, albeit in very different ways, to the loss of
hope brought about by the First World War. Barth located his crisis with liberal
theology at the outbreak of the First World War, when a manifesto supporting the
Kaiser's war efforts was signed by almost all (with the exception ofMartin Rade) of
15 For an excellent study on Wilson and the Progessivists in the United States, see (Knock 1992).
Knock maintains that President Wilson was responsible for the failure of the Progessivists and of the
United States entering the League of Nations: "Although he continued to be the chief agent of the
[Progressivist] movement by virtue of the Fourteen Points and the Original Covenant of February
1919 — and the preponderance of progressive internationalists fully appreciated these outstanding
accomplishments - Wilson had made crucial mistakes long before the treaty [which founded the
League ofNations and ended World War One] was in the Senate. He had neglected to play the steady
role of propagandist and educator; he had allowed the coalition of 1916 to unravel, primarily be
refusing to acknowledge his administration's culpability in the wartime reaction and to take any
serious action to combat it; and from 1918 onward, he was either unable or unwilling to accept the
implications of "Progressive Democracy" and "war socialism" and take the next logical step beyond
them. The result was the erosion of the domestic base and the depletion of the political environment
essential to both ratification and to the American leadership in a progressive, as opposed to
conservative, league movement. By the summer of 1919, Wilson had barely any strategy at all, except
to rely upon his own dwindling rhetorical gifts." (268). It is unclear what role the circumstances
following the war played in the failure of Wilson's progressiveness and Knock does not look in detail
at this.
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his theological teachers in Germany.16 Although this was a powerful demonstration
of the failure of liberal theology, Barth's concerns with liberal theology can be dated
earlier than this.17 The manifesto merely underscored the death of liberal theology in
Europe that had begun already before 1914.
Christian Realism in America also came about in response to the loss of faith
in human potential. The crisis took somewhat longer in the United States than in
Europe; World War One was only the beginning of this loss of faith, as the United
States entered the war late, shortly before it ended, so that the country was spared the
experience ofmost of the tragic suffering of the war. This is even more the case as
the United States is geographically so far removed from the battlefields of the war.
President Wilson's Fourteen Point peace plan to end the war was an expression of
American optimistic idealism. When introducing it for ratification to the U. S.
Senate, he stated:
The stage is set, the destiny disclosed. It has come about by no plan of our
conceiving, but by the hand of God who led us into this way. We cannot turn
back. We can only go forward, with lifted eyes and freshened spirit to follow
the vision. It was of this that we dreamed at our birth. America shall in truth
18show the way. The light streams upon the path ahead, and nowhere else.
His failure to force through this plan for peace against the vengeful desires of the
French and British after World War One and the conservative elements in the U. S.
government deepened this crisis of faith in human ability to build God's kingdom on
Earth; this loss of faith was then completed by the depression. The causes for this
loss of optimism in America are not clear:
If, then American progressivism was damaged by the First World War, the
reason must be sought in some aspect of the particular case. A number of
such aspects have been pointed to by historians. One possibility is that the
pre-war reform movement depended upon assumptions about human progress
that were discredited by the occurrence of such an appalling conflict. Another
is that progressivism was fatally weakened by the divisions created among its
supporters by the new issues of foreign policy, above all the question of
American intervention. Still another is that domestic reform suffered from the
postwar public reaction against American involvement just because the
16 See (Busch 1975), p 93f.
17 See (McCormack 1995), 111-117.
18
Quoted in: (Link 1969), 132.
Wilson Administration had justified this so largely in terms of "the
Progressive values and the Progressive language." Each of these explanations
posses at least some truth, yet no one of them is adequate in itself. The first
implies a more radical discontinuity in the whole tradition of American
reform thought than most historians have observed. The second does not
explain why differences of view on foreign policy questions - which,
however important, were transitory - had a more fatal effect upon the
progressive movement than the deep divisions had always existed within it
over such domestic issues as the trusts or prohibition. The third applies only
to the period after the war, by which time the strength of progressive
sentiment had clearly been much reduced. The relative significance of these
and other connections between the war and progressivism can be assessed
only by studying the subject as a whole.19
This is not a study of this loss of hope in America after the First World War. 20 It is
as a response to this loss of optimism about human ability that theologians such as
Reinhold and H. Richard Niebuhr, John C. Bennett and D. C. Macintosh formulated
what came to be called Christian Realism.
Both Neo-orthodoxy and Christian Realism sprang out of this experience of
hopelessness; Neo-orthodoxy exploded in continental Europe following the war;
Christian Realism came about somewhat more gradually in the States during the
1920's. Although responding to similar affects the war had on theology in Europe
and the States, they are nonetheless different in their outlooks. One very important
reason for this was the American philosophical movement pragmatism, which
stemmed from the work of Charles Peirce and William James and was virtually
• 21unknown in Europe. Peirce, in is well-known essay "What Pragmatism is" wrote:
Endeavoring ... to formulate what he so approved, he framed the theory that
a conception, that is, the rational purport of a word or other expression, lies
exclusively in its conceivable bearing upon the conduct of life; so that, since
obviously nothing that might not result from experiment can have any direct
bearing upon conduct, if one can define accurately all the conceivable
experimental phenomena which the affirmation or denial of a concept could
19
(Thompson 1987), 2.
20 For more information on the loss of hope in America in the twenties, see (Noggle 1974), which
includes a bibliographic essay and Thompson, cited above, which provides a much broader
interpretation than the title might imply.
21 It is significant to note that neither William James nor Charles Peirce are mentioned in Barth's
Church Dogmatics, nor is pragmatism. Realism is discussed in Church Dogmatics II. I in relation to
Barth's discussion of the reality ofGod, but nowhere else. Dietrich Bonhoeffer, while studying at
Union theological Seminary in New York in 1930-1931 studied "almost the complete philosophical
works of William James" which he found "fascinating." See (Bethge 1970), 119-120.
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imply, one will have therein a complete definition of the concept, and there is
nothing more to it. For this doctrine he invented the name pragmatism. ...
Now quite the most striking feature of the new theory was its recognition of
an inseparable connection between rational cognition and rational purpose;
and that consideration it was which determined the preference for the name
22
pragmatism.
A little further in the same essay, Peirce wrote:
Your problem would be greatly simplified, if, instead of saying that you want
to know the "Truth," you were simply to say that you want to attain a state of
belief unassailable by doubt.
Belief is not a momentary mode of consciousness; it is a habit of mind
essentially enduring for some time, and mostly (at least) unconscious ,..23
William James applied Peirce's more secular philosophy to the religious realm.
James wrote:
On pragmatic principles we can not reject any hypothesis if consequences
useful to life flow from it. Universal conceptions, as things to take account of,
may be as real for pragmatism as particular sensations are. They have, indeed,
no meaning and no reality if they have no use. But if they have any use they
have that amount ofmeaning. And the meaning will be true if the use squares
well with life's other uses.24
James continues this section, entitled "Pragmatism and Religion," by applying that
principle to religious truth. Towards the end, he wrote:
On pragmatistic principles, if the hypothesis of God works satisfactorily in
the widest sense of the word, it is true. Now whatever its residual difficulties
may be, experience shows that it certainly does work, and that the problem is
to build it out and determine it so that it will combine satisfactorily with all
the other working truths.23
Pragmatism thus allowed the Christian Realists to argue for a kind of apologetic










... there is nevertheless a positive apologetic task. It consists in correlating
the truth, apprehended by faith and repentance, to truths about life and history
gained generally in human experience.
Pragmatism was not used to demonstrate the truth of social theories or religions, but
to "show that one or another of them provides a better way of anticipating future
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events and making choices in light of the likely outcomes." The tradition of
pragmatism that American theologians had access to accounts for many of the
differences between their theology and that of continental Europe.
Christian Realism, because it is applied to a very broad movement within
American theology is difficult to define precisely. Most scholars define it by
referring to three kinds of realism: political realism, moral realism and theological
realism. The structure of this chapter will follow that definition. We will first discuss
realism and then move on to political, moral and theological realism. This will enable
us to get a clearer understanding of the nature of realism. Following this, we will
look at how these three types of realism interact within Christian Realism.
Throughout the following discussion, we will also compare some aspects Karl
Barth's thought to Christian Realism. We will also take a brief look at some current
Barth literature that has classified him as a realist.
Realism
Walter Marshall Horton wrote in his 1934 book, Realistic Theology that:
... the word "realism" suggest to me, above all, a resolute to determination to
face all the facts of life candidly, beginning preferably with the most stubborn
perplexing, and disheartening ones, so that any lingering romantic illusions
may be dispelled at the start; and then, through these stubborn facts and not in
spite of them, to pierce as deep as one may into the solid structure of
objective reality, until one finds whatever ground of courage, hope, and faith
is actually there independent of human preferences and desires, and so casts








To assert that something exists independent of a mind's apprehension of it is to move
in the realist direction, to deny this is to move in the opposite direction. That serves
as a very basic definition of realism, which is less a single school of thought than a
direction. Charles Peirce wrote:
That is real which has such and such characters, whether anybody thinks it to
have those characters or not. ...
That which any true proposition asserts is real, in the sense of being as it is
?Q
regardless ofwhat you or I may think of it.
In medieval philosophy, realism was opposed by nominalism and conceptualism. D.
M. Armstrong described the debate between Nominalism and Realism:
There is one sense in which everybody agrees that particulars have properties
and stand in relation to other particulars. The piece of paper before me is
particular. It is white, so it has a property. It rests upon a table, so it is related
to another particular. Such gross facts are not, or should not be, in dispute
between Nominalists and Realists.
G. E. More never tired of emphasizing that in the case ofmany of the great
metaphysical disputes the gross facts are not in dispute. What is in dispute, he
contended, is the account or analysis to be given of the gross facts. This
appears to be the situation in the dispute between Nominalism and Realism.
Both can agree that the paper is white and rests upon a table. It is an
adequacy-condition of their analyses that such statements come out true. But
the analyses themselves are utterly different.
We start with a basic agreement, then: that in some minimal or pre-analytic
sense there are things that having certain properties and standing in certain
relations. But, as Plato was the first to point out, this situation is a profoundly
puzzling one, at least for philosophers. The same property can belong to
different things. The same relation can relate to different things. Apparently,
there can be something identical in things which are not identical. Things are
one at the same time as they are many. How is this possible? Nominalists and
Realists react to the puzzle in different ways. Nominalists deny that there is
any genuine or objective identity in things which are not identical. Realists,
on the other hand, hold that the apparent situation is the real situation. There
genuinely is, or can be, something identical in things which are not identical.
Besides particulars, there are universals.30






... experience means something much the same as given and present fact. We
perceive, on reflection, that to be real, or even barely to exist, must be to fall
within sentience. Sentient experience, in short, is reality, and what is not this
is not real. We may say, in other words, that there is no being outside that
which is commonly called psychical experience. Feeling, thought, and
volition (any groups under which we class psychical phenomena) are all the
material of existence, and there is not other material, actual or even
possible.31
A realist would argue that to say that this wood is hard is to assert that the substance
woodhsis the property of hardness. The predicative property of 'hardness' exists
external to our thinking. Unlike substances, properties are predicative, which is to
say that it is their nature to exist as a property of something else. However, they do
really exist. Conceptualists would argue that nothing predicative exists independently
of thought. To say that the wood is hard is merely to assert that our concept 'hard,'
which does not exist apart from our concept of hardness, applies to this wood.
Hardness thus exists only as a concept in our mind. A nominalist would want to carry
the conceptualist argument further by arguing that 'hard' is merely a word,
dependent on a particular language, not just on a mode of thought.
Since the Enlightenment, realism has been opposed by idealism, which
argues that there is no access to reality apart from the mind's perceptions and the
mind can only reveal its own contents to us. Reality is therefore located in the mind.
Realism argues, on the other hand, that the objects we perceive exist independently
32of our perception of them. The problem with realism has to do with truth-claims.
To know something is to believe it because it is true, but to assume that a belief is
true in the realist sense is not to explain why it is believed. In other words, ifwhat we
observe can be explained by various mutually exclusive theories, on what basis,
other than intuition or luck, are we to choose the correct one? Realism seems to
require that humans have a "God's eye" view of reality - the ability to know what
things are in themselves. We will return to this below.
31
(Bradley 1908), 144.
>2 There is an ongoing discussion in current post-modern philosophical debate concerning realism. We
will only touch on this debate very briefly in this article. For more information about the realist - anti-
realist debate, see (Dummett 1993) and (Putnam and Conant 1990). For information about the
movement in contemporary theology called Christian Non-Realism, see (Crowder 1997).
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This problem has lead in recent times to an anti-realist response. Michael
Dummett is one of the leading representatives of this point of view. He builds on
Frege's philosophy of language, arguing against the concept of bivalence - that an
assertoric sentence must be either true or false. He wrote:
... I shall take as my preferred characterization of a dispute between realists
and anti-realists one which represents it as relating, not to a class of entities or
a class of terms but to a class of statements, which may be, e. g., statements
about the physical world, statements about mental events, processes or states,
mathematical statements, statements in the past tense, statements in the future
tense, etc. This class I shall, from now on, term 'the disputed class'. Realism I
characterize as the belief that statements of the disputed class possess an
objective truth-value, independently of our means of knowing it: they are true
or false in virtue of a reality existing independently of us. The anti-realist
opposes to this the view that statements in the disputed class are to be
understood only by reference to the sort of thing which we count as evidence
for a statement of that class. That is, the realist holds that the meanings of
statements of the disputed class are not directly tied to the kind of evidence
for them we can have, but consist in the manner of their determination as true
or false by states of affairs whose existence is not dependent on our
possession of evidence for them. The anti-realist insists, on the contrary, that
the meanings of these statements are tied directly to what we count as
evidence for them, in such a way that a statement of the disputed class, if true
at all, can be true only in virtue of something which we could know and
which we should count as evidence for its truth.
Dummett argues that language must have a compositional semantics, but rejects the
association of sentence meaning with truth-conditions, preferring to associate
meaning with assertibility-conditions. We cannot grasp circumstances in which a
sentence would be true independent of any evidence that might bear on its truth; we
cannot grasp the meaning of an assertion an sich. However, we can recognise the
circumstances to the point that we can justify an assertion. So we can only give
justifications for the assertion, not make any absolute truth claims. Ifwe have no





How, then, does Barth relate to realism? Recent studies argue that he is a
realist, although his realism was of a unique kind. For Barth, God is the truly real, as
only God exists in Godsself, independent of any human perceptions about God. Our
beliefs about God can therefore only be judged by reference to God. Wolfgang
Ullmann pointed to this in his analysis of Barth's Fides quaerens intellectum34 when
he wrote:
But let us recall once again the entire weight of the crucial centre on the
Anselm-thesis, the identity ofGod and truth. On the basis of this, one can be
clear that the position of Barth, as here described, is not a connection point
with the so-called natural theology, whatever one means by that. The decisive
contradiction is not: acceptance or rejection of natural theology. The decisive
disjunction is much more between a theology ofword-games that is
indifferent to the truth and a theology that holds to the definiteness if truth
and, thereby, also to the risk of falsification...
Wolfhart Schlichting stated the matter even more decisively:
Belief leaves no area, however partial, to unbelievers, but takes up the fight
with them for the entire reality. It does not merely erect a small over-reality,
but reality completely. ... It must stand firm.
This, however, presents a problem for Barthian realism, as sinful humans have no
access to knowledge about God. This leads Barth to the miracle of Jesus Christ. God
revealed Godsself to humanity in Jesus Christ. The problem remains, however, about
how we recognise this knowledge as knowledge about God without having any prior
concept ofGod and how we know that what we learn from Jesus' revelation is
knowledge about God. Michael Beintker, referring to Barth's early essay "The Word
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of God and the Task ofMinistry " described this infinite, qualitative distinction










"We cannot speak of God" We cannot do so - and this thought through a light
of hope onto our situation because there is truly no way from the sinful
person to God, neither a way of thought nor a way of experience. It is
promise, because inversely a way from God to humanity is conceivable.38
Beintker however does not address the question of how we recognise this knowledge
as knowledge about God. As we have no natural, prior knowledge about God, how
can we know what knowledge about God is? In response to this, Barth referred to the
unveiling and veiling of God in Jesus Christ and the mystery of revelation. In
essence, Barth argues that God is revealed in the human Jesus, but it is only by God's
grace that we can see God veiled in the human Jesus. In the end, however, he must
leave the problem unsolved, claiming it is a mystery of faith that is, in turn, based on
God's divine election. By means of this election, humans are enabled to see the word
of God in the Bible. How we are to recognise it as the word of God without any
natural knowledge ofGod is never dealt with adequately by Barth.
It is also important to note a further aspect of Barth's theology here. Humans must
act as their nature requires. As created beings, they must act properly as created
beings. The fall from Eden was the human attempt to be more than mere creation;
Adam and Eve sought to "be like God, knowing good and evil." [Genesis 3:5] this
arrogant attempt to usurp God's authority was sin. Jesus Christ, however, was not
only fully human; he was also truly human in the way that we were meant to be.
Barth wrote:
If we listen to what Scripture says concerning humanity, then at the point
when our attention and thoughts are allowed to rest there is revealed an elect
human being, the elect human being, and united in Him and represented by
Him an elect people. But just as truly there is revealed at the same point the
electing God. The elect One is truly human according to God's self-
revelation, and that revelation, being God's, has the decisive word concerning
human beings too. And once again we must put it the other way: If we would
know what election is, what it is to be elected by God, then we must look
away from all others, and excluding all side-glances or secondary thoughts
we must look only upon the name of Jesus Christ and upon the actual
experience and history of the people whose beginning and end are enclosed in
the mystery of His name.39
38
(Beintker 1987), 29. Beintker is quoting (Barth 1922), 186.
39
(Barth 1957), 58-59.
As created beings, Barth argues, humans cannot determine good and evil themselves.
Barth, as we will see below, argued for a divine - command ethics where God
determines good and evil in every concrete situation. As creatures, humans must
either obey or disobey God's command.
There are therefore two important ways in which Barth is realistic: his
doctrine ofGod's reality in Godsself; and his belief that Jesus Christ was truly
human in the way we were meant to be but are incapable of being. We will be
discussing this more below.
Much recent scholarship has, as mentioned above, classified Barth as a
realist. Ingrid Spieckermann, in her 1983 doctoral dissertation40 argued that:
The new question of knowledge of God is fundamentally the turn to
theological objectivity. As in modern-liberal thinking the starting-point of
anthropological subjectivity was inseparable from the subjective basis of
religious experience and, and in the anthropological subjectivity ... so in this
new element of history of theology, Barth's thought, directed at a thorough
overcoming of the starting-point in human subjectivity, found its entry-point
in the theological objectivity ...41
Bruce McCormack's 1995 book, Karl Barth's Critically Realistic Dialectal
Theology: It's Genesis and Development has become one of the most important
books in English Barth scholarship in recent times. McCormack re-interprets Barth
and revises much of previous Barth scholarship, especially the von Balthasar thesis42.
40 Published as (Spieckermann 1985)
41
(Spieckermann 1985), 73.
42 Von Balthasar argued that Barth underwent two conversions: "Just as Augustine underwent two
conversions (the one from crass error to the true God and to Christianity and the other, much later,
from the religious, Neoplatonizing philosophy of his youthful writings to true theology), so too in the
development of Karl Barth there are two decisive turning-points. The first, the turn from liberalism to
Christian radicalism took place during the First World War and found expression in the Romerbrief.
The second is the end-point of his liberation from the shackles of philosophy in order to arrive at a
truly independent theology. This second turning point took place after a nearly ten-year struggle,
sometime around 1930. 'The real document of this farewell ... from the remnants of a philosophical
or anthropological ... grounding and exposition of the Christian doctrine ... is not the widely read
little brochure Nein!, directed against Brunner in 1934, but rather the book on Anselm of Canterbury's
proof for the existence ofGod, which appeared in 1931."' (Balthasar 1976), 101; quoted in:
(McCormack 1995), 1. For von Balthasar and others, the first conversion in Barth was from liberal
theology to dialectical theology and the second from dialectical theology to the analogia fidei.
Recently, several scholars have convincingly argued that there was no second conversion for Barth,
rather a change of emphasis to elements which were already present as early as the second edition of
his commentary on Romans. In 1985. Ingrid Spieckermann argued that there was already in that book
an early form of analogical thinking. In 1988 Michael Beintker argued that in Barth's Romerbrief
there was not only a form of the analogiafidei but also four different dialectics. Bruce McCormack,
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His argument is very complex and this is not the place for a critical review of his
work. We will instead look at Barth's realism and argue, in agreement with
McCormack, that he is best understood as a critically realistic theologian. We will
refer to McCormack's and to other's work in passing.
As mentioned above, Barth considered himself a theologian and does not deal
with philosophy in any extended or consistent form. Thus, the phrase "critically
realistic" applies primarily to his theology43. To say that Barth was a realistic
theologian is not to say that he abandoned all idealism in his work. McCormack
wrote:
The "given" (or what we customarily think of as the "real") is the product of
the knowing activity of the human subject. The word "realism" is meant to
suggest, however, that Barth would always insist that the divine being was
real, whole, and complete in itself apart from the knowing activity of the
human subject; indeed, the reality of God precedes all human knowing. But
the only way to secure this theological realism against idealistic
constructivism was by consistently starting with it, rather than with (for
example) an account of the gap between the ethical ideal and human life. The
result would be a completely new framework for theological thinking. Barth
would seek to ground theological reflection in the objectively real 'self pre¬
supposing divine objectivity' in revelation; i.e. to start from the reality of
God.44
Barth was therefore, and remained, both idealistic and realistic. God, the truly real, is
diastasically related to the world, as Barth recognised as early as 1915: "World
building on both Spieckermann and Beintke's work, argues that Barth's Anselm book has been given
too much importance in Barth studies and that the von Balthasar thesis should be rejected. See
(Spieckermann 1985), esp. Chapter 111. Sections 3-4; (Beintker 1987), esp. Chapter 5; (McCormack
1995), especially the Introduction. For a similar treatment on Barth's development which seeks to
maintain the importance of Barth's Anselm book, see (Ullmann 1988).
43 Which is not to say that philosophy did not play a role in his thinking as Michael Beintker argued.
See his (Beintker 1987), where he wrote: "... Barth planned a comprehensive reflection on the
relationship of theological work and philosophical thought-forms for the Christian Dogmatics. This
can then be found then in the corresponding place in the Church Dogmatics - argued with more
sophistication and enriched by concrete rules for theologians. According to Barth, it is unavoidable to
interpret biblical texts or develop dogmatic reflections without philosophical Tenses.'[(Barth 1927),
404] Everyone does this, even the simple reader of the Bible. 'Everyone has some philosophy, even if
it is the most primitive, popular, aphoristic or eclectic ...' [(Barth 1985), 315]" 238-239. Wolfhart
Schlichting argued that Barth has five rules for using philosophical-epistemological categories: " 1.
One is aware that one is using them; 2. One attributes to them the character of an attempt or
hypothesis; 3. One in no ways uses them as ends in themselves; 4. One's own epistemological schema
has no basic priority to others ... 5. One uses them critically." (Schlichting 1971), 227. See also




remains world, but God is God." The real was not the world known empirically for
Barth. The truly real is the wholly otherness of the self-revealing God in conjunction
with whom the world is mere shadow and appearance. The question is, therefore,
how can we obtain knowledge about God, about true reality in this world ofmere
shadow and appearance. It is in answer to this question that the phrase critically
realistic is most applicable. Critical realism describes a theological epistemology that
witnesses to the mystery of divine action in revelation. The revealed Word of God, or
revelation, has two components: the secular form and the divine content. Both must
be present for revelation: focusing solely on the secular form alone leads to a purely
realistic theology; focusing solely on the divine content alone leads to a purely
idealistic theology and both are, according to Barth, bad theology. The synthesis,
however, is humanly impossible. Only God can bring the synthesis about. God has
done so in the incarnation of Jesus Christ, to which we will turn to more fully below.
It is in this synthesis where, for Barth, realism and idealism come together and is
what McCormack means by "critical realism." It is realistic because in true reality, in
other words, God is revealed. It is critical because the secular form is understood
idealistically and is subject to criticism. Barth wrote:
Idealism guards the object of theology from confusion with all other objects
In that it reminds us of God's non-objectivity and therefore of the inadequacy
of all human thinking and speaking about God. Idealism directs theological
thinking and speaking to the God who, only in God's genuine beyondness, is
really God. Theology requires this antidote and this order. A theology, which
has been purified of idealism, would be nothing other than a pagan
45
monstrosity.
This theology is also critical because it attacks any attempt by human beings to
achieve this synthesis on their own. That would be to mistake the secular form with
the divine content and is what lead to Nazism. This Barth rejected in all of his work





Political realism maintains that people who make political decisions make
those decisions based on personal drives and then use moral discourse to hide their
true reasons and to persuade others to agree with their policy. The forces that lead a
person to act in a certain way may well be hidden even to that person. For a political
realist, the language ofmorality is only relevant as a way to hide their real drives -
such as self-interest and will-to-power - from others and possibly from her- or
himself. Hans J. Morgenthau, a prominent political realist, argued that there are six
main principles of political realism:
1.Political realism believes that politics, like society in general, is governed
by objective laws that have their roots in human nature. In order to improve
society it is first necessary to understand the laws by which society lives. The
operation of these laws being impervious to our preferences, men will
challenge them only at the risk of failure.
Realism, believing as it does in the objectivity of the laws of politics, must
also believe in the possibility of developing a rational theory that reflects,
however imperfectly and one-sidedly, these objective laws. It believes also,
then, in the possibility of distinguishing in politics between truth and opinion-
between what is true objectively and rationally, supported by evidence and
illuminated by reason, and what is only a subjective judgment, divorced from
the facts as they are and informed by prejudice and wishful thinking. ...
2. The main signpost that helps political realism to find its way through the
landscape of international politics is the concept of interest defined in terms
of power. This concept provides the link between reason trying to understand
international politics and the facts to be understood. It sets politics as an
autonomous sphere of action and understanding apart from other spheres,
such as economics (understood in terms of interest defined as wealth), ethics,
aesthetics, or religion. Without such a concept a theory of politics,
international or domestic, would be altogether impossible, for without it we
could not distinguish between political and nonpolitical facts, nor could we
bring at least a measure of systematic order to the political sphere. ...
Statesmen, especially under contemporary conditions, may well make a habit
of presenting their foreign policies in terms of their philosophic and political
sympathies in order to gain popular support for them. Yet they will
distinguish with Lincoln between their "overall duty," which is to think and
act in terms of the national interest, and their "personal wish," which is to see
their own moral values and political principles realized throughout the world.
Political realism does not require, nor does it condone, indifference to
political ideals and moral principles, but it requires indeed a sharp distinction
between the desirable and the possible-between what is desirable everywhere
28
and at all times and what is possible under the concrete circumstances of time
and place. ...
3. Realism assumes that its key concept of interest defined as power is an
objective category which is universally valid, but it does not endow that
concept with a meaning that is fixed once and for all.
A small knowledge of human nature will convince us, that, with far the
greatest part ofmankind, interest is the governing principle; and that almost
every man is more or less, under its influence. Motives of public virtue may
for a time, or in particular instances, actuate men to the observance of a
conduct purely disinterested; but they are not of themselves sufficient to
produce persevering conformity to the refined dictates and obligations of
social duty. Few men are capable ofmaking a continual sacrifice of all views
of private interest, or advantage, to the common good. It is vain to exclaim
against the depravity of human nature on this account; the fact is so, the
experience of every age and nation has proved it and we must in a great
measure, change the constitution ofman, before we can make it otherwise.
No institution, not built on the presumptive truth of these maxims can
succeed.
4. Political realism is aware of the moral significance of political action. It is
also aware of the ineluctable tension between the moral command and the
requirements of successful political action. And it is unwilling to gloss over
and obliterate that tension and thus to obfuscate both the moral and the
political issue by making it appear as though the stark facts of politics were
morally more satisfying than they actually are, and the moral law less
exacting than it actually is.
Realism maintains that universal moral principles cannot be applied to the
actions of states in their abstract universal formulation, but that they must be
filtered through the concrete circumstances of time and place. The individual
may say for himself: "Fiatjustitia, pereat mundus (Let justice be done, even
if the world perish)," but the state has no right to say so in the name of those
who are in its care. Both individual and state must judge political action by
universal moral principles, such as that of liberty. Yet while the individual
has a moral right to sacrifice himself in defense of such a moral principle, the
state has no right to let its moral disapprobation of the infringement of liberty
get in the way of successful political action, itself inspired by the moral
principle of national survival. There can be no political morality without
prudence; that is, without consideration of the political consequences of
seemingly moral action. Realism, then, considers prudence-the weighing of
the consequences of alternative political actions-to be the supreme virtue in
politics. Ethics in the abstract judges action by its conformity with the moral
law; political ethics judges action by its political consequences. ...
5. Political realism refuses to identify the moral aspirations of a particular
nation with the moral laws that govern the universe. As it distinguishes
between truth and opinion, so it distinguishes between truth and idolatry. All
nations are tempted-and few have been able to resist the temptation for long-
to clothe their own particular aspirations and actions in the moral purposes of
the universe. To know that nations are subject to the moral law is one thing,
while to pretend to know with certainty what is good and evil in the relations
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among nations is quite another. There is a world of difference between the
belief that all nations stand under the judgment of God, inscrutable to the
human mind, and the blasphemous conviction that God is always on one's
side and that what one wills oneself cannot fail to be willed by God also. ...
6. The difference, then, between political realism and other schools of
thought is real, and it is profound. However much the theory ofpolitical
realism may have been misunderstood and misinterpreted, there is no
gainsaying its distinctive intellectual and moral attitude to matters political.
Intellectually, the political realist maintains the autonomy of the political
sphere, as the economist, the lawyer, the moralist maintain theirs. ...
The political realist is not unaware of the existence and relevance of
standards of thought other than political ones. As political realist, he cannot
but subordinate these other standards to those of politics. And he parts
company with other schools when they impose standards of thought
appropriate to other spheres upon the political sphere.46
This kind of realism, as defined above, operates with a "hermeneutic of suspicion"
that argues that things are never what they seem, nor are claims to be doing the
"moral" thing to be taken at face value. A politician voting on a decision to increase
or decrease aid to the poor is less influenced by any kind of idealism about the evil of
poverty than she is by her own desire to maintain her power base and increase it if
possible. The moral considerations are irrelevant to her decision. A modern example
of this is Dean Acheson, an advisor to President Kennedy during the Cuban Missile
Crisis, who wrote concerning the crisis that, while the lives of thousands and millions
of people were at stake, "those involved... will remember the irrelevance of the
supposed moral considerations brought out in the discussions... moral talk did not
bear on the problem." 7 Some of the arguments presented to President Kennedy did
have a moral flavour to them, such as Bobby Kennedy's argument that an aerial
bombardment of Cuban bases would be a Pearl Harbour in reverse. This position was
rejected by Acheson as a mere obfuscation and part of an 'emotional or intuitive'
response. As C. A. J. Coady put it:
... if moral considerations were not irrelevant, they were surprisingly lacking
in weight when compared to other factors of a more obviously political or
even personal kind, such as the need for President Kennedy to regain
prestige, demonstrate his courage, and eliminate the prospect of
46
[Morgentha, 1978 #921], 4-15 passim.
47 Acheson, Dean. "Homage to plain dumb luck" in (Divine 1971), 13.
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impeachment, as well as the necessity to avoid Democratic Party defeats in
upcoming Congressional elections.
The belief that moral arguments are irrelevant to political decision-makers leads to
the further argument that 'moral norms do not apply to the conduct of States.'49
Kenneth Waltz put this succinctly:
Each state pursues its own interests, however defined, in ways it judges best.
Force is a means of achieving the external ends of states because there exists
no consistent, reliable process of reconciling the conflicts of interest that
inevitably arise among similar units in a condition of anarchy. A foreign
policy based on this image is neither moral nor immoral, but embodies
merely a reasoned response to the world about us .. .50
This is very close to the Christian Realist position as argued by Reinhold Niebuhr's
in Moral Man and Immoral Society.
The selfishness of human communities must be regarded as an inevitability.
Where it is inordinate it can be checked only by competing assertions of
interest...51
The objection that, since individuals have moral limits to what they are permitted to
do, and the State is merely a collection of individuals; the State therefore must be
subject to moral limits, is met in one of three ways by political realists. Some argue a
version of moral nihilism - there are no moral limits on States because there are no
moral limits at all. Alternatively, others argue that, as a result of the anarchy that
rules in the relation of States to States, moral requirements must be suspended.
Finally, others argue that there is a peculiar alchemy in the formation of States that
makes the State more than a mere collection of individuals and therefore allows it to
transcend the moral requirements placed on individuals. Christian Realism goes a
somewhat different route, arguing that morals do play a role in political relations, but











Barth's understanding of the role of the State concerning politics comes quite
close to political realism. Barmen V states:
Scripture tells us that by divine appointment the state, in this still unredeemed
world in which also the church is situated, has the task ofmaintaining justice
and peace so far as human discernment and human ability make this possible,
by means of the threat and use of force. The church acknowledges with
gratitude and reverence toward God the benefit of this, God's appointment."^2
He later wrote:
... it [the State] has no message to deliver; it is dependent on a message being
delivered to it. It is not in a position to appeal to the authority and grace of
God; it is dependent on this happening elsewhere. It does not pray; it depends
on others praying for it. It is blind to the whence ? and whither ? of human
existence, its task is rather to provide for the external and provisional
delimitation and protection of human life; it depends on the existence of
seeing eyes elsewhere. It cannot call the human hubris into question
fundamentally, and it knows no final defense against the chaos which
threatens it from that quarter; in this respect it too depends on ultimate words
and insights existing elsewhere.53
Thus, the State exists to maintain "justice and peace... by the use of force" and has
no moral function in the world. It exists to protect human life by threat. Moral
argument is nor a function of the State. It is important to note that Barth does not
speak to politics as a mere citizen, nor as a political activist. He writes as a
theologian and only from that perspective. He wrote, for example, "The civil
community as such is spiritually blind and ignorant. It has neither faith nor hope."54
It is however, an instrument of divine grace, albeit in ignorance of that and
sometimes it spite of the best efforts of the leaders within the State. The church's
task with regard to the State is to pray for it and remind it of its boundaries.
52







Moral realism operates under the premise that moral questions have correct
answers that are correct because of objective moral facts. These moral facts are
determined by circumstances and can be discovered by using moral reasoning. The
truth of a moral statement is dependent on a state of affairs independent of the ideas
that a person may or may not have concerning that moral statement. In other words, a
moral statement may be true even if no one believes it to be so. The Oxford
Companion to Philosophy defines moral realism as:
The view that moral beliefs and judgments can be true or false, that there
exist moral properties to which moral agents are attentive or inattentive,
sensitive or insensitive, that moral values are discovered, not willed into
existence nor constituted by emotional reactions. Far from being a function of
wishes, wants, and desires, moral demands furnish reasons for acting, reasons
that take precedence over any other reasons.55
This is very close to ethical naturalism which the Oxford Companion defines as:
The views that (i) ethical terms are definable in non-ethical, natural terms, (ii)
ethical conclusions are derivable from non-ethical premises, (iii) ethical
properties are natural properties. A 'natural' term or property is one that can
be employed or referred to in natural scientific explanations.56
There are two variations of this type ofmoral reasoning which differ on how they
determine the truth of a moral statement: reductive naturalism argues that moral
predicates mean nothing other than certain non-natural or metaphysical properties
that exist apart from the natural, empirical properties of a statement. Alternatively,
one may determine truth by means of an ethical naturalism, which argues that moral
properties are supervenient on natural properties. Robin Lovin uses the example of
poverty, a reductive naturalist would argue that poverty is evil because of the
metaphysical properties of poverty; an ethical naturalist would argue that poverty is






It is therefore right to act against situations of poverty and wrong to create or
perpetuate them, not because we intuit some non-natural property of Tightness
or wrongness in those acts, but because the conditions of poverty have the
natural properties that they have.57
Christian Realism tends to use an ethical naturalist moral realism and would argue
that poverty has a negative effect on human beings; one must work towards its
elimination. Reinhold Niebuhr wrote:
Every truly moral act seeks to establish what ought to be, because the agent
feels obligated to the ideal, though historically unrealized, as being the order
of life in its more essential reality. Thus the Christian believes that the ideal
of love is real in the will and nature ofGod, even though he knows of no
place in history where the ideal has been realized in its pure form. And it is
because it has this reality that he feels the pull of obligation. ... The "pull" or
"drive" of moral life is a part of the religious tension of life. Man seeks to
realize in history what he conceives to be already the truest reality - that is,
58its final essence."
Thus the "true reality" is the pull toward moral action and is not merely a natural
property of a given situation. This is not to argue, however, that voluntary poverty,
such as the vow members Roman Catholic orders vow take, ought to be forbidden.
As poverty is rejected because of the effects it has on human well being, if a certain
type of poverty has different effects, it need not be rejected. Therefore, a vow of
poverty taken with the goal of some sort of spiritual self-realisation is essentially
different from inner city poverty as the causes for and effects of the poverty are
different. The fact that circumstance plays such a crucial role in moral realism is an
important issue for social ethics.
Ethical Naturalism, however, can be broken down still further based on the
natural properties and experiences that are considered significant for moral
assessment. One finds within this type ofmoral realism utilitarian (focusing on
human happiness and the natural properties that bring about this result for the
greatest number of people), eudaimonistic (natural circumstances that maximise the






(focusing on the developments that allow constructive responses to social problems)
and natural law forms (which stress human functioning in accordance with an order
that can be discerned in nature and progress toward states of affairs that mark the full
development of that nature).
Christian Realism shares with the natural law tradition the belief that right
action is action that conforms to human nature. A moral person acts in ways that
develop the capacities that humans have by nature. Reinhold Niebuhr, in his Nature
and Destiny ofMan, wrote:
Man is a sinner. His sin is defined as rebellion against God. ... Sin is
occasioned precisely by the fact that man refuses to admit his "creatureliness"
and to acknowledge himself as merely a member of a total unity of life. He
pretends to be more than he is.59
One must be realistic about the nature of human beings: human beings are limited yet
capable of self-transcendence. Again from the Nature and Destiny ofMan:
To the essential nature ofman belong, on the one hand, all his natural
endowments, and determinations, his physical and social impulses, his sexual
and racial differentiations, in short his character as a creature imbedded in the
natural order. On the other hand, his essential nature also includes the
freedom of his spirit, his transcendence over natural process and finally his
self-transcendence.60
The moral person does not settle for less than the human possibilities allow but, at
the same time, this person must avoid expectations that exceed a realistic estimate of
those possibilities. According to Lovin, the key point is that: "moral and political
systems are to be formulated in relation to that realistic assessment of human nature,
not imposed on it from some other source." 1
Barth is somewhat ambiguous concerning moral realism. On the one hand, he
is a divine-command moralist. Good is that which God commands us in a given
situation. As God is free, a person in a given situation may not be commanded to do








to the realistic belief that any moral claim must be based on a realistic knowledge of
human capabilities and is opposed to any kind of a metaethical system based solely
on God. However, Barth also argues that it is an essential aspect of human nature that
it is created. To obey God's command is what it is to be human. For Barth, the
original sin was the attempt by humans to determine what good and evil is. As early
as the first edition of his commentary on Romans, Barth wrote:
There is only one sin: the desire of human beings to be independent vis-a-vis
God. Out of immediacy of being with God, the man fell ... It was too little
for him to simply be God's. He became interesting to himself. He transmitted
properties and functions ofGod to himself. He wanted to be like God: a being
unto himself, resting in himself and important for his own sake. ... He
became a knower, a superior being. He placed himself next to life, examining
it and observing it. He began to analyse it. He received evil, sharp,
penetrating, and yet blind eyes. A view of himself, "knowledge of
humankind," experience," "psychology," historical" thinking - all of that is
ftl
only possible outside of God.
In fact, he says that when the serpent tempted Adam and Eve in the garden to taste
the fruit of the tree of knowledge about good and evil, it was the temptation to "do"
ethics! Human nature is created nature and, therefore, limited nature. Any attempt
by human beings to determine good and evil is to overstep the boundary of their real
nature. Thus, to obey God's command is to be true to our nature as God's creation
and can be brought into accord with a theologically realistic anthropology.
Theological Realism
Theological realism claims that, in a similar way to moral realism's
understanding of a statement's validity, theological statements are also true or false
on the basis of a reality external to the person or persons making the statement. God
exists and has certain, for lack of a better word, "properties" against which our
beliefs about God must be measured and which determine whether our beliefs about
God are true or false. God exists in Godsself and, therefore, any beliefwe have




concerning God must be judged by who God is. It is to this that Reinhold Niebuhr is
referring to above - the statement that God is love is true because of its relation to a
reality external to our thought process. God exists. And, because God is real and is
understood as creator of all that is, the unity of purpose that people seek is only to be
found in God. As God is real and external to our thoughts about God, no person can
claim to know God in a complete way. This claim guards against one of the inherent
dangers of realism, which is that it implies a "God's eye" view of reality, as
mentioned above. If there is one real reality against which our beliefs are to be
judged, then there can only be one true account of this reality that presents things
exactly as they are and not as they are related to any particular observer's point of
view. This danger is especially apparent in moral realism, because if there is only
one moral reality, then there is a moral claim to impose that morality on all,
including those who hold other interests and opinions. Theological realism argues
that only God has a God's eye view, we do not. Because we lack this "God's eye"
point of view, we can only speak of theological truths in terms of myth. Since
Christianity can only speak of theology in terms of image and symbol, it is always
incomplete and partial. As it is symbol, however, it can encompass a reality larger
than our experience and we can use its symbols to order our experience. H. Richard
Niebuhr wrote:
What is the general idea in such interpretation of ourselves as symbolic more
than as rational animals? It is, I believe, this: that we are far more image-
making and image-using creatures than we usually think ourselves to be and,
further, that our processes of perception and conception, of organizing and
understanding the signs that come to us in our dialogue with the
circumambient world, are guided and formed by images in our minds... At all
events we reflect on our existence as Christians with this hypothesis in mind
we become aware that in Christian life Jesus Christ is a symbolic form with
the aid of which men tell each other what life and death, God and man, are
like; but even more he is a form which they employ as an a priori, an image, a
scheme or pattern in the mind which gives form and meaning to their
experience.64
Symbols include the coherent facts about the world, but also allows for unknown
truths and incoherent elements of our world. It is not coherent as a literal
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representation of the known facts, but deals with aspects of the world in which
ignorance, uncertainty, and conflict render the facts themselves incoherent. By
pointing to the possibility of a resolution beyond the present conflicts, the symbol or
image represents a world that is more coherent than the world of facts, though the
symbol cannot be maintained as a statement of what those facts are. This means that,
while acknowledging that theological statements are true or false based on an
external reality, theological realists must acknowledge that many of their statements
will be found to be false. As Lovin states:
Someone who understands theological language in this way is more
concerned with the cognitivist claim of theological realism that theological
propositions can be true than with the truth value of specific traditional
theological formations.65
Truth is therefore understood pragmatically, not as dogmatic orthodoxy, nor fidelity
to scripture, but coherence with all available sources of insight. The theological
realist prefers therefore also to speak of "justified beliefs" rather than "universal
truths."
In order for our world to have meaning, it must be coherent. There must be a
way in which our experiences are interrelated to each other and to the experiences of
others. The liberalism of the 19th century believed that this coherence could be found
in rationality; however, World War I shattered that belief. What could then provide
coherence and meaning in the world? For theological realists, it was to be found in
God and the symbolic understanding of God described above. God is, in the words of
H. Richard Niebuhr, the "center of value." The unity of all things is thus to be found
not in any human quality or ideal or goal, but in God. This unity must therefore be
understood to be eschatological; it can only be brought about by God. We, as image-
users strive to have a unity of action based on seeking the universal in all of our
apparently disconnected experiences. This, for H. Richard Niebuhr and Christian
Realism, provides for a place for apologetics in theology; Barth, on the other hand,
rejected all forms of apologetics. For Niebuhr, the symbols we use must be able to




.. .are unable to make sense out of our history and fate. Though they be
applicable within narrow limits when they are subordinate to grander
hypothesis, they leave great areas of life unexplained and when they are the
ultimate images of the heart they lead to confusion and disaster.66
The method we use to interpret reality must therefore be able to interpret all of our
experience. Thus the symbols we use to interpret reality are used, modified or
rejected on the basis of how well they allow us to interpret our experience. This
allows for an apologetic theology based on a pragmatic evaluation of our symbols.
This harmony or unity that is sought for human experience is to a certain extent what
is also sought by theories ofjustice, which seek to resolve conflicts without creating
further struggles.67 George Sabine argues that in Plato's Republic.
The theory of the state in the Republic culminates in the concept ofjustice.
Justice is the bond which holds a society together, a harmonious union of
individuals each of whom has found his [or her] life work. ... It is both a
public and private virtue because the highest good both of the state of its
members is thereby preserved.68
The basis for this claim to justice is found in Plato in the gods.69 Theological realism,
agrees that the importance ofjustice for relationships on an individual and group
level is to be found in God. It argues God is love and love requires justice. This claim
is made on the basis ofwho God is. Our knowledge ofGod and God's activity is
based on images concerning God's person in the Bible and in history. From this, we
learn that God's action toward us is based on love, and that this love requires justice.
However, "to speak theologically of 'the will and nature of God' as a reality in which
the conflicting impulses and purposes that rend individual lives and human
communities are unified, or as a law according to which all persons could live in
harmony is not, however, to claim that we can give a complete account of that reality
or that we know everything that the law requires."70 In other words, this theological
realism provides an explanation of how moral language is meaningful and not a set
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of moral claims that are true. To say that love is the law of life and that love requires
justice is to provide a "regulative principle" as a means to judge between our
proximate morality and provides limits to what "moral" truly is. This ethic is most
clearly seen in the teachings of Jesus and in his sacrificial death.
For theological realism, that commitment to pursue justice is based on the
belief that God is love and love requires justice. This statement does not provide a
formula for achieving the resolution of all conflicts; it does, however, claim that
justice and love have a reality beyond our beliefs about what justice and love require.
Reinhold Niebuhr wrote:
Statements about God are not simply expressions of emotion or acts of
personal commitment. Theological claims have cognitive content. They may
be true or false. True statements about God are true because they accurately
represent a reality independent of the concepts, theories, and evidence we
have pertaining to that reality.71
Moral requirements have a true reality in God. This belief thus links theological
realism to moral realism.
Barth has a great deal in common with theological realism. He also argued
that God is a real person, complete in Godsself without reference to humanity. He
wrote:
When Holy Scripture speaks of God, it does not permit us to let our attention
or thoughts wander at random until at this or that level they set up a being
which is furnished with utter sovereignty and all other perfections, and which
as such is the Lord, the Law-giver, the Judge and Saviour ofman and men.
When Holy Scripture speaks of God it concentrates our attention and
thoughts upon one single point and what is to be known at this point. And
what is to be known there is quite simple. It is the God who in the first person
singular addressed the patriarchs and Moses, the prophets and later the
apostles. It is the God who in this "I" is and has and reveals sovereignty and
all other perfections. It is the God who wills to be known and worshipped and
72reverenced as such..."
The miracle of revelation for Barth is that God is truly revealed in Jesus Christ yet






mystery ofwhat Barth calls the "veiling and unveiling" of God in Jesus Christ. God
remains real in God's self and nature, and remains independent of our perception of
God, yet makes it possible for us to know who God truly and really is.
Barth clearly and explicitly rejects any claim that God's moral command to
us is a "love your neighbour" ethic or any other general rule of action. God is real,
and God's moral claim on us is also real. Yet, it is only real to us in our concrete
situation. God does not speak in universal moral claims. However, Barth does argue
that there is a boundary to what God commands us in any situation. Although he
does not call it a regulative principle, it functions in a similar way. In the Church
Dogmatics, he argues that both the Ten Commandments and the Sermon on the
Mount provide boundaries within which the command ofGod comes to us.
Concerning the Ten Commandments, Barth wrote:
... [I]n the strict sense the Ten Commandments do not contain any direct
command, but only prohibitions or rather delimitations. The holiness of God,
and the holiness of human beings conditioned by it means delimitation,
separation, setting apart, as befits the divine election and the position of the
elect defined by it. In this context even the command with regard to the
Sabbath day, as also that concerning the respect due to parents, has the
following meaning. A definite sphere is marked out, but not positively and
inwardly. No account is given of what must happen within this sphere.
Directions to this effect obviously belong to quite a different plane and
cannot be discussed in connection with the Ten Commandments and the
related legislation. We are simply told what must not in any circumstances
take place in this sphere, what can do so only in definite conflict with the
divine will and as an absolutely reprehensible action on the part ofman.
Although not as prescriptive as theological realism's regulative principle, this
understanding of the Ten Commandments as "boundary" or as "marking out a
specific sphere" functions in a comparable fashion. Similarly to the regulative
principles allowed for by theological realism, it does not provide direct commands
about how we are to act in specific situation; it regulates what are acceptable possible
moral commands; and, perhaps most tellingly, it allows for God to remain God and
humans to be true to their nature as creatures. As does Christian Realism, it serves to




however, fails to develop this point in a consistent way, which makes his ethics in
some cases appear to be divine arbitrariness. This has lead Barth to be misunderstood
by many of his critics. We will discuss this in much greater detail below.
A further difference between Barth and Christian realism lies in the use of
symbols and images to interpret reality. Barth rejects any hint of natural theology,
that there is a general source for knowledge about God in the world. The only source,
according to Barth, for knowledge about God is God's revelation in Jesus Christ.
This led him to argue for a divine - command ethics, as a way of avoiding any hint
of a general, natural revelation. However, in discussing how one hears the command
ofGod, he does suggest that the will of God is apparent in the events of history:
The will and governance of God are not obvious in current events in
themselves, but hidden. We can now see them "in a mirror dimly" (I.
Corinthians 13:12). It is this very Scripture that reminds us that God's will
and governance are not simply invisible. It says, "we see." And indeed: we do
see current events, the tremendous work and suffering of people in their
decisions, undertakings and actions. And so, we also see with open eyes the
will and governance of God which is carried out in them. But we see so much
in addition that we can not see this if our eyes, before which so much of
God's will and governance is shown, are not especially opened to see them.
So it is with God's will and governance in current events. One could compare
them to large handwriting with individual, powerful letters. We see these
letters. They are clearly before us, written in the material of human deeds and
experiences, which the radio and newspaper daily and even hourly lay out
before us. But we need to know that all of those are not merely some
wonderful forms, but indeed are letters. And we must know the alphabet and
the language to which these letters belong. We need to read these letters and
we need to be able to put them together into the written word. Then we would
be able to recognize the will and governance ofGod, although they are
hidden. That is the most important question: can we read?74
This is much weaker than Niebuhr and Christian Realism's use of symbol but it does
imply a similar understanding of God's activity. Barth, however, failed to develop
this in a consistent way, which has led to his being charged with leaving ethical
decision making to a kind of intuition.75
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Christian Realism
Now we must turn to how these three types of realism - political, moral and
theological - interrelate in Christian realism. As mentioned above, moral realism and
theological realism are interrelated by the theory ofmoral regulative principles, such
as that the law of life is love and that love requires justice. These principles are
morally real because they have their reality in God. In order to make any kind of
moral claim, in order for life to have meaning, one must believe in the final unity of
reality. However, Christian Realism is not overly optimistic about this, as it learns
from political and moral realism. Political realism is inherently suspicious of the
motives of all people, and argues that ideals and discussion ofmorals is not only
irrelevant to moral decision making, but also are used to hide base motives of self-
interest and acquiring more power. Life involves a conflict of claims against claims -
claims made by individuals as well as States and other groups. In order to enforce
these claims, we seek power and influence. Political Realism in itself falls into the
trap of ignoring religion in public discourse and seeing all natural events in terms of
material causes. It is politically cynical, and sees all human aspirations in terms of
conflicting interest
This pessimism is however tamed by the belief in the final unity. There will
be a final unity, and we can approximate this unity in history in Reinhold Niebuhr's
words. H. Richard put in somewhat differently when he wrote:
Man's task is not that of building Utopias but that eliminating weeds and
tilling the soil so that the kingdom of God can grow. His method is not one of
striving for perfection or of acting perfectly, but of clearing the road by
repentance and forgiveness. That this approach is valid for societies as well as
for individuals... is what I am concerned to emphasize.76
This call for social action and hopefulness about human potential is an important
difference from Barth's point of view. Barth is much more pessimistic about the
possibilities of politics and human potential. Although he later became somewhat




1920's and 30's. In the second edition of his commentary on Romans, concerning
Romans 13:1 Barth wrote:
Let every person be in subjection to the existing ruling powers. Though
subjection may assume from time to time many various concrete forms, as an
ethical conception it is here purely negative. It means to withdraw and make
way; it means to have no resentment, and not to overthrow. Why, then, does
not the rebel turn back and become no more a rebel? Simply because the
conflict in which he is immersed cannot be represented as a conflict between
him and the existing rulingpowers', it is, rather a conflict of evil with evil.77
Moral realism tries to understand persons as they are, both good and evil. It takes
from theological realism and experience the belief that all people are sinful. It also
takes from experience that humans are capable of doing relatively good things. There
is thus a tension between what we are capable of accomplishing and what we cannot
accomplish. As human beings, we are capable of self-transcendence, imagining and
working toward a better, more moral society. At the same time, we are sinful. Any
moral society we bring into being is a proximate moral society. Christians are thus,
according to Christian Realism, called to work for better approximations ofjustice;
we are also forced to recognise the sinfulness and limits of humanity.
Christian Realism takes from pragmatism the belief that truth can best be
discovered by looking for coherence in as many relevant sources as possible. Robin
Lovin explained:
For theological realism, the criterion of truth would be neither dogmatic
orthodoxy nor fidelity to scripture, but coherence with *all* available sources
of insight.78
This is one of the essential differences between Barth and Christian Realism: for
Barth, there is no external source for theological knowledge. Knowledge ofGod is
only possible in God's revelation in Jesus Christ as attested to in the Scriptures; we
have access to his knowledge only when the Holy Spirit enables us to see it. For






Germany and to the declaration of Barmen. Concerning Barmen I and the context in
which it was written, Barth stated:
We will conclude with a short historical commentary on the first article of the
Theological Declaration of the Synod of Barmen on May 31st, 1934. the text
is as follows:
Jesus Christ, as he is attested to us in the Holy Scripture, is the one Word of
God, whom we have to hear, and whom we have to trust and obey in life and
in death.
We condemn the false doctrine that the Church can and must recognize as
God's revelation other events and powers, forms and truths, apart from and
alongside this one Word of God. ...
For when in Barmen Jesus Christ as attested to us in Holy Scripture was
designated as the one Word ofGod whom we have to trust and to obey in life
and death; when the doctrine of a source of Christian proclamation different
from this one Word ofGod was repudiated as false doctrine; and when, in the
concluding article of the whole Declaration, the acknowledgement of this
truth and the repudiation of this error were declared to be the indispensable
theological foundation of the German Evangelical Church [the Confessing
Church] ... if it was taken seriously, contained in itself a purifying of the
Church not only from the concretely new point at issue, but from all natural
theology.79
Because of the pragmatic understanding of coherence, Christian Realists must use as
many sources as possible - including sociology, anthropology and history. Not all
Christian Realists, to be sure, would agree with Walter Horton when he wrote:
Divine revelation is to the race what education is to the individual; and the
Old and New Testaments mark but two stages, already superseded in God's
orv
never-ending revelation of new truth.
H. Richard Niebuhr was a little less radical when he wrote:
... the effect of Jesus on men is greater than that of his teaching. He is, it is
said, a life and not a purveyor ofmore or less original ideas about life;
Christian life consists in becoming a person through association with him
rather than in the acceptance of creeds and laws. The evident truth in this
conception lies in its retention of the fundamental personal note in faith. It
manages, moreover, keep in view the historical character of the church and
the Christian. But despite its pragmatic values a definition of revelation in
terms of the person of Jesus is manifestly inadequate. The problems which it
79




raises are insuperable. How can we have personal communion with one who
exists only in our memory and in monuments, the books and sentences, which
are the body of our memory? How can the letter and the document become a
carrier of personal life unless they are part of the expressive body of a now-
living spirit. ...
When we say revelation we point to something in the historical event more
fundamental and more certain than Jesus or the self. Revelation means God.
God who discloses himself to us through our history as our knower, our
O 1
author, our judge and our only savior.
The first question for this kind of ethics is therefore how is God disclosing Godsself
to us in what is happening. In order to understand that, one must look at a variety of
sources both within and without the Church. This understanding allows Christian
realist understandings to be relevant to all concerned persons, in a way that Barth's
theology cannot be. During the Cold War, this would lead to Reinhold Niebuhr
accusing Barth of being an amateur dabbling in politics. For Barth there is only one
source of knowledge that theology needs: God's revelation in Jesus Christ as attested
to us in the Bible. Barth's rejection of natural theology is well known and provides
one of the important differences between his theology and ethics and that of the
Christian Realists. We will return to this below.
For Barth's divine-command ethics, the first task of Christian ethics is
... to show... what it means for us that we are commanded [by God] or,
turned around, what it means for our understanding of an issue that we are
commanded, that the command has come into our human life.82
This understanding of ethics is radically different from the Christian Realists.
However, in spite of the differences between Barth's theology and that of the
Christian Realists, there are significant areas where they do agree with each other.
Neo-orthodoxy and Christian realism both were responses to a crisis of belief in the
world in and in theology. In responding to this crisis, both sought to realistically
understand the world, in particular human sinfulness in the world while they
remained faithful to God who is active in the world. These points account for much
of the similarity between the two movements. At the same time, Christian realism
and neo-orthodoxy arose in different milieus with different Weltanschauungen.
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Nonetheless, the similarities are telling, most noticeably the conviction that theology
and ethics must be both realistic and idealistic - it must take the world and the
possibilities and limitations of human action seriously. It must also maintain the
belief that God is active in the world; that God's will will be done in the world.
Christian theology must remain both realistic and hopeful. This tension must be
maintained in theological-ethical discussions, including any discussion of the ethics
ofwar. The purpose of this work is to discuss war and military conflict in a way that
is true to the situation in which such activity takes place and is true to the belief that
God is active in human history. The goal is therefore to espouse a hopeful realist
ethic of conflict.
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Chapter II: Karl Barth
Introduction
Karl Barth is certainly one of the, if not the most influential theologian of the
twentieth century. Although Swiss, he became known in Germany with the
publication of the second edition of his famous commentary on Romans.83 On the
strength of the first edition of this work, he was named a professor at Gottingen in
Germany. He remained a professor in Germany at several different universities, until
he was forced from his chair in 1935 for his refusal to take an oath of loyalty to
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Adolf Hitler. From that time until his retirement in 1962, he taught in Switzerland
at the University of Basel.
Barth's ethics have often been neglected, although his theology remains
hugely influential. In recent years there has been a reappraisal of his ethical thought83
which has reevaluated some interesting aspects of his ethical work. We will be
referring to some of these throughout this chapter.
Barth's Theology in Context
Barth's opposition to the National Socialists is well known. The basis for this
opposition is clearly attested in Barmen I8 , as quoted above. Hitler and the National
Socialists wanted to be a "second revelation" of God's will for the world and Hitler a
political messiah.87 Thus, in 1934 Georg Weippert wrote in a book titled Das Reich
als Deutscher Auftrag (The Reich as German Mission) that "The Reich is not simply
the form of order of the German people; rather the Reich is Germany's mission in the
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world." . Karl Dietrich Bracher discussed the tendency in Germany to see Hitler as a
messiah in his book, The German Dictatorship. He wrote:
Nevertheless, leader worship found a growing response in a democratic, free
society, and it proved to be the most effective part of a propaganda which
promises not only victory and greatness but also salvation and security. Long
before 1933, a wealth of grotesque practises and religious fervour testified to
the quasi-religious impact of the Leader propaganda, as, for example,
obituaries in which the name ofHitler was invoked in the place of the name
of the Lord...
Hitler appeared as the exponent of a new sense of life, fulfilling the need for
devotion, service, and subordination, as the one who alone could meet this
need and transform it into liberating political deed. He was the incarnation of
the 'national community'; thanks to his intuition and his leadership talent, he
was 'invariably right'; he was the indisputable interpreter of the interests of
the 'people's community' whose emanation he claimed to be. Thus he was
not bound by any rule of law, not even vis-a-vis his own followers. This
sense ofmission was greater still than the monarchic sense of legitimacy;
even to a Hohenzollern prince like August Wilhelm, Hitler appeared as the
'leader sent by God'.89
Against that, Barth felt no compromise was possible. There can only be one
revelation of God and one messiah.
Barth not only rejected National Socialism, he also felt that, once the war
against the Nazis finally broke out, that it was commanded by God. In 1941, in a
letter to Great Britain, Karl Barth wrote:
[W]e Christians in all lands find ourselves, as far as this war is concerned, in
a situation strikingly different from anything that we experienced twenty-five
years ago: that is to say, different in so far as we do not just accept this war as
a necessary evil, but that we approve it as a righteous war, which God does
not simply allow but which God commands us to wage. 90
A little later in the same letter he wrote:
As soon as some people in responsible positions began to realize that, as far
as Adolf Hitler was concerned, what we have to do is simply and solely to
defend the Right as such against the Wrong - a matter which did not admit of
discussion but demanded the taking up of arms - as soon as they realized this,
war broke out.
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Since this is so, we Christians cannot say "No" nor "Yes andNo" to this war;
we can only say "Yes". We must postpone our objection to war as such to
some future date, when it may once have some reality. We must not evade
our responsibility for seeing that this war is waged, and waged ardently.91
This, in essence, shows Barth's understanding of the Second World War. Nazism is
rejected in principle because it attempts to set itself up as a second or further
revelation ofGod's will for the world. Negotiations were attempted with Nazi
Germany and failed because Hitler simply ignored all treaties when they no longer
suited his plans. Therefore, war became the sole remaining option for those countries
that opposed Nazism and bore some responsibility for Hitler's rise to power (through
the events at the end ofWorld War I). Barth therefore accepted the war as being just
and supported the Allies against the Axis. The reason for this is that God commanded
it in the concrete situation of the time.
At the same time, that he supported the Allied war effort, he also argued that
Switzerland should remain neutral. Barth wrote in December 1939 to Pastor
Westphal, a French pastor:
You will not, dear friends, misinterpret the fact that we Swiss form at present
an island of "neutrality" from a military point of view. At the moment there is
no other possibility. The causes of the present war lie in the international
decisions of 1919 in which our country did not take part. And since that date
(as before) high politics in Europe have developed without our co-operation.
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For Barth. the command of God to go to war is always a Grenzfall, a command of
God that reaches us at the border of the area within which God commands us. In the
English translation of Barth's Ethik this term is translated as "boundary case" and in
the Church Dogmatics, it is translated as "exceptional case." Translating Grenzfall as
"boundary case" is somewhat closer to the German - Barth means that this command
of God only occurs at the boundary of the area within which God commands us and
human activity takes place. This "sphere" or "area" is not itself a positive command
nor a principle, it is rather the boundary ofwhere God will command us. It does not
tell us what we are to do, it rather tells us what we are not under any circumstances






93in the Church Dogmatics, cited above. It is thus on the boundary of this sphere that
God's command to go to war reaches us. In order to better understand what Barth
means by this, we first need to look at his understanding ofChristian ethics in
general.
Barth and Religion
Barth gave two series of lectures in the nineteen-twenties on Christian
dogmatics. The Gottingen Dogmatics were started in Gottingen in 1924 and
completed in Munster in 1925 and another series started in Mtinster in 1926. The
Gottingen Dogmatics have been recently translated into English,94 although the
second series has not yet been translated into English.
In both series of lectures, Barth discussed Schleiermacher extensively when
discussing religion. He gives the reason for this in the Gottingen Dogmatics:
I thus refrain from giving my own positive account of the concept of religion
and stick with what Schleiermacher understood by it at the climax of the
modern development, for without going into details we may assume that the
modern concept of religion derives from Schleiermacher...95
Both deal with religion as the basis for the possibility of subjective revelation. In
both, Barth discusses Schleiermacher when discussing whether religion can provide a
basis for the subjective possibility of revelation and both are very close to each other.
In Barth's Die christliche Dogmatik im Entwurf the section concerning
Schleiermacher is entitled: "The big mistake (Schleiermacher)," located within the
chapter "The Revelation ofGod," paragraph 18 "Grace and Religion."96 Since they
are relatively close to each other in content, we will discuss both together.
For Barth, religion was a human endeavour - possibly the best human
endeavour only aUempled by the noblest people - the "heroes," as it were, but still, it
is a human act. Religion is therefore anthropocentric — it is an act of human
93 See note 72.
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consciousness dealing with some aspect of human personality or experience.
"Religion" in this form dominated nineteenth century theology and ethics, and it was
against this that Barth was working. For Barth, as for others, Schleiermacher was the
personification of nineteenth century theology and this understanding of religion.
Therefore, we will look at Barth's understanding of Schleiermacher and nineteenth
century theology in order to see how Barth's theology was theocentric in opposition
to Schleiermacher's anthropocentrism. The background for the problem of human
knowledge ofGod is Kant's understanding of the nature of theoretical knowledge.
In his 1922 lecture "The Word of God and the Task of the Ministry," Barth traced his
theological lineage back through Kierkegaard, Luther and Calvin to Paul and
Jeremiah - in opposition to Schleiermacher:
With all due respect to the genius shown in his work, I can not consider
Schleiermacher a good teacher in the realm of theology because, so far as I
can see, he is disastrously dim-sighted in regard to the fact that a person as
person is not only in need but beyond all hope of saving her- or himself; that
the whole of so-called religion, and not least the Christian religion, shares in
this need; and that one can not speak ofGod simply by speaking of humanity
in a loud voice... The very names Kierkegaard, Luther, Calvin, Paul and
Jeremiah suggest what Schleiermacher never possessed, a clear and direct
apprehension of the truth that the person is made to serve God and not God to
serve the person. The negation and loneliness of the life of Jeremiah in
contrast to that of the kings, princes, people, priests, and prophets of Judah -
the keen and unremitting opposition of Paul to religion as it was exemplified
in Judaism - Luther's break, not with the impiety, but with the piety of the
Middle Ages - Kierkegaard's attack on Christianity - all are characteristic of
a certain way of speaking of God which Schleiermacher never arrived at.97
Barth felt that the universe, and our very existence, is best characterised as a
question, the very question of being. The answer is an absolutely new event - and
here we can see Barth's dialectic at work - in which
.. .the impossible becomes of itselfpossible, death becomes life, eternity time,
and God becomes human. There is no way which leads to this event; there is
no human faculty for apprehending it; for the way and the faculty are
themselves new, being the revelation and faith, the knowing and being known
98 ^






In paragraph 17 section 2, which immediately precedes his discussion of
Schleiermacher in Die christliche Dogmatik, Barth discusses the criteria that make
subjective revelation possible." He gives four requirements:
1. Humans must remain what they are — "poor, wretched and naked"100 and
wholly dependent on God. We must be true to what we are not on the basis of
some philosophy, but because that is what we are before God. It cannot be
that it becomes possible for us to be ".. .the happy subject of that experience
of receiving revelation"101 because of some experience or act on our side. We
only have access to revelation because of the activity of the Holy Spirit.
2. At the same time, God must remain God - "God Godsself, Spirit, not just any
1 09
spirit, but the Holy Spirit, the Creator Spirit." God cannot be some power
present in life or in the grace of existence. That possibility is excluded
because it would require that there be continuity between God and humans -
which would then, according to Barth, be the negation of any need for
revelation. "It must remain absolutely clear that this person - wholly
separated from God, strange to God, turned totally away from God, only
through God can come to God." 103 This God is a wholly other - an ".. .Other
that always must remain other."104 The encounter between God and humans
must be an encounter "... in which God remains not only quantitatively but
also qualitatively wholly superior."105
3. In this encounter, humans must act in belief and obedience - it cannot merely
be something that happens to us, like a thunderstorm or an earthquake.
This encounter must mean question and answer, speaking and hearing,
giving and taking between the person and God; the person must be an
actor in this relationship, and not simply a growing branch on the















divine ocean or a stone in the divine avalanche or even a wheel driven
by the divine motor.106
The human encounter with God is a
.. .demand on the activity of our life." "Fellowship between God and
humans must, in order for the word to have any meaning at all, mean
both a turning of humans to God as well as a turning ofGod to
humans, although the turning of humans can only have meaning when
based on God's turning and only in relationship to that turning.107
4. This relationship between God and humans must remain a free and non-static
relationship, which remains constant only in that in every moment one must
begin again with the beginning. It can never be understood as given; it must
be "new every morning." It could not be otherwise when we are dealing with
the almighty God. It is in God's grace, God's decision to be in relation with
us, God's decision to reveal God's self to us, that the constant of this
relationship can be found. This relationship must there remain a struggle for
life and death, for being or non-existence.
This discussion of the criteria for the possibility of revelation is central to Barth's
epistemology as well as his understanding of revelation. We will discuss this more
below.
Following this, paragraph 18 discusses religion and whether or not the basis
for subjective revelation can be found in it. This paragraph is based on the statement:
The reality of religion, based on a possibility of the human soul, exists in the
purest form in reverence for a totally other, who the human being believes to
be trustworthy of superiority and help on the basis of their experience, yet
contrary to the human beings' self and everything else he or she knows -.
This reality as such is not the subjective possibility of the possibility of
revelation, but the strongest expression of the contradiction of human beings
to God and to themselves. If it is fellowship with God, then not as such, but








Religion, or piety, is therefore based on a "possibility in the human soul." Barth
defines religion by quoting Goethe:
In our bosom surges a desire to willingly devote ourselves in gratitude to a
higher, purer, unknown, thereby deciphering the eternal unknown. We call it
being devout.109
It is, as such, a human possibility. Schleiermacher argued that it is "the feeling of
absolute dependence." Religion is therefore by definition a human feeling, and does
not require God. As Barth wrote:
We can easily reduce all these modern trains of theological thought to
Descartes's proof of God, to which Wobbermin and Scholz make explicit
appeal. Because the idea ofGod exists in us, therefore God exists in
Godsself. The only difference is that the moderns do not speak of an innate
idea of God but of an achieved experience of God, and thus substitute 'so far
as' for 'because.'110
This means that God is placed under religion, in the realm of human possibility. In
fact, God's very existence becomes dependent on our ability to conceptualise God -
with the result that Feuerbach's argument, namely that God is merely human writ
large and therefore, does not exist in Godsself, can not be overcome. In this case,
theology is no longer theology but "untheology, or antitheology, or atheology"111
Barth argues "That the reality of religion and the subjective possibility of
revelation are one and the same, that is the teaching of Schleiermacher and the many
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who, so or so, follow in his footsteps" Barth continues by discussing
Schleiermacher with reference to the four requirements discussed above for
subjective revelation:
1. The first question is whether Schleiermacher understands humans to be
"poor, wretched and naked." Barth argues that Schleiermacher clearly feels
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Religion is based on a inherent ability within the human soul, although this
possibility may only be realised by a few "virtuosos, mediators, priests or
113 •heroes of religion..It is nonetheless a possibility for every person. They
must develop this potential, but they do have the ability to do so. In fact,
Barth understands Schleiermacher to be arguing that "human existence in
self-awareness is one with divine being... For Schleiermacher, the person
stands from the beginning and always before God. This person does not need
God, in order to be possible before God."114
2. The next question is whether, for Schleiermacher, God is understood as a
person separate from all creation. Barth maintains that Schleiermacher does
all he can to prevent this dichotomy between creation and Creator. For
Schleiermacher:
The subjective possibility of revelation consists in the fact that... the
person attributes divine subjectivity to her- or himself. Or how else
should one understand Schleiermacher when he describes in the
Speeches that decisive moment when humans wed the universe in this
way: 'I lie on the bosom of the infinite world. At this moment I am its
soul, for I feel all its powers and its infinite life as my own; at this
moment it is my body, for I penetrate its muscles and its limbs as my
own, and its innermost nerves move according to my sense and
presentiment as my own.'115
Clearly, for Schleiermacher, God is not a separate, wholly other and
unique person.
3. Does the relationship between God and human beings require human action -
in "belief' and "obedience?" For Schleiermacher that would mean confusing
religion with metaphysics and morality. He wrote in the Speeches: "Praxis is
an art, speculation is a science, religion is the sensibility and taste for the






(Barth 1927), 308-309. Barth is quoting Schleiermacher's second speech: (Schleiermacher 1920),
47 [74]; English translation: (Schleiermacher 1988), 113.
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(Schleiermacher 1988), 103. Barth misquotes Schleiermacher here, replacing "Unendliche"
"infinite" with "Universum" "universe." See (Barth 1927), 312.
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... in The Christian Faith the theory of the feeling of absolute
dependence always appears in concerto with a knowledge and
activity, but is understood not in this connection, but in its purity as
the wholly passive piety, or the subject remains in itself. The
relationship to God is beyond the thinking and willing self, with
which it does, however, exist in a sort of symbiosis. This relationship
is pure, without any qualities, it is only definite in itself, it is being
equal with itself and resting in itself.117
Although Christianity is defined as a "teleological religion" - a religion in
which all activity is grounded on the coming kingdom ofGod, religion
remains for Schleiermacher a "peace" in which a person understands her- or
himself to be beyond the opposites of question and answers. This religion
does not require any kind of human acting in belief and obedience.
4. Finally: does Schleiermacher understand our relationship to God as a
dialogue or struggle whose constant can only be found in God and not in
ourselves, at least when it is viewed from our side? According to Barth,
Schleiermacher does not. He argues that religion understands everything in
the universe to be the activity ofGod - this activity is "miracle" in the
language of religion. All existence is therefore "miracle." The whole world is
seen to be a gallery of religious viewpoints. Therefore, all different religions
are understood to be expressions of this unity of existence - and are to be
praised as such:
So, for Schleiermacher, religion, the universe, revelation, the truth,
God - or whatever one wants to call it, move together in an enormous
• 118waltz above each and everything that is.
There is no dichotomy between God and the world, between creation and







The subjective possibility of revelation is based on and consists of this
either - or, not its resolution. This is where our paths separate.119
To summarise: Barth rejects anthropocentric religion, which he believes
Schleiermacher typifies, because of the argument that religion makes subjective
revelation possible. He rejects this because the understanding of humans and human
potential required for it is far too optimistic; because God is not "wholly other" and
seems to be merely the power that is in all of the universe; because humans do not
need to respond to God by acting in faith and obedience; and because there is no life-
or-death struggle in the relationship it is merely a "given" characteristic of being.
God's Primary Activity
Barth modified his earlier criticism of religion somewhat when he wrote the
Church Dogmatics. We will return to this point below but the central characteristic
ofChristianity remained constant throughout Barth's career. God's revelation is a
revelation to humans and as such a religious event. Christianity is therefore a human
"religion." However, and this is the key here, revelation is primary and religion
secondary.
'Experience' is only a reference to the Original, to God... The Catholic
Middle Ages and the Reformation understood this to some extent. It remained
for pietism, Schleiermacher, and modern Christianity consciously to read the
New Testament kerygma backwards. We must win again the mighty sense of
reality in which Paul is one with Plato and the prophets. Christ is the
absolutely new from above; the way, the truth, and the life of God among
humanity; the Son ofMan, in whom humanity becomes aware its immediacy
to God.120
This "mighty sense of reality" remained present in Barth's theology throughout the
remainder of his career, as Bruce McCormack has eloquently argued in his book,







Development. McCormack locates this central component to Barth's theology in
the time-eternity dialectic. He quotes the preface to the second edition of Barth's
commentary on Romans:
What, then, do I mean when I say that a perception of the 'inner dialectic of
the matter' in the actual words of the text is a necessary and prime
requirement for their understanding and interpretation? ... [I]f I have a
system, it is limited to a recognition ofwhat Kierkegaard called the 'infinite
qualitative difference' between time and eternity, and to my regarding this as
possessing negative as well as positive significance: 'God is in heaven and
you are on earth.' The relation of this God to this person, the relation of this
person to this God, is for me both the theme of the Bible and the essence of
philosophy. The philosophers name this crisis of human perception - the
Prime Cause."122
This "infinite qualitative distinction" separates humans from God entirely. We
cannot bridge this gap, only God can. It is only to God's primary action that we can
respond - we cannot initiate any movement towards God. We can only respond to
God's movement to us. The source for all our knowledge of God must remain God -
it is only through God's revelation of Godsself that we have access to knowledge
about God. This distinction must be maintained. Barth argued that grounding human
knowledge about God in human experience failed to sufficiently recognise the
distinction of Creator and creation.
As is the case with Barth's dogmatics, he also based his ethics on his
Christology. He wrote:
The problem of 'ethics' is therefore, identical with the problem of
'dogmatics': Soli Deo gloria... [A]ll ethical behaviour, even the primary ethic
of the broken line, even the worshipper bowed before the merciful God, is no
more than a demonstration: the demonstration is, however, necessary and
obligatory. There is no such thing as the 'building up' by humans of an
adequate ethical life, not even if the quality of their moral behaviour were so
sublime that it might be claimed that the will ofGod had been united with the
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(McCormack 1995). McCormack argues very persuasively against the von Balthasar thesis, which
held that Barth went through two major changes in his thought: his rejection of the liberal theology of
his teachers during the First World War and the further turn to analogy, which entailed the "end-point
of his liberation from the shackles of philosophy in order to arrive at a truly independent theology."
(1) Against this, McCormack argues that the apparent change in Barth's theology of the thirties is a
change of emphasis rather than a replacement of one form of thought by another." (13) See the




human will, or that the human will had been absorbed into the divine, or that
the divine will had been fulfilled in the human will. All human doing or not-
doing is simply an occasion or opportunity of pointing to that alone which
alone is worthy of being called 'action', namely, the action of God... Pure
ethical behaviour depends upon its primal origin, an origin which needs to be
protected by a determination on our part to call God God and human human,
• 123however much we may be tempted to stray into romanticism
In 1919, Barth stated the relevance of theocentrism for Christian ethics:
Our theme contains a question which must now be upon the lips of us all:
What ought we then to do? It is true that many other questions, great and
small, burning questions for which we are badly in need of an answer, are
contained in this fundamental question and have not apparently been met by
the fundamental Biblical answer we have given. But they merely seem not to
be answered. We are moved by the truth of Christ: why should we not then be
grounded in God? We are grounded in God: why should eternity not then be
set in our heart? And sub specie aeternitatis, why should we not know what is
to be done? We can indeed do only one thing - not many. But it is just that
one thing which we do not do. What can the Christian in society do but
follow attentively what is done by God?]24
This move is even clearer in his Ethics, which is a copy of his lecture notes from
1928 and 1930. Barth begins in the first chapter by demonstrating the relationship of
ethics to dogmatics (and theology as a whole) and by showing how theology -
including dogmatics and ethics, must begin with the prior word of God to humanity.
This word has been and is still being spoken to humanity in Jesus Christ Theology
must have God as its sole subject. There cannot be any discussion of humanity as
some kind of a second subject or pole, alongside God or even subject to God. God
must always be primary, must always be the subject of theology. Barth wrote:
Theology is not the presentation of the reality of the Word of God addressed
to persons and also the presentation of the reality of the person to whom
God's Word is addressed...[T]he person to whom God's Word is directed can
never become the theme or subject of theology. The person is not in any








The ethical question must answer the question ofwhat is good. The question of the
good is so basic that the first chapters of the Bible deal with it. Barth equates the
story of humanity's fall in Genesis with the attempt to determine what is good or evil
independently, without God. This is how the serpent tempted Eve, by saying that
when she eats of the tree: "...your eyes will be opened, and you will be like God,
knowing good and evil."126 The serpent is, according to Barth, attempting to lay the
foundation for ethics!127 However, this refers to a particular kind of ethics: an
anthropocentric or casuistic ethics, which attempts to discover criteria or moral laws
for determining what is good and evil. This is the most basic form of human sin,
usurping God's authority by claiming the authority to determine good and evil. God
alone, as creator of the universe, can determine what is good and evil.
By 1922, this move to theocentric ethics was complete. In his essay, "The Problem of
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Ethics Today" one finds a very clear expression of why Barth made this move, and
what this move entails. He begins by setting out the problem of ethics:
The problem of ethics is concerned with human conduct, that is, her or his
whole temporal existence. It arises from crisis. Human beings find
themselves seeking the inner meaning and law of their conduct, the truth
about their existence. For that meaning and law and truth he becomes aware
129that he is responsible.
Human beings only exist in acting. Therefore, the ethical question ofwhat ought we
to do is the question of human existence. For humans it is therefore inescapable. In
the nineteenth century, it was felt that this was the easy question - we ought to do
what we are doing, as this will obviously bring about the kingdom of God. Barth
wrote:
Fundamentally, it was a matter not of asking what to do, as if that were not
known, but rather of finding out whether philosophy or theology, Kant or
Schleiermacher provided the more illuminating formula for the obvious - for
it was obvious that what to do was to further this infinitely imperfect but
infinitely perfectible culture...1 J°
126 Gen. 3:5, NRSV
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The ethical problem was seen, in the nineteenth century, as the "expression and
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witness of the peculiar greatness and dignity of human beings." It was an
incredibly optimistic time.
After discussing the ethical problem, Barth argues that it is clear today that it
is not so simple, but, rather, that it must be seen as a true problem: "Surely we divine
more clearly the unavoidable and ultimate character of the perplexity,
embarrassment, and uncertainty under which man is placed by the ethical
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question." Barth maintains that in his present situation (1922), we have seen that
even the best of human endeavours seems to be flawed. He discusses what we can
desire and can do. Firstly, we can "eat, drink, and sleep, beget and bear children, and
live our physical life." These aspects of our existence should not be left out of
consideration - after all, we all have to work at this level and, for some, it comprises
all of what they do. The next level is the level of theoretical and applied science.
Although it has been said that they serve the kingdom of God, one merely has to look
at World War I to see that science is also used to serve absurd ends. Above this level
is a further level: the level of moral purposes. These purposes are our own. Perhaps
there remains one higher level - the level of religious purposes. We can seek,
worship and pray to God. That, however, is still a human desire and a human
striving, and humans can only desire things and things are not the spirit.
There is nothing, according to Barth, in the whole range of human
possibilities that is capable of realising the "moral objective." The telos of human
action, the final answer to the ethical question, cannot be answered by means of any
"thing"; the answer must come from beyond time if it is to be a final answer rather
than an answer that leads to further questions. Barth then moves on to try to provide
help in answering this question by means of a dialectic method. He wrote:
... that human beings condemn themselves to death by this question about the
good, because the only certain answer is that the person is not good, and from
the viewpoint of the good, cannot exist. But this insight, this all inclusive
critical negation under which we and our world exist, this fear of death into
which the insight leads the upright conscience, is the narrow way and the








In answering this question, we must first fully recognise the negative situation in
which we find ourselves. We must not try to avoid it by rationalising it or by
discounting its severity. We must accept this situation entirely. When we do that,
God then breaks into our situation:
It is through the inescapable severity of this judgment that we come upon the
reality of God. It is this that confirms that the problem of ethics, in that it is
put to us, signifies our relationship to God.134
For ethics, this dialectic means that the value of any human activity or decision is not
based on the inherent goodness or badness of the act, nor on its being in accord with
any law - be it divine or natural or from some other source, nor on the goal it sets out
to accomplish. Acts are good only insofar as they witness to God.
Knowledge of God
The problem of knowledge ofGod was, for Barth, the epistemological
problem of the subject - object relationship in human knowing. Human knowing
necessarily involves this relationship, as the human knower is the subject who learns
about an external "something" that is the "object" of the human activity. Barth
wanted to maintain God's primacy, or subjectness, in all human experience of God
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yet allow for humans to have true knowledge of God . This is not new to Barth nor
was it ignored by liberal theology; Ingrid Spieckermann traced this problem back to
Kant's critiques and shows how liberal theologians, including Ritschl, dealt with
it136. To rephrase the question in these terms, then, we must ask how persons can
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(Barth 1922), 168.
lj5 It is interesting that it is here that Barth criticizes the pietists in the second edition of his
commentary to the Romans. Eberhard Busch wrote: "There is a definite criticism of pietism in the
second Romans. ... Barth sees the pietists together with the ascetics; and one could see that which he
likes about the pietists as the ascetic line in pietism: namely, the move in it in which there is a
knowledge ofGod's 'No', of human sinfulness and the necessary fear of God and repentance in the
light of it, of the disruption of all identification of human with the divine. Here is where Barth
criticizes it. His criticism is not against the fact that pietism also knows about a 'Yes' ofGod, about
God's love, about the new person, indeed about the unity of God and humans. Rather he criticizes that
pietism misunderstands and misuses the ascetic negative knowledge as a "way" to come to the divine
love and to the new human and, therefore, makes the divine apprehendable by humans." (Busch
1978), 105.
136 See (Spieckermann 1985), 14-17.
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have knowledge of God such that God remains subject at all times and never
becomes an object. As knowledge of God must be of a different type than human
knowledge of other things, Barth argued that knowledge ofGod can only come by
revelation. This argument comes, according to Barth, only a posteriori:
... one can seriously raise and treat the problem of the possibility of
revelation only when we know its reality; one can construct it only a
posteriori. All reflection on how God can reveal Godsself is in reality only a
'thinking after' of the fact that God has revealed Godsself.137
In order to maintain that "infinite qualitative distinction between God and
humankind" that is vital for Barth, we can only discuss the possibility of God's
revelation aposteriori - after the fact of revelation. We "know" something of God,
the question is how do we know it. Spieckermann argues:
The prerequisite for preaching of the objective knowability ofGod in light of
God's irreducible subjectivity, God's pure I-being, is not merely a speculative
norm, it is rather the a posteriori prolegomenal perception of God's
unavailable actuality in the fact of revelation, in which the knowledge ofGod
exists only from God. The Deus dixit, which completely takes the person
over, was just the starting point of God's addressing him or her. This address
brings the person into relation with God; it is the given prerequisite behind
i io
which we can have no knowledge ...
God must remain the eternal subject and never be allowed to be an object, which
would be the case were we able to discuss the possibility of God's revelation prior to
the fact of this revelation. It is only as a result of God's revelation that one can
discuss the possibility of God's revelation. For this distinction between God and
God's creation to be maintained, revelation must be in hiddeness or, as Barth stated
1TQ ... .
it, "The divine incognito must be total." The possibility of revelation must lie with
God and not with humans. It is therefore in Jesus ofNazareth, truly human in all
ways, that God veils and unveils Godsself. Gotthard Oblau stated:
As Jesus Christ is the subject of the history of reconciliation, he is also the
subject of its revelation. If he becomes in the revelation its object, it is only
137




(Barth and Reiffen 1991), 138
because and in so far as he makes himself that object. Barth secures the unity
of the subject in reconciliation and in its revelation in the teaching of Jesus'
office: next to the munus sacerdotale (Jesus as the Son of God, as High
Priest) and the munus regium (Jesus as the Son of humanity, as King), he also
knows the munus propheticum (Jesus as prophet, guarantor the reconciliation,
as his own revelator).140
Revelation is indirect as it is through a human intermediary. Jesus Christ is the
veiling and unveiling of God and, therefore, the objective possibility of revelation:
Christology, set face to face with the fact of Jesus Christ, is an effort to
understand that the objective possibility ofGod's revelation is the
'irremovable mystery' of God in God's indirect communication, but the
mystery of God which has entered time and history, which has become
palpable and actual, in God's encounter with us by virtue of the incarnation...
This man, this man [Jesus Christ] (we must emphasize both), is God Godsself
who reveals God Godsself, who by God Godsself is revealed as God
Godsself. He is God who is not just there but also here, who is not just at the
beginning and end but also in the middle, who is not just with Godsself but
also with us in the world. He is living proof of the fact that God is not
unfruitful and the world is not forsaken by God.141
Barth found the solution to the problem of knowledge ofGod in the classic
Reformed Christological doctrine of the anhypostatic - enhypostatic incarnation. He
discovered this doctrine in the spring of 1924 in Heinrich Heppe's Reformed
Dogmatics: Set Out and Illustratedfrom the Sources142, while preparing for his
lectures in dogmatics at Gottingen.143 Barth summarized this Christology by referring
to Maresius:
We find the clearest summary of this Reformed doctrine of the relation
between the Logos and flesh in the statement ofMaresius that the Logos so
unites the human nature to himself that he totally indwells it and yet is totally
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This doctrine was formulated in order to preserve Jesus' true humanity and true
divinity. The humanity of Jesus is truly human, as we are but without sin, yet did not
exist of itself without the Logos, thereby avoiding any accusations of adoptionism.
The divine Logos, however, existed from eternity as divine and infinite. The
infinitude of the Logos can not be predicated of the human nature: "If the human
nature is no longer finite, then it is no longer human nature."14? This is opposed by
the Lutheran view of the communicatio idiomatum which argues that whatever can
be predicated of the divine nature can be predicated of Jesus Christ, including the
human nature. Therefore, wherever the Logos is, there also is the human nature of
Jesus. The Lutherans termed this idea of the infinite Logos being wholly present in
Jesus and at the same time in infinitude wholly outside Jesus the extra calvinisticum.
Thus, although the infinite is capable of assuming the finite, the finite is not capable
of assuming the infinite. Bruce McCormack summarizes this development in Barth's
thinking:
In May 1924 Barth made a momentous discovery. During the course of his
first lectures in dogmatics, he came upon the anhypostatic-enhypostatic
Christological dogma of the ancient Church in a textbook of post-
Reformation theology. He saw in it an understanding of the incarnate being of
the Mediator which preserved that infinite qualitative distinction between
God and humankind which had been at the forefront of his concerns... The
central thrust of the ancient dogma was that the Logos (the second Person of
the Holy Trinity) took to Himself human flesh (i.e. a human "nature",
complete, whole and entire) and lived a human life in and through it. The
proximity to Barth's dialectic of veiling and unveiling was obvious. In that
God takes to God's Self a human nature. God veils God's Self in a creaturely
medium. He enters 'the divine incognito' - a situation of unrecognizability.
Outwardly (and inwardly!), He is a human being like any other. But the
Subject of this human life - we may liken this to Kant's conception of an
unintuitable, noumenal self- was at every point the Second Person of the
Trinity; a Subject who, because of the veil of human flesh remains
unintuitable. Because of His unintuitability, God can only be known in Jesus
where He condescends to grant faith to the would-be human knower; where
He unveils Himself in and through the veil of human flesh.146
This discovery remained central to Barth's thinking, although it was modified when
Barth modified his understanding of election. At this point, the emphasis was on the
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occurrence of revelation here and now on the basis of God's revelation in Christ. As
McCormack argues, Barth's theology at this point is grounded in his Christology, but
his theology is largely pneumatocentric.147 In the Gottingen Dogmatics, he argues
that it is the Holy Spirit who grants us the ability to see the divine in the human Jesus
ofNazareth.
This discovery was ofmajor importance for Barth, in that it allowed a place
for historical studies into the life of Jesus and into the Bible. The Logos, the one
Word ofGod, is veiled and unveiled in human flesh, in the life, death and
resurrection of Jesus Christ. The question of the subjective possibility of faith then
must be answered. How do we have access to this revelation, where God is both the
revealer and that which is revealed? For Barth, we have no inherent ability to see this
revelation, in the same way we have no ability to see God directly. The question is
how we humans, who are utterly incapable of standing before God, then stand before
God? Barth answered this question by referring to the Holy Spirit:
The person who stands before God, we must now say, is precisely the person
who can not stand before God... This person stands before God because
God's revelation is not only a there but a here, it is not only objective but also
subjective, because God not only reveals Godsself in the Son but reveals
Godsself in the Son by the Spirit.148
As discussed above, here are four main strands that are crucial to properly
understand the subjective possibility of revelation. Barth summarized these criteria:
Thus the condition of this possibility, formally distinguished under four
heads, may be summed up as follows: (a) Unequivocal humanity as one side
of the relation; (b) the sure, distinguishable, personal presence of God
Godsself on the other side; (c) human activity or action in its own sphere; (d)
indestructible flexibility in the realization of the relation.149
In these conditions, we can see the realistic basis of Barth's theology. Humans must
be understood as they actually are, God must be understood as God actually is.150
147 See (McCormack 1995), 328.
148
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150 It is important to note that Barth acknowledges the circularity of his argument here. Any discussion
of the possibility of God's revelation ofGodsselfmust be a posteriori to the fact ofGod's revelation.
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From these two points follow the two final points: humans act within their sphere
and the relationship to God must be free and not mechanical, as the relationship can
only occur on the basis of God's veiling and unveiling of Godsself in Jesus Christ
and God is free. Above we discussed how religion, understood on the basis of
Schleiermacher, failed to fulfill these criteria. We now turn to how Barth sought to
do so in the Gottingen Dogmatics.
For Barth, our ability to hear God's revelation is based solely on the Holy
Spirit, who enables us to hear God's word willingly.
Thus the miracle of the Holy Spirit is first of all that at the very point where
the humanity of revelation cannot be evaded but is experienced in all its
offensiveness, its divinity speaks imperiously to us and is willingly heard by
us... In other words, the second miracle of the Holy Spirit is that cheek by
jowl we again have the human side, that of a person with her or his religion,
with her or his watching and praying [see Mark 14:38], and we also have the
divine side. God hearing and seeing God's own voice and deed in this human
stammering and stumbling (which is certainly never worse than when in
addition to all else it is also devout), God recognising God's own work in
these human marvels and weaknesses...151
The first miracle of the Holy Spirit is therefore that God speaks and we hear; the
second is that God sees God's own actions in our activity, in spite of our weakness.
Revelation must be understood, as discussed above, dialectically. This means God
wills to be in relationship and therefore meets us, but this grace is also judgement as
it shows what it means to be human. God speaks to us, but that speaking is a
command that cuts us to the heart. This is what is meant by the classic reformed
understanding of faith and obedience. We put ourselves under grace but at the same
time, under judgment. Being confronted by God's revelation could lead us to despair
because of our weakness which, in turn, could destroy us. That this does not occur is
the third miracle of the Holy Spirit:
A third aspect of the miracle of the Holy Spirit, then, is that we are not torn
asunder by the Word that leads us to the heights and to the depths, that we are
not plunged into despair by it, that we are upheld and carried and led in both
The discussion therefore presupposes the fact of the revelation. This is clearly seen in both Barth's
ethics and in his dogmatics.
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cases because it is the Word ofGod, because God does not deceive us but
also will not let Godsself be mocked [see Gal. 6:7], by either a belief that is
not ready to be obedience or by a zeal for God's kingdom that wants to be
without faith.152
This leads to the question of what faith is. Faith is understood as fiducia cordis, the
faith of the heart. Barth emphasized that it is the emotional experience with which
God's word must be grasped. Faith cannot be understood as a matter of human
understanding, rather it is irrational; it is the heart's venture of trusting in God's
promise. It is, again, only by a miracle of the Floly Spirit that we can have faith, and
then we must have faith:
... [faith] never ceases to be what it always is, a psychological impossibility,
just as revelation is a historical impossibility. It may be conceived - no, it
may be asserted and described only as a miracle of the Holy Spirit (the same
thing again seen from the other side) that forces us to do what we cannot do,
that is, to believe in God, not because we have access to God but because he,
the Holy Spirit, is himselfGod and creates access where there is none.153
Although faith is not itself rational, it carries with itself a rational demand, that we be
obedient to God's command. As creatures, we are confronted by positive and
negative demands from our Creator. To trust God means to accept God's demand
with fear and trembling. It is only by a miracle of the Holy Spirit that we can
maintain childlike trust in God while fearing the command ofGod. Therefore, the
subjective possibility of revelation is the Holy Spirit for it is only in the Spirit that
revelation is possible.
The problem remains of how humans can speak ofGod, as speaking of
something again makes us the subject to the object about which we speak. This is, for
Barth, the mystery of revelation. God reveals Godsself in such a way that we can
speak about God objectively, although our speaking is only secondarily knowledge
of God and is therefore subject to criticism and correction. At the same time, it must
be maintained that:
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In God's revelation in which God distinguishes Godsself from all gods and
idols, God is and exists only as subject. God's revelation consists precisely of
God's decisive refusal to become a He or She or an It. an object...154
Therefore, the knowledge of God about which we preach and speak is indirect, not
direct, as direct knowledge of God would compromise God's being as the eternal
subject.
Barth summarised his early view on this in the Gottingen Dogmatics:
Let us recall the conditions under which revelation is factual. When God truly
reveals Godsself truly to us, this presupposes... (a) that God meets us and (b)
that we stand before God. For our problem this means that God is an object of
our knowledge and we the subject. God is an object of knowledge and we the
subject. God becomes an object of knowledge by becoming human in Christ.
We become the subject of knowledge by faith and obedience. Concretely and
objectively something is there and takes place in human space and time - the
humanity of Jesus Christ. Just as concretely and objectively we on the other
side know and do something - our faith and obedience. The one thing in this
twofold event is revelation. This twofold event is the condition under which
God's Word is spoken and his covenant is concluded with us. Under this
condition, in this simple subject-object relation, God is knowable by us. To
deny that God accepts this condition and enters into this relation in which
God is knowable would again be to deny revelation. This is revelation - what
else could it be? God does not set aside or reverse God's irremovable and
irreversible I. He does not cease to be God in God's revelation. But God
conceals God's I in a relation in which we can share in God's self-
knowledge, in which God can meet us, in which we can stand before God.
God conceals God's I in a human It or He or She. God conceals Godsself in a
human seeing, hearing, touching and tasting of this objective reality [see I
John 1.1].'155
This experience of the veiling and unveiling of God is only possible in the Spirit, but
it is possible. Because of the grace of God, revealing Godsself in human experience,
in history in Jesus Christ, we can know God. Although this knowledge ofGod is not
direct, it is only because of God's veiling that we can have indirect knowledge; in
this veiling we do know God. This knowing is only possible because the Spirit makes
it so, we must not allow the mistake of seeing Jesus Christ as the revelation ofGod,
as if to merely look at Jesus Christ is to look at God. It is a veiling and unveiling only
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when the Spirit enables us to see it as such. In a parallel way to how the incarnation
does not entail the divinization of the human, there also is no divinization of the
object which is the medium of divine revelation, it remains a mundane object like
any other. Barth wrote:
.. .God's revelation in any case means God's revelation in God's
concealment, as the radical dedivinization of the world and nature and
history, the complete divine incognito...156
God must remain God and not be exchanged for any objective reality which would
then become an idol. It is important also to note that Barth is writing at this point a
more Pneumocentric theology rather than Christocentric; he does not explicitly limit
God's revelation to us, as enabled by the Holy Spirit, to Jesus Christ. He also does
not explicitly allow for revelation to occur outside of Jesus Christ, although he does
mention the possibility:
Let us assume that the possibility becomes a reality, that the ability [to know
God by the Spirit] is put into practice, that we stand before the mystery, and
that the mystery becomes a pointer to God. No matter how or where or when
this might happen, we must say that we stand in the relation of revelation,
that God's Word is spoken to us and received by us, that the Holy spirit is
working in us. No matter how or where or when, I say... we have to ask
whether we are bold enough to state that the human possibility for knowledge
of God can become a reality only by the path of Christian proclamation. Ifwe
are not bold enough to say this, if even hypothetically we think that the step
from possibility to reality might be taken on paths that God alone knows, then
we must be serious and say that if this is revelation, then it is the one
revelation; if this is real knowledge of God, then it is full knowledge of God -
for neither real revelation nor real knowledge ofGod can be quantified - and
we have to agree with Zwingli's view that Socrates, Cato, Seneca, and other
enlightened pagans saw the day of Christ from afar like Abraham and the
other prophets, and in faith partake of full salvation. Let it be understood, /
am not proclaiming this doctrine, nor indeed the opposite that there is no
salvation outside the visible church.1"^7
Barth is neither arguing for or against the position, he is merely allowing for the
possibility. This possibility has two components: that those outside the church have
knowledge ofGod by divine revelation and that God can be active outside of God's
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activity within the Christian tradition. If Zwingli was right, and Socrates witnessed
God's revelation from afar and Christians therefore ought to study him to learn about
God's action in the world, then God is active not only in Socrates' learning of the
world, but also in our learning from Socrates. The freedom of God to veil and unveil
Godsself is therefore not limited to God's activity in Jesus Christ. Barth would later
modify this when he moved to a more Christocentric theology in the development of
his understanding of election in the Church Dogmatics, but for the purposes of the
argument here, Barth's more spirit centred theology of the Gottingen Dogmatics is of
greater concern.
Barth's Divine-Command Ethics
Ethics attempts to answer the question of what we ought to do. By definition,
that which we ought to do is the good. For Barth, however, we are incapable of
determining the good. Any attempt by humans to determine the good is sinful; in
fact, this attempt brought about the fall, as the serpent in the garden stated: "God
knows when you eat of it your eyes will be opened, and you will be like God,
knowing good and evil." (Genesis 3:5, NRSV) Barth wrote in the Church Dogmatics
concerning this verse:
We have seen that in its root and origin sin is the arrogance in which man
wants to be his own and his neighbour's judge. According to Genesis 3:5 the
temptation which involves man's disobedience to God's commandment is the
evil desire to know what is good and evil. He ought to leave this knowledge
to God, to see his freedom in his ability to adhere to God's decisions in his
own decisions.138
He went even further in the same volume when he wrote:
There is a definite content to the promise: Eritis sicut Deus, and to the
concealed invitation to a human being to become the master of her or his own






Is there, then, a proper function for ethics, or are all attempts at ethics the human
attempt to "become the master of his or her own destiny?" If there is a proper form of
ethics, what is it and how does it function?
Ethics cannot be the human attempt to determine good and evil, as this would
involve humanity arrogantly usurping of God's authority. Barth remained true
throughout his career to what he wrote in his commentary on Romans:
The problem of ethics is identical with the problem of dogmatics: Soli Deo
gloria!... [A]ll ethical behaviour, even the primary ethic of the broken line,
even the worshipper bowed before the merciful God, is no more than a
demonstration: the demonstration is, however, necessary and obligatory.
There is no such thing as the 'building up' by human beings of an adequate
ethical life, not even if the quality of their moral behaviour were so sublime
that it might be claimed that the will of God had been united with the human
will, or that the human will had been absorbed into the divine, or that the
divine will had been fulfilled in the human will. All human doing or not-
doing is simply an occasion or opportunity of pointing to that alone which
alone is worthy of being called 'action', namely, the action ofGod... Pure
ethical behaviour depends upon its primal origin, an origin which needs to be
protected by a determination on our part to call God God and human human,
however much we may be tempted to stray into romanticism.160
Understanding ethics in this way requires a radical reinterpretation of the ethical task.
The proper task of ethics can not be the attempt to answer the question of what we
ought to do by means of any human determination of good and evil. For Christian
ethics, any morality must be based solely on God's determination of good and evil.
Therefore, ethics, as is also true with dogmatics, must begin with God's word spoken
to humanity and not with any aspect of an individual person or a group characteristic.
God must remain the primary, initiating actor in dogmatics and ethics, indeed in all
theology. Humans can only respond to God's command. Theology and ethics must
have God as its sole subject. There cannot be any discussion of humanity as some
kind of a second subject or pole, alongside God or even as a kind of secondary





Theology is not the presentation of the reality of the Word of God addressed
to the human being and also the presentation of the reality of the human
being to whom the God's Word is addressed... But the person to whom the
God's Word is directed can never become the theme or the subject of
theology. The person is not in any sense a second subject of theology which
must be approached with a shift of focus.161
This excludes many traditional methodologies in Christian ethics. Notably, it
excludes any methodology that understands ethics by means of a divine "principle"
1
given by means of natural law or revelation. Many people have based their ethics
in this way on biblical commands, such as Jesus' answer to the question of which is
the greatest commandment - "Hear, O Israel: the Lord our God, the Lord is one; you
shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with all your soul, and with all
your mind, and with all your strength. The second is this, 'You shall love your
neighbor as yourself."163 Barth rejects understanding the commands as "guiding
principles" in ethics as it still is the attempt by humans to determine good and evil.
Any such ethic is, according to Barth, an expression of human sinfulness, as it is
casuistic and anthropocentric.164 There are three main reasons to reject it:
1. In this kind of ethics, the person, by claiming to know what is good and evil,
places her- or himself "on God's throne." This occurs in the first place in that
she or he, alone or in community, claims to know and be able to summarise
God's command, be it from natural, biblical or traditional sources. It occurs
in the second place when she or he claims to know a human action, their own
or someone else's, so well, that they can judge whether God sees that act as
good or evil.
2. A casuistic ethic turns God's command into a general rule or formula, which
we must give meaning to by our actions. In itself, the command is
161
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meaningless. The command must be put to use by us in a situation for the
command to have any meaning. God's command, on the other hand
... leaves nothing to human choice or preference. It thus requires no
interpretation to come into force. To the last and smallest detail it is
self-interpreted, and in this form it confronts man as a command
already in force.165
3. A casuistic ethic destroys Christian freedom. We are free, by God's grace, to
serve God by obeying God's commands. God commands us, choosing to be
in a personal relationship to us. In obeying that command, a Christian is free
to offer him- or herself to God. A casuistic ethic puts a law between God and
humanity, thus destroying this freedom and, in putting this law between God
and us, it denies God's freedom to choose to be in relationship to us.166
Individuals must accept God's decision concerning good and evil and not desire the
authority to do so for themselves. The person who does this
... is therefore then a free human being, when he or she thinks and decides
and acts at peace with God, when his or her decision is simply and
exclusively a repetition of the divine decision. If that is not enough, if he or
she wants to make a primary decision where the decision of God and
therefore the divine knowledge of good and evil has already preceded him,
this involves a foolish over-estimation of him- or herself, as though he or she
is the one who can stand over that alternative and exercise the function of an
Atlas bearing and holding together the great building of the universe.167
Therefore, source for the Christian answer to the ethical question is God's Word to
humanity. Barth wrote:
The task of theological ethics is to understand the Word ofGod as the
command of God. Its fundamental, simplest and comprehensive answer to the
ethical problem is that human action is good insofar as it is sanctified by the
Word of God which as such is also the command of God.168
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Thus, humans ought to do what God commands them to do. That is the good. The
question is not what ought we to do, but what is God commanding us to and what it
means that God commands us.
Hearing the Command of God
Ethics, as discussed above, cannot tell us what the command ofGod is in a
given situation. It rather asks what it means to us that God commands us. Barth
wrote:
We do not have to show what is commanded us. In this regard no ethics can
intervene between God and humans. We have to show rather what the fact
that we are commanded means, or, conversely, what it means for the fact that
we are commanded that the command is given within our human life.169
There is then one command that reaches each and every one of us in our concrete
situation. This command cannot be stated as a universal truth - that is not the task of
ethics, nor is it possible. Nor can ethics attempt to judge other's ethical decisions. It
does have the obligation to ask questions of any ethical decision in order to
understand a person's reasons for making this decision, and to help clarify what the
chosen option actually is and means. The question then is: how do we hear the
command of God in "our own here and now?" What role does this "here and now"
play in our hearing of the command? The command of God is not the same for all
times, as Barth wrote in a letter to an American Churchman in 1942: "The Word of
God for tomorrow will certainly not simply be a repetition of that which we today,
conscientiously and to the best of our knowledge, believe we are hearing."17
According to Barth, we need to learn how to see the will and providence ofGod in






The will and governance of God are not obvious in current events in
themselves, but hidden. We can now see them "in a mirror dimly" (I.
Corinthians 13:12). It is this very Scripture that reminds us that God's will
and governance are not simply invisible. It says, "we see." And indeed: we do
see current events, the tremendous work and suffering of people in their
decisions, undertakings and actions. And so, we also see with open eyes the
will and governance ofGod which is carried out in them. But we see so much
in addition that we cannot see this if our eyes, before which so much of God's
will and governance is shown, are not especially opened to see them. So it is
with God's will and governance in current events. One could compare them
to large handwriting with individual, powerful letters. We see these letters.
They are clearly before us, written in the material of human deeds and
experiences, which the radio and newspaper daily and even hourly lay out
before us. But we need to know that all of those are not merely some
wonderful forms, but indeed are letters. And we must know the alphabet and
the language to which these letters belong. We need to read these letters and
we need to be able to put them together into the written word. Then we would
be able to recognise the will and governance of God, although they are
171hidden. That is the most important question: can we read?
There are three temptations that affect persons in this regard. The human in current
events can bring us to ignore current events in order to be alone with God, as ifwhat
is happening in the world is not relevant to us. This may be termed as the mystic
temptation in that one believes that they must get away from the world and all
distractions to commune with God. However, ifwe ignore the human events around
us, we will also fail to see the divine handwriting and "...in our, so to speak, stolen
172
quiet and solitude it would be difficult to have God as our companion." The
second temptation, which we shall term the atheistic, is to believe that, because we
see only human actions in the world, and those seem to become more and more
tragic, there is no God governing the world. God may exist, but it is atheistic in that
God is in no way active in the world. The third and most serious temptation is to turn
the human, or some human element, such as race or nationality, into God because we
cannot see God in current events. We will call this the anthropocentric temptation, as
it deifies the human at the expense of God. It is wrong because none of these idols
can govern the world. We fall into this temptation when we
... stop at the wonderful forms of the human in current events and look at






forms there are no words to look for and decipher, no language to
understand.173
The events in themselves are not sacred and are not decisive for ethical decision¬
making. What is decisive is the command of God that can be "read" in these current
events but is not the same as the events themselves. According to Barth:
Outside of the Christian congregation, there are only these three possibilities:
either the apathetic indifference or the denial of God or the worship of false
gods.174
These are thus the temptations the church has to avoid in its understanding of current
events. The Church must therefore pay close attention to current affairs in the world
in order to recognise the "will and governance of God."
Killing and the Command of God the Creator
Recent history has clarified our understanding of the nature ofwar.
Previously, it was felt that war was the affair of a few members of any given society
- the rulers and professional soldiers and possibly their families. However, in
modern times the nature ofwar has become much clearer. Barth wrote:
To-day, however, the increasing scientific objectivity ofmilitary killing, the
development, appalling effectiveness and dreadful nature of the methods,
instruments and machines employed, and the extension of the conflict to the
civilian population, have made it quite clear that war does in fact mean no
more and no less than killing, with neither glory, dignity nor chivalry, with
neither restraint nor consideration in any respect. The glory of the so-called
military profession, which has incidentally become the profession of
everybody either directly or indirectly, can now feed only on the relics of
ancient illusions long since stripped of their substance. Much is already
gained if only we do at last soberly admit that, whatever may be the purpose
or possible justice of a war, it now means that, without disguise or shame, not
only individuals or even armies, but whole nations as such, are out to destroy
one another by every possible means. It only needed the atom and hydrogen
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There are two things to be noted in this passage. The first is to note that war is
defined in terms of killing (as opposed to murder), the lawful taking of life. . The
proper place therefore to discuss the ethics of war is the understanding of the
command of God the Creator, the giver of life. Killing is the taking of life as
commanded by God; murder is the wilful taking of life without the command of God.
This distinction is crucial for Barth. The sixth commandment (Exodus 20:13;
Deuteronomy 5:17) clearly prohibits murder. Clearly, within the Old Testament,
killing is not prohibited. Capital punishment is commanded within the Ten
Commandments as well. The prohibitions in the New Testament (notably Matthew 5
and I John 3) refer to murder and not killing. Barth refers to the story of Ananias and
Saphira in Acts 5 to show that killing is not prohibited in the New Testament.
Romans 13:1-7 clearly allows that the State has the right to use the sword. This is
more clearly shown in the account of Jesus before Pilate in John 19:10-11: "Pilate
therefore said to him, "Do you refuse to speak to me? Do you not know that I have
power to release you, and power to crucify you?" Jesus answered him, "You would
have no power over me unless it had been given you from above..." The power to
use the sword is therefore given by God to the State. Therefore, both the Old and
New Testament prohibitions against the taking of life refer to murder and not killing.
The second point to note is that Barth understands war in this way as a result of its
occurrence in history, the circumstance ofwar. Barth learned from the historical
appearance ofwar that war is "killing, with neither glory, dignity nor chivalry, with
neither restraint nor consideration in any respect." Based on the occurrence ofwar in
history, Barth discusses the ethics ofwar under the heading of the command of God
the Creator, the command to live. The historical appearance thus plays a major role
in his ethical discussion of this problem by defining the area in which the discussion
must take place.
Because God speaks to us, we may live. Barth wrote:
God's command applies to me inasmuch as I exist as a creature. As God
speaks to me, God acknowledges me to be alive. And as God wills something
from me, God commands me to live. I cannot be told this without
Problem der Gerechten Krieges" in Texte zur Barmer Theologischen Erklarung, Zurich:
Theologischer Verlag, 1984, 195B213, esp. 207f.
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understanding that the life of the creature in general is willed by God and is
an object of respect.176
There are thus two interrelated components of this command to live: the desire to
live and the respect of life. In any discussion of what to do with regard to life, we
must be aware of both of these components. God speaks to us, commands us. In
doing so, God acknowledges that we are alive. From this, Barth draws three main
points concerning life:
1. My life, or life in itself, is not the commandment, but is a component of
that which is commanded.
2. My life is a component ofwhat is commanded to me, I have no inherent
"right" to it or claim upon it.
3. My life is only secondarily mine; it primarily and essentially is God's,
whose command I can hear. This command determines the fact that and to
what extent this life is my life.
Life is not the greatest good, nor is it the highest principle that ought to determine our
actions. As discussed above, good is that which God commands, so the desire for life
in and of itself cannot be good. The desire for life is only good when it accords with
God's command, when the desire is for life in proper relationship to God.
In addition to the desire to live, we also have the desire for power - power to
control our environment, or as much of it as is possible to control. Our desire to live
is supported and inhibited by the circumstances of our lives, over which we have
little control. Barth wrote:
Asserting our creaturely life takes place under demands and restrictions that
are not primarily under our own control. For my creaturely life does not
exhaust God's creation. It is lived in the sphere and under the determinations
of the general creaturely life around it... This is the problem of power. To be
powerful means to be successful in maintaining one's life by using whatever
help the creaturely life around us affords, and overcoming the obstacles it
poses. This will to for power is the will to succeed in this way. The simple




will to be happy, and the will to be individual all mean that I also have the
will for power... And as we know that our life-act is neither good nor bad in
itself but reveals itself to be good or bad in the event of our encounter with
God's command, so it is with the will for power which is always implicated
in this life-act.177
This will to power, which is inherent in our will to live, leads to conflict between
individuals and states. As the will to live is inherent in the fact that God commands
us, and since the will to power is inherent in the will to live, Barth seems to imply
that conflict is inherent in the fact that God commands us. The key to understanding
this will to power is in the fact that in itself it is neither good (as Nietzsche argued in
Will to Power) nor evil (as J. Burckhardt argued in Weltgeschichtliche
Betrachtungen); our will to power is revealed to be good or bad in the encounter with
God's command. Good as by definition for Barth only that which God declares to be
good.
The possibility of God taking life back is acknowledged as a result of these
three points. God gives life, God can also take it back and, what is more important
for this discussion, God can command others to take life, acting as God's deputies.
This is not another form of causality - the fact that God may command us to take life
does not mean that God does so. Barth does not argue that killing in order to save life
is command; he rather argues that God only commands us to kill under these
conditions. In other words, the command to kill can only occur when that condition
is present, the presence of that condition, however, does not casually mean the
command to kill is present. There are goods for which God may command us to
place our lives at risk. This may involve an individual decision, such as risking one's
life to save someone else's, or it may involve a corporate decision, such as the
decision to go to war. These decisions, as is true for all ethical decisions, can only be
good when they are made in accordance with the command of God. Thus, war may
be justifiable, but solely on the basis of God's command and not on a quality
inherent in the situation itself.
Life can only be properly understood when the command to live is understood as the




egoism in discussions about life. Life is understood relationally as life in relation to
the Creator, not analogically, where other life is understood as similar to my life.
Other life is understood as being life in relation to the same Creator. The point here is
not that /must live at all costs, but that I may live for God. Therefore, my desire to
live must also include the possibility that I sacrifice my life as an expression of this
desire to live. This understanding of life as creaturely life means that one can no
longer understand other life solely as either helping or hindering one's own desire to
live. Because one sees their life as creaturely life, they must also see other life as
creaturely life. Therefore, one must respect the other's life, as they exist in the same
situation.
Life is a loan from God. We have no inherent right to it and God can and
sometime does command us to place our life at risk to sacrifice our life. Barth wrote:
God can take it [life] back. But as long as God does not do this, so long as a
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person has it, it is given to that person only as an inalienable loan.
We may also be commanded by God to take other's lives as God's deputy. We may
only take other lives when God commands us to do so, and God only commands that
within the two spheres of God the Creator's command to live: the desire to live and
the respect of life. Life is lived in both of these "spheres" - not in a synthesis of both,
but in a kind of unity where both are always present, although one may be
emphasised more in any given moment, but never without the other being integrally
present. Therefore, any discussion ofwar, the goal of which, Barth maintains,
requires "... not merely the most skilful and courageous dedication and possible
forfeiture of one's own life but also quite nakedly and brutally the killing of as many
as possible of the persons who make up the opposing forces"179 must involve both of
these areas - the desire to live and the respect for life. God's command to go to war
must occur within the area of these two spheres. If both are not present, neither is
God's command to go to war. By the same token, the presence of both areas does not
mean one is commanded to go to war. The area here delineated is, as discussed
above, not a positive one but a negative one, marking the area within which the






war falls within both of these spheres does not guarantee that God's command to go
to war is present. We must always listen for the command of God in every situation
anew.
The Ethics of War
War is the execution which a people organized as a state, on account of its
will to live, performs on another people which threatens its will to live. The
problem of war is the question whether such an execution is possible in and
in spite of respect for life.180
War is killing in self-defence when commanded by God to do so- one group of
people decides that the only defence to their existence, which is threatened by
another State, is to attempt to kill as many persons of the opposing side as possible,
thus eliminating the threat. The nature ofwar has changed in modern times, thus
Luther's discussion ofwar is "pointless." Barth wrote:
The intervening [since the Middle Ages] change in the situation is that, in
both practise and theory, the people itself has increasingly become the agent
ofwar... We no longer have soldiers as we have cobblers and doctors but
fundamentally everybody has become a soldier (the recent [1927]
conscription of the whole male and female population from six years up in
France and Italy is simply the logical climax of this development,) and it
would obviously be a misuse of Luther to support the new ideology by his
dialectic and thereby to evade the new and general problem. The new
ideology ofwar, which is to be distinguished from the old one that Luther
contested, is that, in case ofwar, a person as a member of the state
unavoidably has an active part, whether directly or indirectly. That person has
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an active part, then, in the mass killing of enemy soldiers.
The moral dilemma of going to war is whether this "mass killing of enemy soldiers"
and the placing of one's own life at risk can be done in the respect for life. As
discussed above, this respect for life is a result of God the Creator commanding us.
Another way of asking this question is to ask whether the command to go to war that






area God has given for human activity. If that is the case, the command to go to war
may be present. If not, then the command to go to war cannot be present. A State, in
deciding to go to war, is deciding whether or not its citizens ought to attempt to kill
as many of the enemy as possible while placing their own lives at risk. If the
command of God is not present, then the State is calling on its citizens to commit
mass murder. Moreover, as the State is made up of its citizens, the responsibility for
this decision is borne by all members of the State.
Since war is such a terrible event and involves so much suffering, the
question must be asked why there may be cases where war is justified. Barth wrote:
Why do we have to allow the possibility that in the light of the divine
commandment this is a justifiable reason for war, so that a war waged for this
reason must be described as a just war in spite of all the horrors which it will
certainly entail? The obvious answer is that there may well be bound up with
the independent life of a nation responsibility for the whole physical,
intellectual and spiritual life of the people comprising it, and therefore their
relationship to God. It may well be that in and with the independence of a
nation there is entrusted to its people something which, without any claim or
pretension, they are commissioned to attest to others, and which they may not
therefore surrender. It may well be that with the independence of the state,
and perhaps in the form of the legally constituted society guaranteed by it,
they would also have to yield something which must not be betrayed, which
is necessarily more important to than the preservation of life itself, and which
is thus more important than the preservation of the lives of those who
unfortunately are trying to take it from them. It may well be that they are thus
forbidden by God to renounce the independent status of their nation, and that
they must therefore defend it without considering either their own lives or the
lives of those who threaten it. Christian ethics cannot possibly deny that this
case may sometimes occur. The divine command itself posits and presents it
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as a case of extreme urgency.
The question then is under what circumstances may we hear God's command to go
to war. It is important to remember that this command, as in all cases when God
commands the taking of life, is a Grenzfall.n3 The first thing that must be said about
a Grenzfall is that only God can determine when a specific situation is a Grenzfalh
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(Barth 1961), 462.
18j John Howard Yoder argues in his book Karl Barth and the Problem ofWar that Barth here falls
into the casuistry he is trying to avoid. Yoder claims that Barth's concept of the Grenzfall is casuistic
in that it states as the general principle that life can only be taken when life is threatened and then
applies this principle in a specific case. However, this would only be casuistic is Barth claimed that at
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Here as elsewhere the possibility of the Grenzfall is the particular possibility
of God. Nor should we merely persuade ourselves that this is given to us. It is
casuistical frivolity to try to do so. This is something we can only be told. If a
man kills himself without being ordered to do so, then his action is murder.
God may forgive him, but it is still murder, so that none can will to perpetrate
• • •• • • • 184it with uplifted head if he has faith in the gracious God who forgives sins.
Although we cannot determine when a Grenzfall is present, we can discuss under
what conditions such a Grenzfall may be present. This does not mean we ascribe to
that point we have God's command to take life, a claim which he no where makes. It is at that point
that God may command us to take life, but it is not definite that the command is present in such a
case. Although Barth may argue casuistically, he does not fall into a casuistic ethics here, as Yoder
misunderstands, contrary to his statement on page 17 that "at no point did the paper's argument rest
upon a mistaken understanding of Professor Barth's position and intention", what Barth means by the
term Grenzfall. Yoder wrote concerning Barth's view of suicide: "In the instance of suicide, Barth
begins the transition from command to exception..." Yoder assumes that there is a general command
to protect life, to which there may rarely be exceptions where the command requires the opposite:
"Can it ever be that the protection of life, which as a general rule means that suicide is forbidden, may
in certain cases mean the contrary?" (p 30) Concerning his discussion with Barth's view of war,
Yoder wrote; "The discussion with Barth is... not a debate between pacifism and militarism, nor even
between pacifism and non-pacifism. It is rather a debate to be carried on within the pacifist camp,
between one position which is pacifist in all general statements it can make but announces in advance
that it is willing to make major exceptions, and another possibility, nearly the same in theory, which is
not able to affirm in advance the exceptional case." (page 52) Barth, as argued here, maintains that
there is no ethical "rule" only the command of God spoken to a concrete individual in a concrete
situation. The Grenzfall can therefore not mean a case where a general rule is either rescinded or
requires an opposite action, as there can be no general rule. A Grenzfall is rather the boundary of what
God will command us, as limited by God's revelation. With regard to war, Yoder makes much of
Barth's statement that "The divine command [to go to war] itself posits and presents it [war] as a case
of extreme emergency. I may remark in passing that I myself should see it as such a case if there were
any attack on the independence, neutrality and territorial integrity of the Swiss Confederation, and I
should speak and act accordingly." (CD III.4. 462) See Yoder, Chapter 9: The Grenzfall as a Tool of
Ethical Thought, especially page 66: '"If you think there can be extreme cases [Grenzfalle], what kind
of thing do you have in mind?' The defense of Switzerland is the kind of thing Barth has in mind...
We face two possibilities. We can seek to define hypothetically the case in which Switzerland would
be attacked and the conditions under which war would be commanded... or we can look at the point in
history about which Barth could claim that an exception obtained." In a discussion concerning this
section of the Church Dogmatics and its relevance to the debate concerning German rearmament,
Barth said:
"The small printed section [CD III/4 462] - though only three and a half lines - plays an important
role in the discussion, where I said: I personally, in considering Switzerland, and I would still say that
I consider it worthwhile to fight a small war for Switzerland. ... I could perhaps have left out these
three and a half lines. However, I thought it would be the decent thing to do to tell the reader that I
know of a situation where I would say «bellum iustum». We just came from the Hitler war. And I,
for my part, was absolutely certain that Hitler must not be allowed into Switzerland, whatever else
might happen with him. And I not only write against Hitler but would also take up a gun against him
and would help to prevent this - 1 probably would not have prevented it - but I was nonetheless
prepared to do so. And to support this I wrote these three and a half lines about Switzerland, you
know. And not this is rolled out to prove: see - bellum iustum, there it is! I can only say that that is
malicious. That's not the proper way to cite someone. Whoever read this passage honestly must have
noticed that I just said with my last breath that perhaps it can and must happen yet again." (Barth




ourselves the ability to determine when such a situation has arisen. We must avoid
that "casuistical frivolity." The fact that God commands us has, as discussed above,
ramifications for us. These ramifications include, amongst others, that we are
commanded to live and to respect life. Within these boundaries, one can discuss the
possibility of hearing God's command to go to war. Not casuistically, as the just war
theory does by stating conditions which, when fulfilled, justify war. Rather, we can
discuss the conditions, created by the fact that God commands us, under which God
may command us to kill.
In Ethics, Barth described how killing must be understood as a borderline
case:
A feature of the admitted or nonadmitted knowledge of the command of life
as the command of respect for life is that all these possibilities [killing in self-
defence, capital punishment and war], which may actually take very different
forms, have, in all historical periods and areas that have made use of them,
the character of final reasons, borderline possibilities, extreme and by no
means obvious or self-evident necessities... The genuinely or supposedly
permissible or commanded killing of persons has always and everywhere
been felt to be a final and dreadful thing, or at least something that is
surrounded by all kinds of restraints. At this point, then, our first task is
simply to emphasize that in all cases it is true that here no less than in suicide
we have an extreme, a most extreme possibility which the command of
respect surrounds with all kinds of possible question marks. Ethical reflection
and instruction has done a great deal when it has simply underlined as heavily
as possible the borderline character of this possibility.185
Thus, war must always have the character of ultima ratio, of a last method to resolve
a conflict. Christian ethics has the task of reminding the State of this, as Barth wrote
in the Church Dogmatics:
A first essential is that war should not on any account be recognised as a
normal, fixed and in some sense necessary part of what on the Christian view
constitutes the just state, or the political order demanded by God... It
[Christian ethics] cannot assure the state that in the exercise of power either
the state or its organs may do gaily and confidently whatever they think is
right. In such cases it must always confront them with the question whether






In fact, war is not an essential element of the State, rather, it occurs as a result of the
failure of the State to properly be State. Therefore, the Church is pacifist with regard
to war under normal circumstances, although it cannot be pacifist in principle, as
discussed above.
According to the Christian understanding, it is no part of the normal task of
the state to wage war; its normal task is fashion peace in such a way that life
is served and war kept at bay. If there is a mistake with pacifism, apart from
the inadvisable ethical absolutism of its thesis, it consists in the abstract
negation ofwar, as ifwar could be understood and negated in isolation and
not in relation to the so-called peace which precedes it. Our attention should
be directed to this relation. It is when a state does not rightly pursue its
normal task that sooner or later it is compelled to take up the abnormal one of
war, and therefore to inflict this abnormal task on other states.187
The only case where war can be commanded by God is when it is ultima ratio, when
the situation forces a State to decide either to go to war against a threat or to cease to
exist. The reason that God may command a State to go to war in this situation is that
something more precious than mere life may be bound up with the independent
existence of the State. The question facing a state must therefore be existence or
destruction and that State must be commanded by God to protect something even at
the cost of the lives of its citizens and the citizens of the threatening country. If there
are other options, then war is not the last possibility and a Grenzfall is not present. If
the question facing a State is either to fight or give up its independence, then a
Grenzfall may be present; God may be commanding that State to go to war.
Therefore, there is an assumption that one State can bring another State into
abnormal circumstances where war may be commanded. If this is not the case, war
cannot be justified. Barth wrote:
This further point rests on the assumption that the conduct of one state or
nation can throw another into the wholly abnormal situation of emergency in
which not merely greater or lesser prosperity but its very existence and
autonomy are menaced and attacked. In consequence of the attitude of this
other state, a nation can find itself faced by the question whether it must




Nothing less than this final question must be at issue ifwar is to be just and
188
necessary.
By means of extension, if a State has obligations by treaty or otherwise to another
State whose existence is threaten, then that State may also be commanded by God to
fulfil its obligation and go to war on behalfof the other State:
But a similar situation may arise in a different form, e.g., when a state which
is not itself directly threatened or attacked considers itself summoned by the
obligation of a treaty or in some other way to come to the aid of a weaker
neighbour which does actually find itself in this situation. In solidarity with
the state which it tries to help, it will then find itself in a position of true
emergency. As a result of this type of situation, Christian ethics can no longer
be absolutely pacifist, and can not oppose all military action and therefore
• • 189also not all military armament.
To summarise: under normal circumstances, the Church is pacifist with regards to
war. The Church cannot be pacifist as a principle, rejecting all forms of violent self-
defence under all circumstances. War is not understood as always being sinful,
rather, it is sinful under normal circumstances. It may occur that a "true emergency"
or Grenzfall occurs where a state is commanded to go to war. This is always a case
of ultima ratio where the very existence of a State is threatened by another. This does
not casuistically guarantee that the Grenzfall is present; it however must be present
for the command of God to go to war to be present. War is not commanded for any
reason other than to protect the existence of a State - it can be justified when it is
fought to expand a nation's political or economic influence, it also cannot be fought
to maintain a State's standard of living.
If, then, the Grenzfall is present and a State goes to war, then it must do so
with "joyous and reckless determination."190 The potential results of the war are
irrelevant - one's chances for success have no effect on God's command. IfGod's
command to go to war is present, then going to war is righteous and ought to be







There can certainly be no question of howling with the pack, or of
enunciating a military code invented ad hoc, but only of preaching the Gospel
of the lordship of God's free grace and of direction to the prayer which will
not consist in the invocation of a pagan god of history and battles, but which
will always derive from, and return to, the dona nobispacem. In this form,
however, the message of the Church may and should be a call to marital
resolution which can be righteous only as an act of obedience but which as
such can be truly righteous, which can be powerful only as an act of faith but
which as such can be truly powerful.191
This understanding ofwar clearly falls under Luther's famous statement pecca
fort iter, crede fortius. If you understand God's command to be to go to war, then do
so boldly. If you are wrong to do so, God's grace is sufficient. This is one of the
methods for understanding the command of God - if it is present, then you will go
forward boldly and do so. If you hesitate or are unsure, then it may well be that you
have failed to hear the command properly. Barth questions whether the persons
involved in the plot to assassinate Hitler on the twentieth of July, 1944 had the
command ofGod to do so:
When it was already too late, the attempt actually made by Count Claus von
Stauffenberg on July 20, 1944, was bound to fail... We do not blame these
men for what Kordt calls their (and his own) "inadequacy." The only lesson
to be learned is that they had no clear and categorical command from God to
do it. Otherwise they would have had to overcome what was not in any case
an ethical difficulty. Nor can we seriously blame these men for seriously
considering and even deciding upon assassination. In such a situation it might
well have been the command of God. For all we know, perhaps it was, and
they failed to hear it.192
Therefore, ifwe believe we have the command of God to kill, then we must do so
resolutely and in the confidence that that action is righteous. Ifwe are not that
certain, then we ought to listen again for God's command. It may well be that we






The Ethics ofWorld War Two
Barth clearly supported the Allied war effort against the Axis. He therefore
understood that God was commanding the Allies to fight. The question we therefore
have to deal with here is how this command of God is present, how did Barth
understand his situation not only to allow the possibility of a Grenzfall, but indeed
that this situation was a Grenzfall.
In his lecture (discussed above) "VerheiBung und Verantwortung der
christlichen Gemeinde im heutigen Zeitgeschehen" Barth analyses the circumstances
of World War Two in order to understand God's will and governance in the events so
to assist in ethical decision-making concerning the war. For Barth, the war began in
1933 with the founding of a "warrior-State like the world has never seen before."
This State wanted to be godlike and made godlike claims upon and promises to the
German people. The Jews were, from the very beginning, the archenemies of this
State. The international community did not always understand that this was not
merely an internal German matter, but affected everyone. Three years after the
founding of this State, it began to threaten other States around it - making and
breaking treaties with them at will. For the National-Socialist State, the "Jewish
problem" was the central issue. This was so at the very beginning, and became
increasingly clear as time went on. The reason for the rabid anti-Semitism is that the
Nazis, as discussed above, wanted to make themselves like God. "One does not fight
against the Jew Jesus for no reason. One raises one's self up against the secret of
God's decision."19j The fact that the Jews are God's chosen people, through whom
he blessed all people, made them the enemy of the Nazis, who wanted to be master
of not only their own destiny but of the destiny of the world. They believed that the
Germans were the superior race and should be the lord of the Earth. The rabid Anti-
Semitism of the Nazi's was the result of their ideological belief that the Germans




Jesus: "The Jewish problem is the Christ problem."194 The mass destruction of the
Jews in the Shoah must lead the Church to pray for forgiveness. Barth wrote:
What kind of a picture is this, which is brought before our eyes in the middle
of the current events, in the needless and defenceless slaughtering and
sacrificing of the Jewish people? Is it not the one who was punished and
tortured for everyone else, the servant of God from the book of Isaiah, is it
not "in a mirror darkly" our Lord Jesus Christ himself who, in the destiny of
each of the innumerable murdered or buried alive, in overfull cattle cars or
finally murdered by poison gas Jews from Germany and France, Poland and
Hungary, is made visible? What an amazing sign of revelation, what a letter,
what a word, what a proof for the existence of God! Is it possible that a
Christian congregation does not see what, or who, this is about? That a
Christian does not fall to his or her knees: All of our sins you have born!
Lord, have mercy upon us! Not the Jew, but in the shadow of the persecuted
and killed Jews you are the one, whose rejection, in all its entire
incomprehensibility is shown here yet again, of your lonely death we are here
once again reminded.19"7
Therefore, the Nazi ideology by rejecting the Jews must also reject Jesus and is
therefore directly opposed to the Christian church. The reason Barth opposed the
Nazis is clear.
The Nazis had to reject the Jews in order to make their godlike claim upon
the Germany. They wanted to be lord of all in their State: "The German venture
existed essentially and at its core - and just that is the German solution to the Jewish
problem - in this, that it wanted to intervene in the rule ofGod."196
Precisely in line with the genuine Christian belief in the resurrection of Jesus
Christ from the dead and with the belief that all power in heaven and on earth
has been given to him, we must say to German National-Socialism neither
Yes, nor Yes and No, but, from our entire hearts and in firm determination,
we must say No. Otherwise, one must have not properly understood the
message of the Bible nor have thought it through to the end or one must
suffer from a kind of schizophrenia, in which one has one has quite











Therefore, it is clear that Nazism is to be rejected by the Church. Nevertheless, that
in itself does not mean that the Grenzfall is present. One of the first criteria for the
possibility of the Grenzfall is that it be the last possible action. For Barth that was
already the case in 1938 when France and Great Britain gave in to Hitler's demands
concerning the Sudetenland in Czechoslovakia. During that crisis, while Hitler was
meeting with the leaders of France and Great Britain in Munich, Barth wrote n his
well-known letter to Professor Hromadka in Prague:
As of yet - I am writing this on Monday afternoon - the worst, that the
Western powers agree to the insane demands ofGermany, has not happened.
But if it should happen? Will your government and your people nonetheless
remain firm? I can clearly see what kind of a never-ending burden and
suffering you would bring upon yourselves. But I still dare to hope that the
sons of the old Hussites would then show Europe, which has become too soft,
that there still are men around today. Every Czechoslovakian soldier who
then fights and suffers will also do so for us, and, I can wholeheartedly say,
he will also do so for the Church of Jesus Christ, which can only fall into
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ridiculousness or eradication in the orbit of Hitler and Mussolini.
The Western powers did in fact give into the German demands, and the
Czechoslovakian government did not fight the Germans. Six months later, the
Germans broke the agreement ofMunich and took over all of Czechoslovakia:
We experienced in the autumn of 1938 - and all of the church-bells were
rung as a result - the peace agreement of Munich, which six months later was
ripped up by the victors who forced that agreement through. And so it
continued - until the resistance of the others became, reluctantly enough,
unavoidable as a result of the new threats and acts of violence.199
It is thus clear that, for Barth, at least, war was the ultima ratio against the Nazi
aggression.
Another element of the Grenzfall is that the decision is made that the
command ofGod is given without consideration of the possible result of following
that command. If God commands us to go to war, then the question of our success or
failure is irrelevant. As mentioned above, Barth felt that the conspirators around





unconditionally, because they were not willing to do so without regard for the
consequences. If war is justified, then the chance for success is absolutely irrelevant.
Since a Grenzfall is determined by believing that God is commanding one to do
something that is not normally acceptable, the chances of success can play no role. If
that were a criterion, that would mean that there are other possibilities against which
the chances for success are to be measured in which case all other possibilities have
not yet been exhausted. If all other possibilities have not been exhausted, then a State
is not justified in going to war. War can only be chosen in "the last hour of the
darkest day," when the State is in a "true emergency" "This is the duty of the church
and Christian ethics, to remind the State of the horrors of war, and that the decision
to go to war, when not truly a Grenzfall and commanded by God, is a decision to
commit mass murder." Barth wrote:
In this matter, Christian ethics must above all itself feel a distinct terror and,
with that, a distinct distance to war, and it must make that terror and distance
clear to others.200
The church (including theology and Christian ethics) must therefore continue to
prolong this decision, to throw its weight against the decision to go to war until this
"last hour of the darkest day" has arrived. Then:
If it [Christian ethics] has said all there is to be said about the just peace and
the practical avoidability ofwar; if it has honestly and resolutely opposed a
radical militarism, it may then add that, should the command of God require a
nation to defend itself in such an emergency, then it not only may but should
do so. It may also add that if this is basically the only reason for war on the
basis of its constitution and history and in the minds of all its responsible
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citizens, then it may and should arm for it even in the peacetime.
The question is when that "last hour" has arrived. Barth's answer to this is discussed







Barth and the Holocaust: Humanitarian Intervention
For Barth, the Flolocaust was the final expression of the claim to absolute
power of Hitler and the Nazi leadership. Barth does not argue that the Allies should
fight against Germany in order to protect the Jewish people , as important as that
may be. He rather argues that because the Nazi's make sinful claims to have absolute
authority they are to be resisted. The Holocaust is an expression of this sinful claim
to authority.
Barth regretted that the Barmen Declaration of 1934, for which he was
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largely responsible, did not mention the Nazi's anti-Semitism. In a letter to
Eberhard Bethge from May 1967 concerning the publication of Bethge's biography
of Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Barth wrote:
I have learned many things about Bonhoeffer for the first time, or they have
first made an impact on me, in your book... Especially new to me was the
fact that in 1933 and the years following, Bonhoeffer was the first and almost
only one to face and tackle the Jewish question so centrally and energetically.
I have long since regarded it as a fault on my part that I did not make this
question a decisive issue, at least publicly in the church conflict (e.g. in the
two Barmen Declarations I drafted in 1934). A text in which I might have
done so would not, of course, have been acceptable to the mindset of even the
"confessors" of that time, whether in the reformed or the general synod. But
this does not excuse the fact that since my interests were elsewhere I did not
at least formally put up a fight on the matter.204
As early as 1933, shortly following Hitler's rise to power, Barth wrote:
The Judenfrage is clearly, from a theological point-of-view, the expression of
everything that is happening in our time. ... Precisely in the Judenfrage I
could not go the smallest step with National Socialism. If at any point then
here, I believe, one must stop and see the boundary beyond which one can
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only go by betraying the Gospel.
202 For an exhaustive study of Barth's relation to the Jews, see (Busch 1996). Busch makes the
suffering at the Jews more central to Barth's theological and political work of the 1930s and 1940s
than I do here.
203 See (Barth 1984) for a collection of Barth's later comments on Barmen.
204
(Barth 1981), 250.
205 Letter to Fr. Dalmann from 1. September 1933. Quoted in (Busch 1996), 49
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Barth preached a sermon in December 1933 concerning Jesus the Jew:
He had to preach again on 10 December. This particular sermon caused a stir
by its clear recognition that 'Jesus Christ was a Jew'. It touched on the
'Jewish question - not because I wanted to touch on it, but because I had to
touch on it in expounding the text (which on this occasion, too, was
prescribed by the lectionary). Some of the congregation left the church in
protest during the sermon. Writing to one woman from the congregation
afterwards in a letter, Barth confirmed that 'anyone who believes in Christ,
who was himself a Jew, and died for Gentiles and Jews, simply cannot be
involved in the contempt for Jews and ill-treatment of them which is now the
order of the day.'206
207Kristallnachr , in English Crystal Night, was the first organized, violent persecution
of the Jews in Germany. Arno J. Mayer describes this tragic event:
The infamous Crystal Night ofNovember 9-10, 1938 - the twentieth
anniversary of the revolution of 1918 and the fifteenth anniversary of the
Munich Putsch of 1923 - was no more spontaneous than the great boycott of
five and a half years before. At about midnight, Gestapo locals were notified
by phone and telegraph that at the "earliest possible moment you are to take
actions against Jews, in particular against their synagogues," whose archives
were to be spared. They were also to arrest "between 20,000 and 30,000
Jews," preferably "wealthy Jews." A subsequent order specified that the Jews
to be interned in concentration camps should be healthy adult males of under
sixty years of age, and that they should not be roughed up. ...
The assaults started at 1 a.m. on November 10 and continued full-force until
early that evening. The targets for attack were identical all over the German
Reich. Synagogues were set on fire, while Torah scrolls, prayer books, and
tallithim were thrown into the streets and burned. Firemen were summoned
not to put out the flames but to keep the fire from spreading to adjoining
buildings. The licensed vandals also attacked Jewish-owned stores in
commercial districts, breaking shop- windows and tossing merchandise into
the street. Quite a few shops were either completely gutted or severely
damaged. ...
By all accounts, considerable crowds gathered to witness the desecration of
synagogues, the sack of Jewish shops and the arrest of Jewish neighbors.208
This event clearly demonstrated the nature of the Nazis' Jewish policies. Three
weeks later Barth gave a lecture entitled "The Church & the Political Problem ofOur
206
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Day." This lecture was, to a large extent, a response to the Kristallnacht. Barth
wrote:
Quite apart from National Socialism's revelation of itself, the Church which
cannot have heard the Word of the true God in vain ought to have established
from her own perceptions and knowledge, that in the innermost and real and
most holy essence ofNational Socialism, in its mystical faith and not in any
"excrescences," there has entered the field not just another God, not just a
strange God, but a hostile God, an evil God and a hostile, evil service of God.
But the really decisive, biblical, theological reason for the church establishing
this, does not lie in the various anti-Christian asservations and actions of
National Socialism. On the contrary it lies in that thing which just in this last
week has especially moved us, viz. the anti-Semitism, which is one of its
principles. Were this to stand by itself it would quite in itself suffice to justify
the sentence; National Socialism is the anti-Church fundamentally hostile to
Christianity. ... When that occurs which in this matter is now in Germany
notoriously resolved upon and already put into practise, namely the "physical
extermination" of the people of Israel, the burning of Synagogues and
Scriptures, the rejection of the "Jew God" and the "Jew Bible" as being the
very essence of all that which ought to be an abomination to the German
"man" - then it is thereby and thereby alone decided that there the attempt is
being made to strike a mortal blow into the roots of the Church. Can anyone
so much as want to close his or her ears to all the unutterable misery caused
by this anti-Semitic pest, crying to Heaven in every German country? But
how is it possible that our Christian ears do not tingle in view of what this
plight and malignancy mean? Objectively, what are we without Israel? The
one who rejects and persecutes the Jews rejects and persecutes the one who
died for the sins of the Jews - and then, and only thereby for our sins as well.
The one who is a radical enemy of the Jews, were that one in every other
regard an angel of light, shows that he or she is, as such, a radical enemy of
Jesus Christ. Anti-Semitism is a sin against the Holy Ghost. For anti-
Semitism means rejection of the grace of God. But National Socialism lives,
moves, and has its being in anti-Semitism.209
Barth continues by arguing that such a State as a Nazi Germany has ceased to be a
just State and this State's expansion must be resisted:
Whatever the Church may have to say, or not have to say, to other wars - in
this regard we speak also of the church and the political question of to-day
this is certain: as a praying Church she must support armed defence against






As impassioned as Barth's rejection of anti-Semitism is, it does not amount to an
argument that the use of military force against Germany was justified on
humanitarian grounds in order to protect the Jews and others who were persecuted by
the Nazis.211 Resistance is called for against an unjust State that seeks to expand its
influence. For Barth, the Nazis anti-Semitism was a result of their claim to absolute
authority. It is because of this claim that Nazism must be rejected. It is also as a
result of this claim to absolute authority over life and death that the Holocaust
212occurred.
It is in this way that one can see Barth arguing for a humanitarian
intervention - not in order to prevent the torture and death of a large number of
innocent persons, as important as that may be, but to prevent a person or group from
making Godlike claims to authority over all areas of life. This is because, as
discussed above, Barth argues that it is a fact of human existence that humans exist
as created beings. Any claim to absolute authority over all areas of life is therefore to
be understood as sinful and resisted. The claim by a government to have authority
over life and death is therefore an expression of human sinfulness by human usurping
God's authority as Creator. This usurpation often, if not always, results in the
suffering of people under this sinful authority of the State. In this way, Barth can be
understood to be arguing for humanitarian military intervention backwards. The
problem is not primarily the suffering caused by an evil authority; the problem is the
claim to power that a civil authority must make in order to persecute persons and
groups within (and without) its jurisdiction. The suffering caused by a government is
therefore a symptom of the root problem that must be resisted. It is in this way that
211 One important reason for this was that the extent of the Nazis persecution of the Jews was not
known in 1938, when Barth began to argue for military action against Germany, nor was it known in
1939 when the war started. In 1965 Barth wrote to Oscar Moppert"... we in Switzerland first began
to learn about the nature and dimension of the horror of the persecution of the Jews after the end of the
war." (Barth 1975), 287. In addition, the Holocaust itself did not begin until after that war was
underway. There was therefore no way Barth could have argued that military intervention was
necessary in order to prevent the death of innocent Jews (and others).
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Irving Greenberg argues is a somewhat similar way, although he locates the decisive element of the
Holocaust not in the Nazi's claim to absolute authority over life and death but in the modern belief in
the absolute authority of rationality over life (what Niebuhr would term henotheism). Greenberg wrote
"No assessment of modern culture can ignore the fact that science and technology - the accepted
flower and glory of modernity - now climaxes in the factories of death; the awareness that unlimited,
value-free use of knowledge ... had paved the way for bureaucratic and scientific death
campaign."(Greenberg 1977), 15. Bertold Klappert provides an interesting discussion of this issue and
cites Greenberg. See (Klappert 1994), chapter 10.
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Barth's support of the Allies must be understood, especially since that support came
before Barth (or anyone else) knew of the atrocities that the Nazi government would
commit.
The Barmen Declaration, as Barth wrote to Bethge, did not mention the
Jewish situation in Germany. However, the root cause of the problem is clearly and
direct refuted throughout the Barmen Declaration:
1. ... Jesus Christ, as he is testified to us in the Holy Scripture, is the one
Word ofGod, whom we are to hear, whom we are to trust and obey in life
and in death. ...
2. ... We repudiate the false teaching that there are areas of our life in which
we belong not to Jesus Christ but another lord ...
5. ... We repudiate the false teaching that the state can and should expand
beyond its special responsibility to become the single and total order of
human life, and also thereby fulfill the commission of the church.
We repudiate the false teaching that the church can and should expand
beyond its special responsibility to take on the characteristics, functions and
213
dignities of the state, and thereby become itself an organ of the state.
It is this root cause of idolatry or henotheism (to use Niebuhr's term) that provided
the reason for Barth's support for resistance to the Nazi State. This resistance
included, at least from 1938 on, war against Germany.
Barth, for the reasons discussed here, would never say that the claim to power
of the Nazi State, or the tragedy of the Holocaust, show when war is permissible.
War is only morally permissible when the command of God to go to war is present;
then going to war is not only permissible, it is required. When a government claims
to have the authority to deem a group - be it a group based on race or religion or
some other criteria - to be unworthy not only of the protection of the government but
to be unworthy of life, it is clear that that government has overstepped its God-given
authority and has become demonic. That does not guarantee that war is morally
commanded, but it does indicate in Barthian terms that the command of God to go to
war may be present. Therefore, a humanitarian crisis may mean that the command of
God to go to war is present, so that other nations ought to use force to intervene in
that nation's affairs and prevent, or at least stop the suffering that a demonic State is
causing. But, for Barth, there can be no set of criteria - humanitarian or other - that
213 The Barmen Declaration, in (Leith 1982), 518-522.
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demonstrates that a nation ought to go to war. This would, as discussed above, be
casuistry and sinful. Yet there is a humanitarian use ofmilitary force when the
command of God to go to war is heard in the suffering of people under an unjust
authority.
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Chapter III: H. Richard Niebuhr
Introduction
Niebuhr's work is of a different type from Barth. Niebuhr was more
concerned with relationship between faith and ethics than with dogmatics proper.
William Stacy Johnson in his introduction to H. RichardNiebuhr: Theology, History,
and Culture stated the matter succinctly:
In the narrow sense of creedal formulas, doctrine was never the primary focus
for H. Richard Niebuhr. Niebuhr fits much more readily into Karl Barth's
category of the "irregular" or "occasional" theologians, that vast majority of
theologians for whom what matters most is not the system-building of
dogmatic treatises but the application of theological insight into pressing
problems of the day, whose highest work is not creating a summa for all time
but speaking an intelligible word for this time.214
We therefore will have to look more at his ethics and less at his theology than we did
with Barth. In looking at Niebuhr's ethics and understanding of humans - before -
God and God - before - humans, as Niebuhr stated it, we will also look at his
theological and philosophical propositions that support these arguments. The
theology is implied in ethics, rather than the other way around. Unlike Barth,
however, we will not look at his dogmatics.
Ethics of responsibility
Niebuhr argues that there have been two "classic" approaches to ethics: a
deontological method and a teleological method. Deontologic ethics argues from the
point of view of law: human beings are understood as citizens who make and obey
laws. The ethical question here is: "Which law am I obeying?" Teleologic ethics, on
the other hand, understands humans as makers who seek to bring about a goal - the
ethical question is "Which end am I serving?" and "Is this decision conducive or
prohibitive of accomplishing this end?" Niebuhr offers a third symbol to these other
214
(Niebuhr and Johnson 1996), x.
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two, the symbol of responsibility, which asks the question: "What is happening
now?" Humans are understood as responders, always engaged in dialogue; their
actions are always in response to prior actions upon them and in anticipation of
responses to their responses. There are four elements to responsibility: first, all of our
actions are responses', second, our responses are responses to our interpretations of
prior action upon us; third, we are accountable for our actions in that we must act in
anticipation of responses to our action; fourth, all of our actions are done in social
solidarity with others, in other words, in a continuing discourse.
This diagram shows Niebuhr's triadic nature of response: The self comes to the, for
lack of a better term, phenomenon not as a blank page but with a history of her or his
own and her or his culture. The self interprets a phenomenon (B). She or he interprets
this not in itself, but by means ofmemory - that is, categories, language and schemes
inherited from the culture (C) and knowledge gained (E and F) previous encounters
with either this phenomenon or phenomena interpreted as being similar. However,
the self s interpretation also is made in anticipation of a response (confirming or
refuting) from the phenomenon to the self s response (A). The self also verifies her
or his interpretation of and response to the phenomena with others who also have
encountered it (C and D).
A good example of this triadic nature of response is the action of the self in
response to a natural event. The natural event is interpreted as thing-like; in other
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words, we do not interpret it as knowing us. This interpretation comes from my
society. I also use language and other symbols from my society in order to
understand it better. In other words, from my community I receive the categorical
schemes used to organise and interpret the natural event. I also receive from my
relation to others verification ofmy reports of the encounter, as other members of the
society have also been in encounter with this natural event or similar ones. The
individual who is responding to various natural events and various other selves is a
unity - he or she is not one "I" when responding to X and a different one when
responding to Y. This unity exists because we are always responding to a third
element we interpret as being active in all the others. This "third element" is more
universal - it is active in all the other Thous and Its to which we respond. It is what
enables us to centre our experience. It is the centre that allows us to interpret and
value all events to which we respond. For example, the patriot responds to all things
and interprets all events by means of this central "loyalty" or the thing to which she
or he is responding in all other things, in this case, by means of his or her nation. All
events and persons are valued on the basis of what they can do to further the nation.
We have conflicting loyalties, which are active at different times in different
situations and may come into conflict with each other. This will lead Niebuhr to the
conclusion that one of the main aspects of his symbol of responsibility is the quest
for personal integrity. This move toward the universal is found in teleological as well
as deontologic ethics; in deontology we end up asking, "What is the universal form
of the law?" In teleological ethics, we ask, "What idea is being realised in the totality
of being? What is the form of the good that is the form of the whole?" In
responsibility, we ask, "What am I responding to in all ofmy responses to actions
upon me?"
Teleological and deontological ethics both operate under the assumption that
humans are masters of their destiny and can shape the future by their current actions
or determine the proper action on the basis of the general principles applied to
particular situations (casuistry). For Niebuhr, suffering demonstrates that humans are
not the masters of their destiny:
Because suffering is the exhibition of the presence in our existence of that
which is not under our control, or of the intrusion into our self-legislating
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existence of an activity operating under another law than ours, it cannot be
brought adequately within the spheres of teleological and deontological
91 S
ethics, the ethics of man-the-maker, or man-the citizen.
It is war where one most clearly sees the problem of suffering - the relatively
innocent suffering for the sins of the relatively guilty. This shows, according to
Niebuhr, that we are not the makers of our own destiny nor do we live in a universe
governed by retributive justice in which the good flourish and the evil suffer. We
rather live in a web of relations many of which lie outside of our control yet have
profound impact on our life. As both teleological and deontological ethics fail to take
adequate account of this aspect of human existence, a different model is required.
For Niebuhr's ethics, the responsible self is a "time-full and historic being." For
teleological and deontological theories, the triadic understanding of time as past,
present and future is not of much importance . In deontology, a person responds to
universal law that is by definition beyond all time - as Kant said: "The future is not
one ofmy concerns." In teleology, a person is seen as striving to accomplish some
goal in the future, in the limited time allotted to a person, but it lacks any
understanding of the critical present or of the past. The present is only understood in
terms of the goal to be realised in the future. Responsibility provides a more adequate
model for understanding the time-full and historical being. The past and future are
always present to this person - the past as still-present and future as already-present.
The past is present as memory - habits of behaviour, speech, thought, memories of
past encounters (guilt). The future is present as our expectations and anxieties about
impending questions, unfamiliar actions and encounters. These both affect my
present encounters: the social past provides me with language, modes of
understanding and interpreting present encounters, while the personal past colours
my interpretations of current encounters (fear, guilt, joy, past meetings, past
responses). The future is also a major influence on my current responses: the
215
(Niebuhr 1963), 60.
216 Gotthard Oblau wrote concerning Barth's understanding of time: "Analogous to the attempt to
come to terms with the nature of the reality of the past, we also see the attempt to subsume the future
ontologically to the present. One says that the future has its materialiter in the present. ... Barth sees a
principal difference between the telos implicit in the present and future existence. The criterion of
difference is not the difference between noetic and ontic. The difference consists in that the noetic or
ontic telos of a given situation or action is does not belong solely to the future, but is also a predicate
of the present. This telos nonetheless remains future in relation to the future." (Oblau 1988), 48, 50.
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question of whether or not I expect to encounter in the future the agency acting on
me now is one example of this influence. Therefore, the question is not only of
Tightness or wrongness, nor of goodness or badness, but also of their fittingness or
unfittingness in the total movement in time, in the whole conversation.
The responsible self also has more freedom, as the question of human
freedom is "the question of the self s ability in its present to change its past and
future and to achieve or receive a new understanding of its ultimate historical
917
context." There are two ways in which we can change our inherited patterns of
interpretation: anti-traditionally or by means of a reinterpretation of the past. The
anti-traditional method is the way of Descartes and radical empiricism. It entails the
rejection of inherited beliefs about the nature of reality for the method of empirical
research - if a belief is not empirically verifiable, then it cannot be true. This method
has been most successful in the natural sciences, but can only succeed in the social
realm when it is able to reduce all others (persons, ideas, and societies) to objects. On
the other hand, the method of reinterpreting the past does not reject the past, as the
anti-traditional method does, but re-examines and reinterprets it in light of new
understandings. In understanding our past in a different way, our present attitudes
and actions can be changed. A new orientation of the self can also result from
reinterpretations of the future. Reinterpreting the past, however, is not sufficient to
transform our present "understanding of action upon us or our general mode of fitting
response so long as our sense of the ultimate context remains unrevised." The great
religions, and Christianity in particular, challenge our ultimate context, and, thereby,
our very being.
Humans have their being, according to Niebuhr, in absolute dependence. We
do not choose to exist; a radical action has thrown us into existence. Indeed, it is
questionable whether we can choose to cease to exist - 6/ocide is clearly possible,
but is suicide? The act by which one exists cannot be interpreted - it is a unique act
which we cannot understand by any kind of analogy, nor can we understand it by
referring to other, similar events that have happened to us. It is a unique event,
although it happened to every person. This question ofmere being is deepened by the




first part of answering this question is to recognise that I am who I am as a result of
action upon me, as discussed above. The better I can understand this, the more fitting
my responses to actions upon me can be. The better one understands their biological
functions in terms of response, the better they can respond to their body; for
example, when someone with heart problems exercises in order to improve their
health. Understanding my intellectual ideas as coming from the actions of others
upon me also helps me to understand that these ideas do not come from some kind of
pure reason, but are conditioned by my experience.
The feeling of absolute dependence is very uncomfortable, most people
respond by ignoring it, asking, "What is human?" rather than "Why am 11?" thereby
moving from the personal to generalities, turning the "I" into an object, not a self.
Thus, we ask what the meaning of human life is, rather than what the meaning ofmy
life is. The other way of responding to this dependence is to interpret the radical
action by which I am I as the action of some deluded power.
Both of these responses are expressions of faith, but of negative faith and,
therefore, are inconsistent with Christian faith. Niebuhr defines faith as
... the attitude of the self in its existence toward all the existences that
surround it, as beings to be relied upon or to be suspected. It is the attitude
that appears in all the weariness and confidence of life as it moves about
among the living. It is fundamentally trust or distrust in being itself... Faith
as trust or distrust accompanies all our encounters with others and qualifies
all our responses. But it is the chief ingredient in our interpretation of the
radical act or agency by which we are selves, here and now.218
The interpretation of the agency that throws us into being is the most basic element
in our fundamental interpretation of the world. There are only two ways to respond:
trust or distrust. Ifwe assume this agency is neutral and does not work for or against
us, then we cannot trust it anymore than ifwe see it as a malevolent force. Ifwe call
this agency "God," it may indicate a positive understanding of it, since God in
common parlance means "good." This fundamental trust or distrust colours all our
responses. Indeed, it is this power to which we respond in all our encounters that




which society I respond in my actions. If I always seek to respond to the One creative
power, then all my companions are part of one universal society, which has at its
centre neither me, nor any cause, but the transcendent One. This also has major
ramifications for my understanding of good and evil: if I trust the power that created
me and all that is, then all that is, is good. In summary, Niebuhr wrote:
Monotheistic idealism [teleology] says: 'Remember God's plan for your life.'
Monotheistic deontology commands: 'Obey God's law in all your obediences
to finite rules.' Responsibility says: 'God is acting in all actions upon you. So
respond in all actions upon you as to respond to his action.'219
Sin is, according to the deontological model, disobedience to law and must be
punished. Our current problems are the result of past sins. The first question is
therefore, "Does the punishment fit the crime?" The second question is, "Why do the
innocent suffer and the unrighteous flourish?" For Niebuhr, this question is
paramount for discussing the morality of war, an event in which we very clearly see
the innocent suffering for the sins of the guilty. We will return to this below.
According to this model, salvation is the pardoning of the transgressor - provided
she or he repents of their sins. This position often, though not always, leads to a
substitutionary atonement theory of the crucifixion. This symbol has significantly
changed the lives ofmany people, and its symbols (such as "commandment,"
"obedience," "justification," etc.) have become imbedded in our Christian discourse.
However, it does present certain problems. There is a paradox between law and
Gospel - the law requires us to love God and neighbour, but if it is a requirement,
then it is not love. Also: the action of the one redeemed must be obedient to the will
of another (God), yet, if redeemed, then that obedience must be freedom.
In the teleological mode, sin is understood as hamartia, missing the mark. It
is vice; the perverse direction human drives strive to go. The consequences of sin
here are loss and confusion, rather than guilt. Salvation is then the restoration to
humans of the vision ofGod and the restoration of reflected image ofGod in
humans. It is also the gift of the ability to move again toward the proper telos. This




has provided many insights into the human situation. However, it also presents some
problems. There is a problem of vision and image: the goal of life is to be seen by
God, known by God and loved by God, yet is also the perfection of the one who is
being seen by God. H. Richard Niebuhr's biggest problem with this model is that it is
anthropocentric. He wrote:
The theory of teleology, whether Christian or non-Christian, always directs
attention to the primacy of the human pursuit of the ideal good. But it remains
most difficult to reconcile this with the Christian conviction and experience
of the primacy of God's action: in making himself known by the revelation of
his goodness rather than allowing himself to be found by search; in giving the
faith, the love, and the hope that aspire toward him; in creating and re¬
creating, making and remaking. There is always a surd, a contradiction, when
the image of man-the-maker and the image ofGod-the-creator and re-creator
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are combined in one picture.
In practice, both theories tend to be used together to understand the human situation.
"The law is introduced into the scheme of salvation by restoration of the image, or
the idea of perfection is introduced into a scheme of thinking that takes obedience as
?? 1 •
its point of departure." This does not solve the problems with each model, and
there are many points of conflict between both of them that also remain unresolved.
The combination is therefore incomplete.
However, when one uses the model of responsibility to understand both the
deontological and teleological models, many problems are resolved. As in
deontological ethics, the fitting response to divine command is obedience, but that is
not the only kind of action to which we respond - there are also other kinds of
actions requiring a different kind of response. Our obedience or disobedience is also
understood as being less dependent on our understanding the law itself and more
dependent on our interpretation of the one acting upon us with the command. The
Gospel, understood as a declaration of divine action, requires a different response
than the divine command.
Ethics of responsibility also provides assistance with the problems in






problem of anthropocentrism is solved - human action is a secondary response to the
primary action of God. And since the goal of human life must be understood in
eschatological rather than teleological terms, the problem of vision and image is also
solved. Responsibility does not replace or supplant deontology or teleology, it merely
provides a new means to understand them and, at the same time, provides a means to
understand other kinds of human behaviour.
Sin is understood with this model as being internal division and conflict. This
results from being one person yet, at the same time, responding to many different
events in many different ways. Without any way of unifying these events, the
individual's responses remain unreconciled and not unified. In all ofmy multiple,
non-unified responses I am not true to the One who acts in all actions upon me. The
question is how do we find unity in all of the events to which we respond. This leads
to Niebuhr's understanding of God's presence in human history.
God and History in Niebuhr's Thought
Niebuhr makes a distinction between external and internal history. External
history is history viewed objectively and neutrally, "the succession of events which
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an uninterested spectator can see from the outside." It is thus the impersonal
history of objects. Internal history is personal; it is our history that has meaning for
us as participants in it. The difference between the two is crucial for an
understanding ofNiebuhr's ethics ofwar, so we must discuss it at some length.
Niebuhr illustrates the difference by referring to the American Declaration of
Independence:
The distinction between our history and events in impersonal time, or
between history as lived and as contemplated from the outside, may be
illustrated by contrasting parallel descriptions of the same event. Lincoln's
Gettysburg Address begins with history: 'Four-score and seven years ago our
fathers brought forth upon this continent a new nation, conceived in liberty
and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created free and equal.' The




fashion: 'On July 4, 1776, Congress passed the resolution which made the
colonies independent communities, issuing at the same time the well-known
Declaration of Independence. Ifwe regard the Declaration as the assertion of
an abstract political theory, criticism and condemnation are easy. It sets out
with a general proposition so vague as to be practically useless. The doctrine
of equality ofmen, unless it be qualified and conditioned by reference to
special circumstance, is either a barren truism or a delusion.'
The striking dissimilarity between these two accounts may be explained as
being due merely to a difference of sentiment; the blind devotion of the
patriot is opposed to the critical acumen and dispassionate judgment of the
scientific historian. But the disparity goes deeper. The difference in sentiment
is so profound because the beings about which the accounts speak differ
greatly; the 'Congress' is one thing, 'our fathers' are almost another reality.
The proposition that all men are created free and equal, to which the fathers
dedicated their lives, their fortunes and their sacred honor, and which for their
children is to be the object of a new devotion, seems to belong to a different
order of ideas than that to which the vague and useless, barren truism or
delusion belongs. Though these various terms point to the same ultimate
realities the later are seen in different aspects and apprehended in different
contexts. Moreover it seems evident that the terms the external historian
employs are not more truly descriptive of the things-in-themselves than those
the statesman uses and that the former's understanding ofwhat really
happened is not more accurate than the latter's. In the one case the events of
history are seen from outside, in the other from inside. Lincoln spoke of what
happened in our history, of what had made and formed us and to which we
remain committed so long as we continue to exist as Americans; he spoke of
purposes which lie in our enduring past and are therefore the purposes of our
present life; he described the history of living beings and not data relating to
dead things. It is a critical history but the criticism of its author is not directed
toward the general propositions so much as to the human beings who measure
themselves and are measured by means of those general propositions;
criticism is moral, directed toward selves and their community. The other
account abstracts from living selves with their resolutions and commitments,
their hopes, and fears. It is not critical ofmen but of things; documents and
propositions are its objects. The events it describes happened in impersonal
time and are recorded less in the memories of persons than in books and
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monuments.
This quote shows Niebuhr's classification of history. Neither internal nor external
history is understood to be truer than the other, nor less critical. Internal history deals
with persons and communities as its objects and seeks to understand and be critical





deals with people as "impersonal parts," it deals with documents and seeks to
understand and criticise them in the light of their relations and effects. Internal
history is our history, it is personal and describes what has made and formed us and
our community; external history is impersonal, it discusses events and describes how
various factors led to the Declaration of Independence being written. Internal history
criticises persons and communities who belong to it on the bases of their
commitment and actions; external history criticises things, such as documents and
propositions, on the basis of clarity and effect. Both are based on the same ultimate
reality - the Declaration of Independence is one document not two, it is not one for
external history and a different one for internal. One interprets a given part of, for
lack of a better term, ultimate reality from one's point of view - externally, where
one describes an event objectively and in connection with other events, or internally,
where one describes an event as part of one's being or community. Neither is more
or less valid than the other and both belong together. Niebuhr summarises the
difference:
From the realistic point of view we are concerned in external history to
abstract from all that is merely secondary, from subjective and partisan
accounts of what happened; we seek to set forth the primary characteristics of
each event as these may be defined by taking into account the reports of eye¬
witnesses, of contemporary documents and those 'permanent possibilities of
sensation,' the enduring institutions, the constant movements of mind and
will available to the experience of all participants. In internal history on the
other hand we are not concerned with the primary and secondary elements of
external historical perception but with 'tertiary qualities,' with values. These
are not private and evanescent as the secondary elements are but common and
verifiable in a community of selves; yet they are not objective in the sense in
which the primary qualities of external perception are said to be objective.225
The difference between external and internal history is essential for Niebuhr's
method of understanding history from a Christian perspective. Persons seek to
understand their history by looking for interconnections between various events.
Niebuhr defines the centre ofmeaning, that which unifies our history and allows us






a history, that is, events connected in a meaningful pattern; to have one god is to
have one history." Most people are polytheists; that is, they have different gods in
different situations. Other people are henotheists who take a finite element of their
experience and make it their god. This finite element can be a social structure, such
as the nation or culture, any element of a given culture, such as democracy or human
rights, or a finite object, such as fundamentalist Christians who make the
understanding of the Bible as inerrant the standard of judgement. This object is
limited and excludes large portions of the world. Christians, however, are radical
monotheists in that they have one God in all situations. The source for our
knowledge about God is revelation, which is an event of our inner history:
When Christians speak of revelation they point to history not as this can be
known by external observers but as it is remembered by participating selves.
Yet revelation does not simply mean inner history as a whole nor any
arbitrarily chosen part of it.
There are many obscure elements in remembered history which are neither
intelligible in themselves nor illuminative of other elements... The question
why I am I, in this here and now, conditioned by and dependent on this body,
and the equally difficult questions communities must raise about themselves
indicate obscurities which reveal nothing. They must be illuminated
themselves if there is to be anything that can be called revelation.
The event that illumines all others is revelation:
Revelation means for us that part of our inner history which illuminates the
rest of it and which is in itself intelligible.227
Therefore, revelation is the event in our personal history that enables us to
understand our whole history.
The imagination plays a vital role in this use of revelation - both in the
natural sciences (objective history) and in the personal, internal history. The
imagination is used to apply our ideas to our sensory data in order to make sense out
of it - "So we may apprehend the meaning of a brown, rough texture of certain size






This use of the imagination is essential: "In such knowing of things, everything
depends upon the continuous conversation between sensation and imagination."228
The imagination is also vital in making sense of our internal history, in looking for
meaning in all of our various experiences. It is thus an essential element of our
existence. Imagination can be good or evil:
Evil imaginations in this realm are shown to be evil by their consequences to
selves and communities just as erroneous concepts and hypotheses in external
knowledge are shown to be fallacious by their results. Some instances of evil
imaginations of the heart will assist toward the clarification of the
relationship between imagination and reason in this sphere. In various forms
of insanity imagination and reason are not lacking but wrong images are
employed by reason... The images are false; his interpretations are
unsupported by what other members of his community experience; hence he
cuts himself off and is cut off from commerce with others and retires at last
into the frustrations of utter solitude. The case is similar with all those
feelings of superiority and inferiority which blight the lives ofmen... Again
the image of the depraved race, now in the form of a Semitic, now of a
Germanic, now of a Negro, now of a Japanese people, is used for the
interpretation of social and individual sorrow. These are evil imaginations,
resulting in continued conflict, in the impoverishment and destruction of
selves both as agents and as sufferers... The images vary from day to day,
from person to person. Arbitrariness and isolated subjectivity are the
characteristic features of the world of selves understood by means of these
imaginations of the heart.229
The use of imagination is evil when the consequences are evil and are characterised
by a too narrow definition, or "us versus them (me versus the world)" mentality. This
egotism characterises the way in which one apprehends and understands the
afflictions that an individual experiences in the world. "In religion the joys and
sorrows of the soul are referred to God as their source but God is thought to cause
joy and sorrow purely because of his pleasure or displeasure in the self."230
Everything is determined in an "I-thou" way of thinking, but only the "I" is known.








"When we reason with their aid most sufferings and joys remain unintelligible. Evil
and selfhood are left as mysteries."231
One way to try to escape this kind of egotism is to eliminate the idea of the
self from ones "image." That forces a person to have a mechanistic view of the
world, relying on viewing history externally. One sees a criminal as an object of
forces within history or the society. There can therefore be no praise or blame for any
person or group - they exist due to the forces of the world. This way of thinking is
fruitful, as it deals with an "inescapable" element in "all responsible dealing with
persons and communities," but
...that the mechanical or at least impersonal model of the observer is a myth
when used primarily or exclusively in understanding and responding to selves
two considerations indicate quite clearly. The first is that no man in the
situation of a participant in life actually succeeds in interpreting and dealing
with other human beings on this level; the second is that the impersonal
leaves large areas of our experience unrationalized and uncontrolled.232
Thus: "the patterns which pure or scientific reason employs in understanding the
behaviour of things are inapplicable to the personal sphere."233 However: "there is an
image neither evil nor inadequate which enables the heart to understand and the
event through which that image is given them Christians call revelation."234
Revelation
Niebuhr wrote:
By revelation in our history, then, we mean that special occasion which
provides us with an image by means ofwhich all the occasions of personal
and common life become intelligible... Such revelation is no substitute for
reason, the illumination it supplies does not excuse the mind from labor; but
it does give to that mind the impulsion and the first principles it requires if it










revelatory moment is revelatory because it is rational, because it makes the
understanding of order and meaning in personal history possible.235
Using revelation to interpret history has three important results:
1. This revelation makes our past intelligible. It is an occasion that shows the
meaning ofwhat we thought was merely haphazard. It gives meaning to our
history. For the Christian Church, Jesus Christ is the revelatory occasion that
enables us to make sense of our past - the revelation in Jesus Christ makes
not only his own Jewish past intelligible to us, but also the whole past, "for
the Christian church the whole past is potentially a single epic."236
2. This revelation forces us to remember things that we have chosen to forget -
uncomfortable parts of our past. As a result of revelation, we must confess
that they also belong to our history, and then we must repent of these events.
3. Appropriation: all human past becomes part of our past through Jesus
Christ: the Jewish past and the Gentile, in all its varieties, becomes our past.
This past is not an external object, but is internal and personal, it is our past, that
which makes us who we are today. Since that is true, we cannot exclude any part of
the past:
To remember all that is in our past and so in our present is to achieve unity of
self. To remember the human past as our own past is to achieve community
with mankind... Through Jesus Christ Christians can and must turn again and
again to history, making the sins and the faiths of their fathers and brothers
their own faiths and sins.237
This "conversion" of the past is an ongoing revolution, because the past is infinite
and because sin - the attempt to cut ourselves off from any part of human history - is
always entering the present. Revelation does not do the work of conversion, the
"reasoning heart" must "search out memory and bring to light forgotten deeds."








Humanity suffers from the same sin with regard to the present as to the past -
the placing of the self at the centre. Here, too, Jesus Christ provides a radical
reorientation away from the self:
Through the cross of Christ we gain a new understanding of the present
scene; we note relations previously ignored; find explanations of our actions
hitherto undreamed of. Deeds and sufferings begin to compose themselves
into a total picture of significant action in which the self no longer occupies
the center.238
The life and death of Christ provides a parable and analogy of our present
experience. This is shown in Niebuhr's understanding ofWorld War Two:
We see through the use of the great parable how bodies are being broken for
our sake and how for the remission of our sins the blood of innocents is being
shed. Not with complete clarity, to be sure, yet as in a glass darkly, we can
discern in the contemporary confusion of our lives the evidence of a pattern
in which, by great travail ofmen and God a work of redemption goes on
which is like the work of Christ. We learn to know what we are doing and
what is being done to us - how by an infinite suffering of the eternal victim
we are condemned and forgiven at the same time; how an infinite loyalty
refuses to abandon us either to evil or to nothingness, but works at our
salvation with a tenacity we are tempted to deplore. The story of Jesus, and
particularly of his passion, is the great illustration that enables us to say,
"What we are now doing and suffering is like this."239
We not only use the revelatory event as a parable or analogy, but also as a rational
image by means of which we can not only know what current actions and sufferings
are like but also what they are\
The revelatory moment now is not itself the rational image but affords
opportunity for the discovery of concepts of great generality whereby we are
enabled to explain contemporary action in the moral or personal realm.
Revelation now is concentrated in doctrines and it seems possible to state
these without reference to the historic occasion in which they first became
evident. As in natural science it is not necessary to remember the person of
Newton and the incidents of his life in order that the theory of gravity may be
employed, so it would appear that in theology we do not need to use the






but are independent of it. Theology, thinking in this fashion, is then inclined
to identify revelation with the publication in an historic moment of great
doctrines or ideas.240
This presents a dilemma for revelation - either revelation means the ideas through
which we understand the present situation, or revelation means the historic occasion
and cannot explain the present situation except by means of analogy or parable. The
dilemma loses some force, according to Niebuhr, when one remembers that
... the reality we are dealing with and trying to understand is our history, in
which we seek less for uniformities of behavior than for a principle of unity
in duration. Concepts which describe the recurrent features in events are
necessary for that external contemplation of our lives to which we return
frequently in order that we may put checks on the inner imagination. But the
real work of reason in our history is that of understanding in terms of persons,
communities and values what we are doing and suffering. In this history, time
is duration and unrepetitive in character. Here we try to understand, not how
features in our past are repeated in our present, but how our present grows out
ofourpast into our future.241
One uses the image provided by revelation to "make sense" out of the present and to
understand "whither" one is going. Not in the sense of "it happened thusly at the
moment of revelation, I must therefore do exactly the same." Rather, "this is what
was considered at the revelatory moment, I must also consider that. Their goal at that
time was this, this is how they went about reaching it, what is the relation ofmy goal
to that goal? How can I use what I have learned from the moment of revelation here
and now?"
So when we interpret our present experience by means of revelation we
return to a critical point in man's conversation with God and try to understand
the present as a continuation from that beginning.242
Revelation, in addition to enabling us to understand our past and present, also








We reason in our hearts in order that we may know the whither as well as the
whence and where of our personal lives. If the past in inner history is what
we are and the present what we do, our future is our potentiality.243
Revelation shows the mortality of groups and individuals - neither person, nor group
lasts forever. At the same time, revelation also shows in Jesus Christ the possibility
of resurrection. No one can promise an easy life without catastrophes or death, in
fact, that is an essential part of life. Yet, in the resurrection of Jesus Christ God
shows the "possibility of the resurrection of a new and other self, of a new
community, a reborn remnant."
Revelation is progressive for Niebuhr, as it is validated and modified through
human experience. There are two different grades of revelation: the first is that event
that provided what Niebuhr called the starting point. As this starting point is used in
our experience to interpret events, that interpretation and the events themselves
become a part of revelation:
A revelation which furnishes the practical reason with a starting point for the
interpretation of past, present and future history is subject to progressive
validation. The more apparent it becomes that the past can be understood,
recovered and integrated by means of a reasoning starting with revelation, the
more contemporary experience is enlightened and response to new situations
aptly guided by this imagination of the heart, the more a prophesy based on
this truth is fulfilled, the surer our conviction of its reality becomes...
Revelation was not only validated but every new event and every
reinterpreted memory became a part of revelation since in all events the same
Lord appeared and was known ofmen. So history based on revelation became
a history of revelation.244
Revelation is validated in the individual Christian whenever she or he understands
new occasions by the aid of that revelation. That "use" of revelation becomes a part
then of the revelation for future generations. Every moment understood by means of
revelation becomes a part of the revelation itself. This is not a change of that "first
principle" but one discovers more fully what that revelation means to them then and
there. This present validation of revelation is why we believe that the past "event"






... [the heart] does not really know what is in the revelation, in the illumining
moment, save as it proceeds from it to present experience and back again
from experience to revelation. In that process the meaning of the revelation,
its richness and power, grow progressively clearer. This progressive
understanding of revelation is also an infinite process.245
Therefore, revelation is a past event that is re-understood in the present and used in
the present to understand the current situation. Every time that occurs, one does not
reinvent revelation, but understands it more deeply. And every application of
revelation becomes a part of revelation itself.
This point shows one of the essential differences between Niebuhr and Barth.
For Niebuhr, this use of revelation provides a place for apologetics, as revelation is
verified through experience. The apologetic question is whether or not a revelation
provides adequate means to interpret our experience. For Barth, there is no place for
apologetics in Christian theology. We shall return to this point later.
Checks on the images we use to interpret events and act in response to them,
what in the Christian tradition is called revelation, are communal and practical. They
are communal in that the understanding and actions based on that revelation are
examined by those who share in our internal history and those who have experienced
similar or the same phenomena to be adequate or inadequate; the "interpretations are
unsupported by what other members of his community experience; hence he cuts
himself off and is cut off from commerce with others and retires at last into the
frustration of utter solitude."246 They are also judged by those external to our
community on the basis of the results of understanding the phenomenon in this way
by the means of a specific revelation. Niebuhr wrote:
The question which is relevant for the life of the self among selves is not
whether personal images should be employed but only what personal images
are right and adequate and which are evil imaginations of the heart.
Evil imaginations in this realm are shown to be evil by their consequences to
selves and communities just as erroneous concepts and hypothesis in external
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The practical checks are as discussed above:
1. The images we use to understand and respond to the world must make that
world - past, present and future - intelligible. This includes that the images
must force us to remember parts of our past which we have suppressed:
"When we use insufficient and evil images of the personal or social selfwe
drop out of consciousness or suppress memories which do not fit in with the
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picture of the selfwe cherish..."
2. These images must lead to better integration of the self with his or her own
community, as discussed above.
3. These images must not result in continued conflict with others inside and
outside of our community: "These are evil imaginations, resulting in
continued conflict, in the impoverishment and destruction of selves both as
agents and as sufferers."249
The more these criteria are met and fulfilled, the more revelation is used to make
sense of the past and present and to help us plan for the future, the more convinced
we become of its truth.
God's Action in History
God's activity in history remains a question for H. Richard Niebuhr: ifwe
interpret history by means of God's action in it, does that mean that God causes the
events to happen? Is Niebuhr a fatalist? H. Richard Niebuhr's first writings on war
involved him in a debate with his brother Reinhold concerning the Manchurian crisis.
This debate took place in the pages of the Christian Century and is helpful for






In September 1931, a Japanese army, apparently without the approval of the
Japanese Imperial government, invaded Manchuria. By the end ofNovember, they
had conquered the entire region. As a result of the army's conquest, the Japanese
government drafted the "Outline of Principles for the Solution to the China Position,"
which stated that Mongolia and Manchuria would be made an essential part of the
empire. The debate that this caused in the United States concerned what, if anything,
the United States ought to do as a response to the Japanese aggression. There were
three main options: non-intervention, third-party intervention with or without allied
support or economic sanctions against Japan. H. Richard Niebuhr argued in the
Christian Century the non-interventionist position, while his brother Reinhold
responded for the interventionist point-of-view.
In "The Grace ofDoing Nothing," H. Richard argues for a pragmatic ethic,
writing:
When we have begun a certain line of action or engaged in a conflict we
cannot pause too long to decide which of various possible courses we ought
to choose for the sake ofthe worthier result. Time rushes on and we must
choose as best we can, entrusting the issue to the future. It is when we stand
aside from the conflict, before we know what our relations to it really are,
when we seemed condemned to doing nothing, that our moral problems
9 SO
1 become greatest. How shall we do nothing?
One must therefore choose on the basis of the expected result a given action should
have. This clearly locates H. Richard in the pragmatic tradition of ethics.
However, in this case, Niebuhr wrote, "there is nothing constructive, it seems,
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that we can do." There appear to be two main reasons why the United States
should not intervene. Firstly, the circumstances are such that no meaningful
intervention is possible. We attempt to accomplish something, in that we "pass
resolutions, aware that we are doing nothing; summon up righteous indignation and
still do nothing; we write letters to congressmen and secretaries, asking others to act
• 252while we do nothing." " Secondly, any action taken by the United States would be
less than "moral." He wrote:
250






The Christian reflects upon the fact that his inability to do anything
constructive in the crisis is the inability of one whose own faults are so
apparent and so similar to those of the offender that any action on his part is
not only likely to be misinterpreted but is also likely - in the nature of the
case - to be really less than disinterested.
We are therefore not called to act in judgement on Japan; indeed, Niebuhr nowhere
in this article discusses the morality of the Japanese conquest ofManchuria. The
question is rather about how we should do nothing. Niebuhr argues that we must
attempt to respond to the Manchurian crisis with "meaningful inactivity." He outlines
five "ways," of doing nothing: There are the pessimists, who believe the world is
going to pieces anyway. Since all attempts to affect the world are by definition going
to fail, the best course is to do nothing. This is a destructive form of doing nothing,
as the world falls apart more quickly if no one does anything. There is also a
conservative way of doing nothing, practised by those who believe in things as they
are. The law of the world is self-interest. The Japanese acted solely out of self-
interest, we must wait for our opportunity to assert our will. This form of doing
nothing encourages further nations and persons to live by the "law" of self-assertion.
There is also the inactivity of those who have renounced violent methods for
resolving conflicts, including the pacifists. Niebuhr likens this position to a person on
the street waiting for the police to arrive while a bully attacks someone. The police
never do arrive; so either one has a heart attack or enters the conflict violently. This
entry can be very dangerous, as Niebuhr warned: "Righteous indignation, not
allowed to issue in action, is a dangerous thing - as dangerous as any great emotion
nurtured and repressed at the same time. It is the source of sudden explosions or the
ground of long, bitter and ugly hatreds."254 The final alternative to Christian
inactivity, which is also the most similar, is communism. It recognises that there may
be nothing to do, yet remains hopeful as "this situation is after all preliminary to a
radical change which will eliminate the conditions ofwhich the conflict is a
product."235 This cynicism, which sees capitalism as evil and inherently causing








brought about through the conflicts of the present. Niebuhr then summarises the
Christian way of doing nothing:
But there is yet another way of doing nothing. It appears to be highly
impracticable because it rests on the well-nigh obsolete faith that there is a
God - a real God. Those who follow this way share with communism the
belief that the fact that men can do nothing constructive is no indication of
the fact that nothing constructive is being done. Like the communists they are
assured that the actual processes ofhistory will inevitably and really bring a
different kind ofworld with lasting peace. They do not rely on human
aspirations after ideals to accomplish this end, but on forces that often seem
very impersonal - as impersonal as those which eliminated slavery in spite of
the abolitionists. The forces may be as impersonal and as actual as machine
production, rapid transportation, the physical mixture of the races, etc., but as
parts of the real world they are as much a part of the total divine process as
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are human thoughts and prayers
There are two main difference between Christian inactivity to communist: firstly, the
Christian realises that they also are sinners, whose faults are so similar and obvious
that any attempt to act in judgement against Japan will be misinterpreted. Secondly,
Christians believe that, although these forces often seem impersonal, they are not.
Rather God is in history, shaping the future to bring about the Kingdom of God. It is
important to note that H. Richard is not saying that God occasionally intervenes in
history to guide it toward its proper goal. Reinhold Niebuhr misunderstood his
brother at just this point, when he wrote in his response to "The Grace of Doing
Nothing" that
It is plausible also to interpret both the evolutionary and the catastrophic
elements in history in religious terms and to see the counsels ofGod in them.
But it is hardly plausible to expect divine intervention to introduce something
into history which is irrelevant to anything we find in history now... My
brother does not like these goals above and beyond history. He wants religion
and social idealism to do with history. In that case he must not state his goal
in absolute terms. There can be nothing absolute in history, no matter how




(Niebuhr 1932), 16, 18. Emphasis mine.
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Reinhold Niebuhr has misunderstood his brother on this point. H. Richard does not
argue that God occasionally or even frequently intervenes in history to maintain
God's telos. He rather argues that God "is always in history; he is the structure in
things, the source of all meaning, the 'I am that I am,' that which is that it is... that
structure of the universe, that creative will, can no more be said to interfere brutally
in history than the violated laws ofmy organism can be said to interfere with brutally
with my life if they make me pay the cost ofmy violation." Thus, Christians ought
to look for what God is doing within the structures of history itself and respond
fittingly to that.
The United States ought to respond to the Japanese conquest of Manchuria
with a "rigid self-analysis." This self-analysis will lead to the conclusion that Japan
is doing the same thing as the United States had done in the past. The question is
therefore what we ought to do in light of the fact that we have committed the same
sins as Japan. The goal is to "create the conditions under which a real reconstruction
259 • •of habits is possible." This way of doing nothing is what "old Christians called
repentance, but the word has become so reminiscent of emotional debauches in the
feeling of guilt that it may be better to abandon it for a while. What is suggested is
that the only effective approach to the problem of China and Japan lies in the sphere
of an American self-analysis which is likely to result in some surprising discoveries
as to the amount of renunciation of self-interest necessary on the part of this country
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and of individual Christians before anything effective can be done in the east."
It is important to note that Niebuhr is not a pacifist on principle here. He is not
arguing that, because all nations are guilty of the same types of sins as the current
belligerent nations, no nation is ever to go to war. He is rather arguing that, in this
specific situation it seems that nothing constructive can be done. The question is then
how do we respond here and now to this specific situation; what is the fitting
response? As we are, according to Niebuhr, in a situation where we can do nothing
constructive, the question is what characteristics ought our inactivity to have.








The inactivity of radical Christianity is not the inactivity of those who call
evil good; it is the inaction of those who do not judge their neighbors because
they cannot fool themselves into a sense of superior righteousness. It is not
the inactivity of a resigned patience, but of a patience that is full of hope, and
is based on faith. It is not the inactivity of the non-combatant, for it knows
that there are no non-combatants, that everyone is involved, that China is
being crucified (though the term is very inaccurate), by our sins and those of
the whole world. It is not the inactivity of the merciless, for works ofmercy
must be preformed though they are only palliatives to ease present pain while
the process of healing depends on deeper, more actual and urgent forces.261
We are thus to be hopefully inactive, repenting of our own sins in preparation of
God's activity in bringing about God's kingdom. Our response must not be one of
judging the Japanese; rather, our attitude must be one of repentance. We must
remember that God's kingdom will come about because of God's activity, not our
own. Indeed, it will come about in spite of our own actions, as slavery was abolished
in spite of the activity of the abolitionists. This seems to leave Niebuhr open to the
Marxist critique that religion is an opiate of the masses - telling them to suffer in
silence waiting for God to act. However, Niebuhr is not arguing that a nation must
never act militarily in principle, but that in this specific instance the United States
can do nothing meaningful. In this case, therefore, the question is how ought the
United States do nothing.
Niebuhr's case is premised on the idea that God is active in history. With
regards to war, he argued that this belief in God's activity differentiates the religious
objectivists from the subjectivists. He wrote:
I must not enter here into a discussion of the meaning of Jesus save to say
that I cannot begin, as religious subjectivism does, with the Fourth Gospel,
but must start with the Synoptics and with a Jesus who finds God's action not
within himself but in objective, natural and historical events. Here is an issue
which goes very deep. Whether we approach the war [World War Two] as
religious subjectivists or as religious objectivists makes a profound difference
to action as well as to thought. As objectivists, we must begin with the initial
assumption that there is no event in which divine reason and will are not
involved, which must not be understood with the aid of the grand Christian
postulate, no matter how difficult the inquiry, and in which we are not
required to respond to the universal, no matter how revolutionary for thought




action within, and will judge the world with him rather than be placed under
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the judgment of objective reality.
This "initial assumption" that God is active in all events is of central importance for
Niebuhr's social ethics concerning war, to which we now turn.
Niebuhr's General Theory of the Ethics ofWar
H. Richard Niebuhr classifies traditional Christian theories of war into two
different categories: amoral theories and moral theories. Amoral theories assume that
victory in war is a matter of force, with the stronger side winning. The moral justice
or injustice of a given position in a conflict is irrelevant to the success of that
position. Moral argument may play a part, but only as a means used by those in
power to cloak their true motives, to enflame the people's emotions and to unify the
people in times ofwar. The victor in any conflict is determined not by any type of
moral justice, but by force, by armies, be they military or economic. Balance-of-
power total war theorists who believe that, when national interest is at stake, total
war is called for, as well as certain types of pacifists, who believe that, since the
victor in war is solely determined by strength and not by moral justice, it is to be
avoided at all costs, fall into this group.
Moral theories of war, on the other hand, believe that war is an event that
occurs in a universe "in which the laws of retribution hold sway."263 According to
this type of argument, war begins with a violation of law - be it international or
national, human or divine - and then continues as the law's upholders seek to punish
the offending nation. There is therefore a distinction between moral and immoral use
of force, between just and unjust war. The most prominent example of this model is
the traditional just-war theory, but also certain types of total-war theorists264 who





264 This position is related to what was known, prior to the modern era, as the crusade See (Bainton
1960).
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These types of theories are based on the assumption that the universe is a
moral system in which laws of retributive justice hold sway. One nation violates an
international law, or an order of creation, or a divine law, and the just nation or
nations have a moral obligation to punish the immoral nation, resulting in war. One
side is using force morally, in response to another side using force immorally265. This
assumes that one side is wholly justified while the other is wholly unjustified.
Clearly, that is never the case. In Article 231 of the Versailles Treaty, Germany
accepted sole guilt for the First World War, but their acceptance was not based on
any historical analysis of the causes of that war, it came about only after Germany
was defeated on the battlefield. This and the huge reparations Germany was required
to pay to the victorious Allies were major causes of Hitler's rise to power, which led
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to the Second World War. Thus the victorious Allies of World War One shared in
the responsibility for World War Two. International relations are far too complicated
for this kind of understanding to function; the causes behind a situation that lead a
nation to go to war are so complicated that assigning sole blame to one nation or
group of nations is overly simplistic and morally dangerous. It may be that one side
decided to use force in an unjust way in order to obtain what they believe they were
unjustly denied in peace, but no nation is morally blameless.
This model also requires the assumption that the whole population of a
country be guilty of the decision to go to war, as it is the whole population who will
suffer the punishment of war. In fact, it is not the decision-makers, those who may
actually be guilty of the "crime" of going to war who will suffer, but rather the non-
combatants, the innocent, who will suffer. It was not Hitler and the Nazi government
that suffered the most in World War II, as Niebuhr put it: "Retribution for the sins of
a Nazi party and a Hitler falls on Russian and German soldiers, on the children of
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Cologne and Coventry, on the Finns and on the French." Not only does the
population of the "unjust" country suffer, large portions of the population of the
265 This is precisely the argument Michael Walzer makes when he writes: "Most wars, as I argue in
this book, are just on one side (the side that fights in self-defense)..." See (Walzer 1977), xii.
266 It is interesting to note that the Calhoun Commission report, "The Relation of the Church to the
War in Light of the Christian Faith," in discussing the Second World War states: "The war that broke
out in 1914 and has continued, with temporary and local interruptions, to the present moment - a




"just" country also suffer. Is it moral for a government to cause suffering amongst its
own population for the transgression of another? Thus those who agree with moral
understandings of war in theory are unable to follow them consistently in practise:
"If they declare a present war to be just they must participate in inflicting suffering
and death on the 'just' with the 'unjust'; if they regard a present war as unjust they
must stand idly by while the 'just' are being made to suffer with the 'unjust.'" 68
The other Christian response to war is pacifism, which can be traced back to
the earliest church. One type of Christian pacifism, mentioned above, assumes that
the decisive factor in determining victory in any conflict is not morality, but
advantage in force (economic or military). Success is not based on the morality of a
position, but solely on amoral factors. Moral phrases are tools of force that are used
to gain support for a particular point of view, but morality plays no role in who will
win the conflict. The leaders themselves are motivated not by the good or some
moral argument, but by self-interest and the desire to maintain and extend their
power and influence. Since morality plays no role in success or failure, Christians
ought to separate themselves from the world and "keep their hands clean."
It is true that the leaders of any country are to an extent motivated by self-
interest, and use moral argument as one tool to win the support of their constituency.
The use of propaganda by Nazi Germany, indeed by all the countries in World War
II clearly demonstrates this. However, human beings are not merely rational beings,
they are also moral beings. They fight a war to "defend the fatherland," to protect our
cultural heritage or for similar values. These beliefs or values may give strength to a
country. These values are not rational, and, although they can be used by
governments to further their own aims, they are true moral elements. The results of
these elements in an individual as well as in societies can and do vary. One person in
Nazi Germany fights in the Wehrmacht not because he believes in the Nazi ideology,
nor because he is violently anti-Semitic, although these impulses may influence his
decision to fight. He fights because he wants to defend his homeland. Another person
living in Nazi Germany, who loves Germany as much as the soldier in the
Wehrmacht, becomes involved in the German resistance to Hitler because he or she
268
(Niebuhr 1943), 65.
269 See (Bainton 1960) for a historical analysis of ethical theories ofwar and an apology for pacifism.
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believes that a totalitarian regime is evil, or that the destruction of non-Aryan peoples
is wrong and must be stopped, or merely that Hitler is bringing about the destruction
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ofGermany and that this must be prevented . A government uses these moral
forces, but they cannot create them. They do attempt to channel these forces to bring
about a desired effect, but they cannot succeed in doing so in their entire
constituency. This was the case in Nazi Germany where, in spite of a highly
developed propaganda ministry, many people had to be put into concentration camps
because they refused to do what the government required of them. One may argue
that individuals may be motivated by morality, but that governments are not271.
Governments are, however, made up of people so that, even though the moral
influence may be reduced in a government, it is still present. It is true that the world
is fallen and we cannot bring about the kingdom of God in the world. However, that
does not mean that we should not try to make the world more just. We cannot give
up on the world, because God does not give up on the world.
Another form of pacifism does not advocate total separation from the world
but the opposite. Since war is evil, Christians must view war as a sin to be avoided at
all costs. They must attempt to influence the government to reject the use ofmilitary
force as a method for resolving conflict. Morality is not a private matter to be sought
for apart from the "world," it is a matter that affects the whole world, a goal for
which the whole world ought to strive for and therefore governments also attempt to
achieve. This point of view emphasises the evil ofwar and argues that it therefore
must be avoided. War, and the killing and suffering that by nature must accompany
it, are to be avoided whenever possible. However, this type of pacifism does not take
the power of sin in the world seriously enough. In the kingdom of God, there will not
be war, but we do not now live in this kingdom, nor can we bring it into being by our
own effort. The unilateral renunciation of force may indeed lead to greater social
injustice, as nations that do not reject the use of force gain in influence over those
270 Dietrich Bonhoeffer summarised the dilemma for Christians in his letter from 1939 to Reinhold
Niebuhr explaining why he felt he had to return from the relative safety of the United States to
Germany. He wrote: "Christians in Germany will face the terrible alternative of either willing the
defeat of their nation in order that Christian civilization may survive, or willing the victory of their
nation and thereby destroying our civilization. I know which of these alternatives I must choose; but I
cannot make that choice in security..." See (Bethge 1967), 736f.
271 As Reinhold Niebuhr does in his MoraI Man and Immoral Society. See (Niebuhr 1932)
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nations that do. Supporters for this type of pacifism may advocate other forms of
non-violent resistance, such as the methods used by Gandhi in India. These methods
have similar results to military force, as Reinhold Niebuhr in his book, MoralMan
and Immoral Society points out.272 Gandhi's non-violent method of not buying cotton
from Great Britain to fight against British colonialism caused much indiscriminate
suffering in Manchester, where unemployment rose dramatically and parents could
no longer afford to support their families. Another method also advocated is the use
of embargoes. However, it is once again the innocent who suffers most, and this may
even be counterproductive in trying to change a government's policy. The dictator
argues that the suffering in their country is brought about not by the government
policies, but as a result of the embargo against them. Although military confrontation
is to be avoided whenever possible, the complete renunciation force may lead to
greater injustice.
In light of the failure of moral and amoral understandings ofwar, Niebuhr
argues for a different understanding ofwar based on God's revelation in Jesus Christ.
The interpretation of events in history by means of revelation is central to H.
Richard's theology and ethics, as discussed above.
World War Two
...Christian like Jewish interpretation of history centers in the conviction that
God is at work in all events and the ethics of these monotheistic communities
is determined by the principle that man's action ought always to be response
to divine rather than to any finite action. Hence it is a sign of returning health
when God rather than the self or the enemy is seen to be the central figure in
the great tragedy ofwar and when the question 'What must I do?' is preceded
by the question, 'What is God doing?'273
As the first question for ethics is, according to Niebuhr, what is happening?, we must
begin discussion ofWorld War Two with his understanding of what was happening.
Answering the question of what is happening requires the use ofmany external
sources of information and interpretation, including politics, psychology, sociology
272 See pgs. 171 f, for his discussion of the harmful effects of violent vs. non-violent means.
273 (Niebuhr 1942), 47.
129
and history. H. Richard's clearest statement concerning the situation ofWorld War
Two is found in the Calhoun Commission report, "The Relation of the Church to the
War in Light of the Christian Faith."274 In December 1942 at the Biennial Meeting of
the Federal Council of Churches in America, held in Cleveland, Ohio, a group of
Christian scholars were commissioned to study and report on the relation of the
church to the situation of war. This commission, chaired by Robert Calhoun, met 4
times between May 1943 and October 1944 and issued a report entitled "The
Relation of the Church to the War in Light of the Christian Faith." The report was
signed by all twenty-six members of the commission, including H. Richard
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Niebuhr. There were three subsections within the commission that looked at the
empirical, the historical and the theological aspects of the problem. The subsection
dealing with theological issues was chaired by H. Richard Niebuhr who prepared a
preliminary study for the commission,276 as did the other two sub-chairs (Edwin E.
Aubrey on empirical issues, Roland H. Bainton on historical).
The members of the commission were surprised at how much agreement
there was between members with very different points of view on war itself. Samuel
McCrea Cavert wrote in the foreword to the report in Social Action:
When the members of the Commission came together they found themselves
holding widely different points of view with regard to the attitude if the
individual Christian in the face of war. It has been a gratifying experience to
discover how impressive a measure of agreement they have been able to
attain on the basic underlying questions having to do with the Christian faith
977
and the nature and function of the Christian Church.
Within the report itself, the problem of dealing with differences between commission
members is mentioned in the beginning of the document:
274 The report was published in complete in Social Action Magazine, Vol. X. Number 10, December
15, 1944. Excerpts have been published in (Miller 1992), 71-124 and in (1982). For a brief discussion
of the writing of the report and the reception, see (Warren 1997), 110-112.
275 The signatories were: Edwin E. Aubrey, Roland H. Bainton, John C. Bennett, Conrad J. I.
Bergendorff, B. Harvie Branscomb, Frank H. Caldwell, Robert Lowry Calhoun, Angus Dun, Nels F.
S. Ferre, Robert E. Fitch, Theodore M. Greene, Georgia E. Harkness, Walter M. Horton, John Knox,
Umphrey Lee, John A. Mackay, Benjamin E. Mays, John T. McNeill, H. Richard Niebuhr, Reinhold
Niebuhr, William Pauck, Douglas V. Steere, Ernest Fremont Tittle, Henry P. Van Dusen, Theodore O.






Where major differences have seemed to require explicit notice, we have
tried to make that fact plain. That these differences (especially as between
pacifist and non-pacifist members of the Commission) exist inside a more
fundamental context of shared Christian faith, and ofmutual understanding,
mutual confidence, and readiness to learn, became clear in the course of our
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debates. That fact is itself one of the primary findings.
Niebuhr's influence in the document is pronounced, although he was unable to
comment extensively on or edit the final edition due to health problems. For the
purposes of the following discussion, we will look at the Calhoun Commission
Report to discuss some aspects ofNiebuhr's understanding ofwar, pointing out
differences between his own work and the report where necessary.
The method the committee used to discuss the current situation was very
much influenced by Niebuhr:
There are thus three phases of the word the Church must speak to our time:
diagnostic, doctrinal and practical. The three parts of this report attempt to
deal successively with these interrelated demands. The first part is diagnostic:
an attempt to make clear what seems to us the character of our present
situation, and some of the major problems it raises concerning the relation of
the Church, its gospel, and its members to the war. The second is doctrinal: a
statement of those primary Christian affirmations that seem to us normative
for any attempt to deal with the problems of the Church in war-time. The
third is practical: a glance at the major attitudes toward war, past and present,
that have actually been maintained in the Church as fitting expressions of
Christian faith, and a summary of the attitudes that seem to us to accord best
with that faith in our own day and for the near future.279
The commission interpreted the time as being a period of great transition; the war is
an expression of this transition, in which "a life and death struggle is going on
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between various old ways of living and various new ones." The war is fought by
various coalitions of nation-states, each seeking their own advantage at the expense








...a revolutionary attempt by each of the chief Axis powers to move toward
world conquest and the establishment of a totalitarian 'New Order,' and a
resolute struggle by their opponents to prevent such a totalitarian conquest
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and to keep the way open for more humane modes of life.
Within this context, two factors seem to the members to be of special importance: a
sudden and violent reversal of the trend toward political democracy and an assault on
the growth of "social democracy." It is the second factor that seems to be most
important. These tendencies have occurred previously in somewhat different forms.
What was new was the development of the sovereign national state. Modern nations
controlled larger areas more effectively, which brought about greater stability than in
the past more localised authorities were able to do. This, however, also led to more
fragmentation among the peoples as each nation has gained in authority over its own
people and made national concern the overriding issue. At the same time, the church
fragmented so that there no longer is (if there ever truly was) a unifying, higher
loyalty to Pope or Church amongst the peoples of Europe. In effect, the churches had
become, to a greater or lesser extent, national churches where loyalty to a universal
church is subordinated to national loyalties. As discussed above, Niebuhr terms this
tendency to take finite elements of our experience and elevate them to our centre-of-
value, henotheism. This can clearly be seen in the German Church struggle, where
the German Christians attempted to meld Christianity with the German Volkish
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philosophy. The leaders of the various Nation-States, taking advantage of this
situation, claimed more and more the citizen's loyalty and claimed that loyalty more
and more to the exclusion of all other loyalties.
Concurrent with this tendency to fragmentation, industrial and technological
advances made isolationism less possible. Developments in production and transport
had increased the size of markets required to keep economies stable:
... the worldwide depression of 1929-1932, and the rise of international
cartels and of expansionist totalitarian programs bear eloquent testimony to
281
(Calhoun 1944), 10-11. Emphasis original.
282 There are many sources for information about the church struggle. See, for example: (Busch 1975),
213-336; (Bethge 1967), esp. 305-357; (Ericksen 1985).
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the inability of nationalism in its traditional form to cope with the expansive
pressures ofmodern industry and finance.283
In summary:
Our present situation is distinguished, then, by the clash of divisive national
interests in a world physically entangled in the web of modern industry and
commerce. There is no chance to restore the physical isolation of nations in
time past. The only way out is to seek, by all suitable means, to transform out
interlocked society into world community, in which great nations may have
284contributive rather than destructive roles.
This ends the secular understanding of the events ofWorld War Two. The next
question concerns the distinctively Christian interpretation of the war:
In such understanding, the war is an event in the providential reign ofGod
whom we know best through Christ crucified and triumphant. For Christian
faith the whole cataclysm, having all the characters just noticed, is a tragic
moment in God's work of creating and redeeming man, and in man's long
struggle with himself and his creator. In this perspective, the opportunity and
obligation implicit in the crisis appear more commanding, and its dangers not
less real but less disheartening than they might well seem apart from
Christian faith.285
H. Richard Niebuhr interpreted the Second World War by means of the revelation of
God in Jesus Christ, specifically, by means of two images from the Christian
tradition: in 1942 he used the image of God's judgement in the "War as the
Judgement of God;" and he used Jesus' crucifixion in his 1943 article "War as
Crucifixion."287
It is important to note that it is at this point that Niebuhr's interpretation of
war differs somewhat form the Calhoun Commission's report. The report begins, in
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Originally published in The Christian Century, April 28, 1943. It has been reprinted in (Niebuhr
1943). All references here are to the Miller edition.
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The primary ground for a distinctive understanding of any situation is the
revelation of God in Jesus Christ.
The commission also used, as Niebuhr did, two images from the Christian tradition
to interpretation war: judgement and crucifixion. Concerning judgement, the report
states:
Divine judgment in the war can plainly be seen at two levels. First, as we
have noted, there is a natural and moral order of creation that God maintains
against all man's wayward efforts in peace and in war... Secondly, God's
judgment in war time negates not merely the selfish conduct ofwar, but also
their inadequate ideals for living.. .Is then war itself to be called a 'divine
judgment,' or an instrument thereof? Does God decree war to punish the
waywardness ofmen? We have said no. War is not divinely ordained, any
more than slums or slavery. God's will is always that men shall live at peace
9RQ
with one another and with Him.
Niebuhr, on the other hand, states:
But something has been gained as a result of the very general recognition that
God is judging the nations, the churches and all mankind in this great conflict
and crucifixion...
At the same time, Niebuhr is also aware of the danger of seeing war as divine
judgement and therefore not as an event brought about by human action. He
continues:
The conviction of sin, which the social gospel has brought about, and the old
understanding of history, which Marxism has forced Christianity to
remember, leave all Christians with a bad conscience in the presence of this
struggle and with the recognition that men are reaping what they have
290
sown.
Most Christians, according to Niebuhr, understand the war as God's judgement in
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1. Pacifists: war is a humanly made evil brought about by human sin. They
work for a just peace but refuse to take part in the human evil ofwar.
2. War is a judgement of human evil, but citizens must defend their nation.
Christians do not make war, but good citizens defend their country.
3. There is a distinction between the absolute judgement ofGod and the relative
judgment of people. We respond to the absolute judgement of God by
contrition, but assert our relative justice against the unjust enemy.
All three understandings are dualistic, responding to two different objects. The
pacifist responds to God by working for justice, to human evil by non-participation;
or as Christians we respond to God's judgment of human evil in war by contrition
but as citizens we fight to defend our country; or we are contrite for our injustice
compared to God but are confident of our justice in comparison with the enemy. For
Niebuhr:
... the dualism of the double response is an intolerable one; it makes us
'double minded men, unstable in all our ways,' [James 1:8] ditheists who
have two Gods, the Father of Jesus Christ and our country, or Him and
Democracy, or Him and Peace. Country, Democracy, and Peace are surely
values of a high order, if they are under God, but as rivals ofGod they are
7Q1
betrayers of life.
Properly understood, God's judgement must not be separated from redemption, as
Niebuhr wrote in response to questions concerning his article "War as the Judgement
of God:"
I was concerned to point our in the article in question that judgment in the
Scriptures meant the corrective action of a God who is loyal to his creatures.
The idea of emotionally motivated vengeance has little if any place in any
effort to think straight on the subject.292
Therefore, war is not hell but purgatory; this is most clearly shown by the fact that, in




Virgil C. Aldrich and H. Richard Niebuhr, "Is God in the War?" originally published in The
Christian Century, August 5, 1942; reprinted in: (Niebuhr 1942). Aldrich addressed several questions
in a letter to the editor of The Christian Century concerning Niebuhr's article and an editorial
concerning the war that had appeared in the Century.
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are responsible for the decision to go to war. Ifwar is the judgment ofGod on
humanity, then it is an absolute judgment on all humanity and the possibility of
speaking of one's relative justice is excluded. God does use finite tools to judge, but
the tool is not justified by God's use of it:
Hence response to divine judgment can never mean justification of either the
enemy or of the self. Insofar as such justification is introduced the conviction
about God's action is abandoned.293
In the same way as one nation is not excluded from God's judgment, so also one part
of life is not excluded. It is not as ifGod judges everything except politics or
democracy, so that we are contrite in response to this judgement where applicable,
but fight to defend democracy. Thus God's action in the war is "redemptive and
vicarious, absolute and unified."294
God's action in war, understood in this way, has three main consequences for
our action. We must stop passing our own judgments on ourselves or on the enemy
and . .simply inquire what duty we have to perform in view of what we have done
9QS
amiss and in view ofwhat God is doing." At the same time, we must also stop
thinking of the self as central and reject all self-defensiveness and self-
aggrandisement:
If we accept God's judgment on our self-centeredness we cannot respond to it
by persisting in actions of self-defense and by fighting the war for the sake of
protecting our selves or our values instead of for the sake of the innocent who
9Q f\
must be delivered from the hands of the aggressor.
Thirdly, when God's action is seen in war in this way, our response must be hopeful
and trusting. God's judgement cannot be separated from redemption, so we can never
give in to despair as ifwe or our enemy or the world is so depraved that there is no
hope. We must refuse to give up on what God does not give up on.










To recognize God at work in war is to live and act with faith in resurrection.
If God were not in the war life would be miserable indeed. It would mean that
the cosmos had no concern with justice. But if God were in the war only as
judge, man's misery would be only slightly assuaged since before the judge
all are worthy of death. To see God in the war as the vicarious sufferer and
redeemer, who is afflicted in all the afflictions of his people, is to find hope
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along with broken-heartedness in the midst of disaster."
The other crucial image Niebuhr uses to understand war is the image of
Christ's crucifixion. According to Niebuhr, war is like crucifixion in two main ways.
Firstly, there is a strange mixture ofjustice and injustice in both Jesus' crucifixion
and in war. Three persons were crucified, all of whom were accused of insurrection.
Two of these were actually guilty of insurrection, one was not, at least not in the
same sense the other two were. Jesus did strive to bring in a new kingdom, yet also
said "My kingdom is not from this world" (John 18:36). Of the two who were guilty,
one was unrepentant, while the other recognised the relative justice of his
punishment. And among those who crucified the three, there was a mixture ofjustice
and injustice: "soldiers who did their duty in obedience to their oath, priests who
acted according to their lights - though their light was darkness - a judge who failed
in his duty, citizens who were devoted to the maintenance of the sacred values of
298 •Jewish culture, a mob overborne by emotion." In war it is also true that the
motives of those leaders who decide to go to war are mixed - as were the motives of
those who decided to crucify Jesus; some feel they are trying to serve their own
country as best they can, some feel they need to protect their own traditions, and
some feel that they are obeying their oath to serve their country's own interests.
Those nations who fought for "righteousness" also played a major role in the
situation that led to Hitler's rise to power and, eventually, to the war. Amongst the
victims of the war are also those who are unrepentant, those who recognise the
relative justice of their suffering, and those who are truly innocent. "War is like that
- apparently indiscriminate in the choice of victims and victors, whether these be








A second similarity between crucifixion and war is that neither of them can
be fully understood in terms of a moral (retributive justice) system, nor by an amoral
(might makes right) system. Both systems are inadequate to the task of explaining
these events. Ifmorality is based on retributive justice, or if the world is amoral,
then, as Niebuhr puts it: "the cross would be the final demonstration of God's
injustice or, rather, of his non-existence."300 If the universe is understood in terms of
retributive justice, then the fact that Jesus was crucified implies that he was guilty of
breaking some law, and was being punished for it. Otherwise, the system of
retributive justice fails. If, on the other hand, we understand the world in an amoral
sense, then Jesus' crucifixion is irrelevant, merely another event in an amoral world
where "might makes right." Neither the cross nor war, however, is a case for moral
indifference, rather the opposite is true: both events show the seriousness of our
decisions, for good and for evil. The crucifixion shows that God will not abandon
humanity to its own self-destruction: God chooses to sacrifice the Son of God, Jesus
Christ "for the sake of the just and the unjust." War also involves great sacrifice;
parents also must sacrifice their children in war for causes or things that they love,
that they believe in. Where great sacrifices are called for, there is no room for moral
indifference.
The cross shows us that we live in a world of graciousness, rather than a
world of retributive justice or an amoral world. The crucifixion is a demonstration of
God's righteousness, which is beyond any righteousness of the law, and shows that
our 'righteousness' is as unrighteous as our unrighteousness. This means, as Niebuhr
continued: "the whole effort to assess and judge the goodness and the evil of self and
others, and to reward or punish accordingly, is mistaken."301
When we interpret war by the cross of Jesus Christ, our attention is focused
on the suffering and death of the guiltless, which then becomes a call to repentance,
to a spiritual revolution. This understanding ofwar does not lead to any new law for
determining action, because the cross does not impose any new law, but
demonstrates that all action based on this understanding ofwar will have one thing in






excusing of self because one has fallen less short of the glory ofGod than others;
there will be no vengeance in them."302 They will also share one positive aspect: they
will be performed in hope, in reliance on the continued grace ofGod in the midst of
our ungraciousness."
The Calhoun commission did not go as far as Niebuhr in interpreting war by
means of the crucifixion of Jesus. This interpretation is present, but only in a very
qualified way. The commission stated:
Is war itself a Golgotha, and suffering humanity a new embodiment of the
crucified Redeemer? In particular, can we say that the men killed in battle, or
the refugees driven out to wander and starve, or the children who die in bomb
shelters or blockaded famine areas are vicarious redeemers of our time? We
share deeply in the desire of bereaved parents and comrades, and of chaplains
and pastors to say these things, but they must not be said carelessly. War is in
a general sense a crucifixion ofboth man and God, but it is not the
crucifixion ofJesus Christ, and it is not a chiefsource ofman's salvation.
What made the tragedy on Calvary uniquely redemptive was the Man on the
middle cross, and the unmixed revelation oflove andpower that was in
him...LQ\ the Church, then, say that in the light of the Crucifixion we see
more deeply and clearly the meaning of the present struggle. We see that in
our world, the burden of suffering is not distributed according to guilt and
303
innocence, but that all suffer, even the best."
The members of the commission wanted to avoid any identification of our vicarious
suffering in war with the unique vicarious suffering of Jesus Christ as source of our
salvation. Niebuhr would agree with this sentiment, although went further with the
identification of Jesus' suffering with the human suffering in war. Jesus suffering and
death on the cross is the
.. .final, convincing demonstration of the fact that the order of the universe is
not one of retribution in which goodness is rewarded and evil punished, but
rather an order of graciousness wherein, as Jesus had observed, the sun is
made to shine on evil and on good and the rain to descend on the just and the
unjust.304
302 (Niebuhr 1943), 70.
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As Jesus suffered and died vicariously for humanity and as a result of human
sinfulness on Calvary, so too war
...is Calvary, the place of vicarious suffering and death. Here individuals die
for the sake of communities, because of the transgressions of nations... [I]t is
exactly at this point that the action ofGod, the Father of Jesus Christ, is most
apparent in war, for this is the way of his working which was made evident in
the cross of Christ. He gives his best-beloved rather than to allow the work of
his creation to dissolve into the anarchy of existence which can recognize no
order, to decay internally. The intense seriousness of the love of God, as
revealed in Jesus Christ's death, is confirmed and recalled and illustrated and
re-enacted in the vicarious suffering ofwar.
Thus war is crucifixion not only in that we can use the crucifixion of Jesus to better
understand it, but also in that God's love is demonstrated in it in God's maintaining
of order throughout the chaos ofwar. Through our understanding war by means of
Jesus' crucifixion, we not only gain a better understanding ofwar and God's action
in it but also a better understanding of Jesus crucifixion.
Niebuhr's belief that Christian duty "involves... resistance to those who are
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abusing our neighbours" provides a guideline for determining action in war. It is
important to note that this is not a principle that must be fulfilled in order for the act
of going to war to be justified. Rather, it is a guideline for interpreting events and
making a decision concerning the various courses of action open to a person. For
Niebuhr, this guideline involves the amount of suffering for the innocent. Niebuhr,
unlike Barth, does not give us many clear statements of his position concerning the
Axis and the Allies. One clear statement, from the Calhoun Commission report
states:
In the actual course of events, dominance by the Axis powers would have
fastened upon their own peoples and upon the conquered lands a reign of
tyranny and terror full of danger to humane living everywhere. Resistance to
such rule, whether by armed force or by more peaceful means, became
imperative. We speak here with keen awareness of the confusions of human
motives, the mingling of good with base intents, the differences among
striving human groups that mark each new situation in history. We have in






is biased and incomplete. Yet one judgment concerning the years of uneasy
truce seems clear. Every nation then was concerned more for the immediate
advantage of self than for the larger welfare of mankind and for the glory of
God as Lord of all. Every nation, moreover, thus jeopardized even its own
well-being, along with that of its neighbors, since none can long prosper
alone.307
This is very close to a statement found in Niebuhr's article:
Instead of asking whether we are right people or wrong people we shall
simply inquire what duty we have to perform in view of what we have done
amiss and in view of what God is doing. If that duty involves, as I believe it
does, resistance to those who are abusing our neighbors, we shall not inquire
whether our neighbors are not better people than those who are abusing them.
In social life our duty frequently requires us to protect neighbors whom we
dislike against the injustices of those whom we like and who on the whole
seem to us to be better people than their victims are. The same principle
applies in the affairs of the society of nations.
This is as close as Niebuhr comes to a principle for deciding whether or not to go to
war. This guideline must be based on an interpretation of what God is doing and in a
spirit of repentance for our own sins. It is also independent of any moral judgment of
the aggressors or the aggrieved. The emphasis is on our sinfulness and repentance. In
war, we are being judged and called to repentance - we are not judging our enemy
nor are we carrying out God's judgment. Rather, we are being judged together with
our enemy and all of humanity.
Like Barth, Niebuhr rejects casuistic ethics in principle as anthropocentric.
Ethics must be ground in God's activity and then, and only then, in human response
to God's primary activity. The decision to go to war should, therefore, not be based
on some moral decision based on a system of retributive justice. Nor should we, as
Christians, say nothing, as if morality played no role in the world. In the situation of
war, we see that it is the (relatively) innocent, "the children of Cologne and
Coventry, on the Finns and on the French" who suffer in war. It is very difficult if
not impossible to understand this crucial element of the experience ofwar by means






It is also not possible to deny that there is a moral order; otherwise, our experiences
would be utterly meaningless. Rather, we live in a moral order of grace. As shown by
the events of the Second World War, this order of grace is one in which all efforts at
moral assessment is sinful:
The cross is not the demonstration of the fact that man has a wrong standard
of judgment which he must correct or for which he must substitute a right
standard of judgment by means of which to assess goodness and sinfulness,
but it shows that the whole effort to assess andjudge the goodness and the
evil ofselfand others, and to reward or punish accordingly, is mistaken.309
Niebuhr's primary concern is therefore not the action a person takes, but on their
attitude, as David Grant put it:
Niebuhr's articles concerning World War II reflect the same tendency to
focus ethical reflection back upon the attitude of the agent rather than upon
the agent's outward actions.31
In going to war, we must stop all attempts at moral judgment - both judging the self
and the enemy. We must also cease thinking and acting in a self-centred fashion - all
self-defensiveness and attempts at self-aggrandisement must be rejected. In addition,
all of our actions must be done in the hope and trust in God's activity in the world -
God has not given up on the world, we therefore must also not give up on it.
Niebuhr and the Holocaust: Humanitarian Intervenion
Niebuhr does not mention the Holocaust in his writings, although the events
of the Holocaust confirmed his belief that one of the main elements ofwar is that it is
the innocent who suffer the most. War is like crucifixion in that the suffering of the
relatively innocent is a call for the relatively guilty to repent of their sinfulness.
Niebuhr's critique of both the just-war theory and pacifism is based on the fact that







The problem with conventional approaches to war ... is that they assume that
the meaning of events is clear, that there can be some easy consensus about
the problem ofwar and its moral dimensions.
Niebuhr uses the symbol of the cross to show that such epistemological self-
confidence is deceptive, that our conventional wisdom fails to discern the
whole because it obscures the perduringfact ofwar, namely, that the burden
ofwar falls on the innocent. Pacifists and nonpacifists fail to detect this
pattern in war because they are caught within the conventional categories of
justice and injustice, purity and wickedness.311
When one understands this suffering as a central, if not the central, element in our
experience of war, all wars become a type call to repent of sinfulness, of the
henotheism of elevating the importance of one's own race or religion or nation over
against others.
Niebuhr argues that Christians have a duty to protect their neighbours:
Instead of asking whether we are the right people or wrong people we shall
simply inquire what duty we have to perform in view of what we have done
amiss and in view ofwhat God is doing. If that duty involves, as I believe it
does, resistance to those who are abusing our neighbors, we shall not enquire
whether our neighbors are not better people than those who are abusing them.
In social life our duty frequently requires us to protect neighbors whom we
dislike against the injustices of those whom we like and who on the whole
seem to us to be better people than their victims are. The same principle
applies in the affairs of the society of nations.
If injustice is done to totalitarian countries (as Greece was somewhat
totalitarian) or communist countries or the Jewish people, the answer to our
question about our duty does not depend on the answer to our question about
the relative goodness of the victims and the victimizers. Nor does the answer
depend on the reply to our question about our own relative goodness. Duty is
duty and no man [sic] or nation has a right to excuse the self from doing the
dutiful thing now because of past failures. Response to the judgment of God
on men who have failed to do their duty in the past consists in the
performance of present duty and not in the passing of new judgments on
• • • T1 *)
others because they have failed more signally in our view.
As here discussed, Niebuhr would later modify his view of duty somewhat.






permissible if not necessarily a moral obligation. This intervention is not to be done
with any kind of self-righteousness or triumphalism; it is rather to be done in
repentance for our own shortcomings. This duty is not to be understood as a type of
law which we must obey, but rather as a response to God's judgment of our own
sinfulness. It is important to remember that, for Niebuhr, the first ethical question is
what is happening and what is God doing. Therefore, like Barth, he does not argue
for a principle or criteria for determining when we ought to go to war. War is
understood as crucifixion because it is the relatively innocent who suffer for the sins
of the relatively guilty. War is also understood as the judgment ofGod against all
humans for their moral failings; this judgment is a call to repentance in our current
decisions and, in the case ofWorld War Two, included the decision to go to war.
Prior to World War Two, Niebuhr also understood the suffering caused by the
Japanese in their takeover ofManchuria as a call for the United States to repent of
acting in self-interest. He did not, however, argue that the American repentance
should lead to military intervention. Thus there is no law requiring military
intervention in humanitarian crisis; each situation must be examined and then we
must respond to what we understand God to be doing in the circumstances in an
appropriate way. This response will always be characterised by prayerful humility





Barth is arguably the twentieth century's most influential theologian. His
theology has been written about and discussed by different people throughout the
world. Comparatively little, however, has been said about his ethics. Although there
are significant problems with Barth's ethical thought, there is also much value in his
position. We will first discuss his theology and how it relates to his ethics, then we
will examine his ethical thought with regard to the Second World War.
Theology
One of the cornerstones of Barth's theology is his recognition of the infinite
qualitative difference between God and human beings, as he wrote in the
introduction to the second edition of his commentary on Romans:
... if I have a system, it is limited to a recognition ofwhat Kierkegaard called
'the infinite qualitative distinction' between time and eternity, and to my
regarding this as possessing negative as well as positive significance: 'God is
in heaven and thou art on earth.' The relation between such a God and such a
man, and the relation between such a man and such a God, is for me the
theme of the Bible and the essence of philosophy. Philosophers name this
TIT
KRISIS of human perception - the Prime Cause ...
This recognition provided the basis for all of Barth's later theology and it has been
argued to be his greatest theological legacy. Benjamin Leslie argues in his article on




motifs or methodological patterns all of which are based on the first motif of the
radical transcendence of God.J14 Bruce McCormack writes in a similar vein when he
states: "Barth's theological development from this point [circa 1915-1916] on
represented a more-or-less continuous unfolding of a single theme: God is God."315
Related to Barth's understanding of God's radical transcendence is what H. Richard
Niebuhr recognized to be one of Barth's greatest contributions to theology - the
rejection of nineteenth century anthropocentrism for a theocentric system. In an
article discussing the Social Gospel and Karl Barth, Niebuhr wrote:
The distinctive difference between Barth and the Social Gospel is not that
eschatology takes precedence over Kingdom ofGod in his thought but that
divine action, which eschatology symbolizes, takes precedence over human
action... Christian action is to be understood not as parallel to divine action
in the common striving after a common telos, nor as counter-action to God's
action, but as response to the divine activity which precedes, accompanies,
-3 i z
and awaits human action in history.
This must be maintained in order to avoid the mistakes of the Social Gospel and
much of liberal theology in the nineteenth century - God's activity must always be
prior to and take precedence over human action.
A further component to God's radical transcendence is God's absolute
freedom. God is free to be God's self, we are totally dependent on God for our being.
In 1928, Barth very succinctly stated:
It seems to be a truism to say that only God is absolutely powerful. This
truism, however, is the dividing point of good and evil in the question of the
317will for power.
All of Barth's later theology and ethics were based on these theocentric a priori. The
reasons for this move are compelling, as discussed above.
Barth's answer to the dilemma posed by God's radical transcendence and our






(Niebuhr 193?), 120, emphasis mine.
317(Barth 1981), 258.
146
theological and ethical debate. His rediscovery of the classic Reformed doctrine of
anhypostatic-enhypostatic Christology has received the attention it deserves in recent
studies of God's providence. By means of this understanding of the veiling and
unveiling of God in the divine revelation that is Jesus Christ, Barth focused on the
318
importance of revelation here and now. Barth clearly related all revelation to
God's revelation in Jesus Christ, yet was unwilling at this point to argue that God
does not reveal Godsself in current affairs. As discussed above, one always finds
glimpses in Barth of the desire to seek God's action in current events. The fact that,
only by God's grace, that women and men could preach about God means that God
is able to use the mere human words to reveal Godsself. As Bruce McCormack
wrote:
God's act of taking up a creaturely reality and revealing Himself in and
through it was no longer restricted to the event of the cross, and not even to
the incarnation. God was now seen by Barth as taking up human language
and bearing witness to Himself in and through it. The result of such a divine
action is that human words are qualified to be bearers of revelation. The
complete inadequacy of human language for revelation is not set aside in the
least. But in that the Word of God conceals Himself in human words, a
relation of correspondence is established, an analogy between the Word and
the words.319
It is important to remember that Barth is not allowing natural theology any place
here, as Brunner and others may have felt he did. Barth made his position abundantly
320clear in his well-known polemical work No! An Answer to Emil Brunner. Barth
forcefully rejected any attempt to give humans the ability - be it an essential
characteristic of human nature or a function of a universal grace of God - to read
God off the face of any object. The "divine incognito" must be maintained; God is
only visible where by God's grace a veiling and unveiling occur without affecting the
318 McCormack makes a similar point in his discussion of Barth's theology during the Gottingen time.
McCormack wrote: "... although the theoretical ground of Barth's theology in this phase was found in
his Christology, his basic orientation (his existential focus, if you will) was toward the revelation-
event which occurs in the here and now on the basis of God's Self-revelation in Christ... Thus,
though the ground of his theology was now clearly Christological, his theology was largely
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status of the object itself. It is only God's grace that makes revelation possible. But
God does make this possible:
Human activity which the creator uses to carry out the work ofGod's grace?
This concept is intelligible on the basis of the Augustinian idea of the indirect
identity of human and divine activity or of the Thomist idea of the co¬
operation of the divine causa materialis with a human causa instrumentalis.
It might be favorably understood ifBrunner were speaking of the one
justifying and sanctifying grace of Jesus Christ. For in that case also human
activity "comes within the purview of divine grace.321
Thus by God's grace we can be enabled to see God's activity in the world. We are
not given this ability by a once for all act of God's grace that gives us the glasses to
see God's activity, but in every moment solely because God chooses and as a result
of God's grace, we do see God's action. Therefore, there can be a place for looking
at history to try to understand the causes of such and such an event; or natural
science, to try and see what causes certain reaction. These are important for human
understanding. One can also look at the historical events around Jesus ofNazareth.
But none of these give access to revelation, although the event studied may be
revelatory by the grace of God. That is not a condition of the mundane event or
reaction; it is solely the grace ofGod.
The objects of revelation, of the veiling and unveiling of God's self-
knowledge, are purely mundane things - human beings, human words or other
human actions. It is in this way that Barth's article, "VerheiBung und Verantwortung
der christlichen Gemeinde im heutigen Zeitgeschehen," which was mentioned above
and is more fully discussed below, is to be understood. God's will and governance
can be seen in the current situation as a result of God's grace. This does not involve
the divinization of those involved in a given situation, nor does it allow for a natural
theology where we have the ability to, merely by properly understanding the
situation, see the hand of God in it. It is by God's grace that God reveals God's
activity in the world to us. God's activity in the world to us is, according to Barth, to
command us; our question is therefore to obey or not to obey. We then are involved
321
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in a "thinking after of the thoughts of God." We must now look at how Barth's ethics
maintain this a priori of God has the primary actor, as the eternal Subject.
Ethics
Barth rejected any attempt to separate theology and ethics. As quoted above,
the problem is the same for both dogmatics and ethics: Soli Deo gloria! Ethics cannot
be separated from dogmatics, nor can dogmatics be separated from ethics. Barth
wrote:
Our contention is, however, that the dogmatics of the Christian Church, and
basically the Christian doctrine of God, is ethics. The doctrine is, therefore,
the answer to the ethical question, the supremely critical question concerning
the good inh and over every so-called good in human actions and modes of
322
action.
We must therefore, in any discussion of the ethical problem ofwar also discuss the
related theology. As Christian theology must remain theocentric, so too must
Christian ethics.
For Christian ethics to be theocentric, it must reject all human attempts at
determining good and evil. Adam's sin forms the basis for anthropocentric ethics,
where ethics is understood as the attempt by human beings to determine good and
evil for themselves, thereby attempting to usurp God's authority. This theological
statement of the proper relation of humanity to God, based on the account in Genesis,
seems to be compelling. Any attempt by humans to determine good and evil by
themselves, where God remains at best secondary to human decision-making, must
be rejected. God must remain the subject whose activity is prior to human action and
determinative of good and evil.





... [I]f ethics is to keep to the point, then even in the face of the most striking
impossibilities it must keep on putting questions, or rather showing that they
are already put. It should not hand out either good or bad testimonies. It
should not judge. Knowing the radical antithesis of good and bad, it should
point to the command ofGod which alone can really and properly judge, and
which will tell each of us what is good and bad.323
God commands, as discussed above a concrete individual in a concrete situation. The
strength of this position is that it, as discussed above, allows God to remain subject
and it leaves the determination of good and evil to God. By asking questions, it also
forces us to try to understand our concrete situation. Barth's article, "VerheiBung und
Verantwortung der christlichen Gemeinde im heutigen Zeitgeschehen" shows the
strength of this. As discussed above, in this article he provides a discussion of what
events led up to the war and the events occurring at that time. After this discussion,
he deals with how the Christian Church ought to participate in these events.324 This
shows the strength of Barth's ethics. However, it also demonstrates its weakness.
Ethics can not judge what a person ought to do, for were it to do so it would come
between God and the person. Ethical decision-making therefore requires some sort of
divine intuition of what God is commanding in a concrete situation. That, however,
must not necessarily involve humans giving up all rational discourse concerning
ethical decision-making, as Barth's divine-command morality seems to require. This
provides very little help for individual decision making in Barth. Beyond the
negative function of the biblical witness, he does provide tantalizing hints about how
Christian ethics and theology may provide some positive guidance to help hear the
command of God. In the first edition of his commentary to the Romans, he wrote:
There is in this last point-of-view, which we must take as Christians, no
ethics. There is only the movement ofGod, which in every moment must
correspond to, on our side, a quite specific understanding of the situation and
then the necessary action that must follow from it.
323
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Although this theme was much subdued in the second edition and was not much
developed in the 'twenties and 'thirties, in the first volume of the Church Dogmatics
Barth wrote:
God may speak to us through Russian communism, through a flute concerto,
through a blossoming shrub or through a dead dog. We shall do well to listen
to God if really God does so.326
Later we find a tantalizing idea of how one may hear the command ofGod. For
clarity, the quote is repeated here:
The will and governance of God are not obvious in current events in
themselves, but hidden. We can now see them "in a mirror dimly" (I.
Corinthians 13:12). It is this very Scripture that reminds us that God's will
and governance are not simply invisible. It says, "we see." And indeed: we do
see current events, the tremendous work and suffering of people in their
decisions, undertakings and actions. And so, we also see with open eyes the
will and governance of God which is carried out in them. But we see so much
in addition that we can not see this if our eyes, before which so much of
God's will and governance is shown, are not especially opened to see them.
So it is with God's will and governance in current events. One could compare
them to large handwriting with individual, powerful letters. We see these
letters. They are clearly before us, written in the material of human deeds and
experiences, which the radio and newspaper daily and even hourly lay out
before us. But we need to know that all of those are not merely some
wonderful forms, but indeed are letters. And we must know the alphabet and
the language to which these letters belong. We need to read these letters and
we need to be able to put them together into the written word. Then we would
be able to recognise the will and governance of God, although they are
^97
hidden. That is the most important question: can we read?
Thus, although rejecting any possibility of a natural theology based on God's
immanence, Barth does believe that God's action in history is visible to humanity.
This line of thought is not clearly developed in any of Barth's writings on dogmatics
or ethics. Fie argues that God's action in the world is visible to us, although "in a
mirror dimly." There is no indication here as to how "recognising the will and
governance of God" can provide assistance for moral decision-making or, in other





what God's will in a concrete situation may be, it would follow that this can provide
guidance for our own activity.
The question remains as to why Barth did not develop his ethics in this way.
As many others have written, Barth's fear of casuistry led him to avoid any concrete
advice on what one ought to do, or on a methodology for determining the proper
course of action. Barth wrote:
... [Tjhere is only one real command, namely, that which is given to each of
us in our own here and now. Ethics does not have to set up the command
of God, this one real command. It has to see it as already set up in the life of
a person. We do not have show what is command us. In this regard no ethics
can intervene between God and human beings. We have to show rather what
the fact that we are commanded means, or, conversely, what it means for the
fact that we are commanded that the command is given within our human
life.328
Concerning Barth's understanding of casuistry, Nigel Biggar has written:
This understanding of casuistry as the epitome of ethical rationalism, as a
necessarily closed logical system, is something that Barth shares with most
Protestant writers on ethics since the seventeenth century - including Dietrich
Bonhoeffer, Emil Brunner and Helmut Thielicke. It is, however, a
misconception; for casuistry has not always, or perhaps even usually,
pretended to provide an absolute method of deciding what is right.329
It is this misunderstanding of casuistry that led Barth to reject any concrete assistance
for ethical decision-making. Any attempt to speak about concrete ethical decisions is
rejected as human usurpation of God's authority. For this reason, Barth argues that
ethics can only discuss what it means that God has commanded us, not what God has
commanded or how we are to hear what God does command us. Barth's ethics are
thus individualistic in that only the concrete individual in a concrete situation can
hear the command of God for her or him in that situation.





Barth's divine command ethics is therefore, at best, problematic. Although
his arguments against separating dogmatics and ethics and against any
anthropocentric ethic as discussed above are compelling, the kind of ethics that this
argument led him to must be questioned. Theologically Barth is attempting to define
ethics in terms of the doctrine of God. Practically, however, Barth's ethics do not all
offer much assistance in dealing with the general question of what we ought to do
nor with the specific question of under what conditions a nation ought to go to war.
According to Barth, the Bible does not provide positive commands about
what we must do in our current situation. It rather, as best exemplified by the Ten
Commandments and the Sermon on the Mount, defines the area in which we are to
act. It does this in a negative way by showing what is not, under any circumstances,
morally justifiable. The Bible thus provides a via negativa in for ethical decision¬
making, defining not what we must do but what we must not do. In the New
Testament, most notably in the Sermon on the Mount, this argument is continued.
Concerning the Ten Commandments, Barth wrote:
What in reality ought to occur, that is a question in itself. But whatever ought
330
to occur it must occur within these boundaries. ...
There are two main problems with divine-command morality. Firstly, it makes no
allowance for moral argument. Although one can discuss what is not allowed, within
the realm of what is allowed there can be no debate. That which a concrete individual
ought to do in a concrete situation is left to the individual's intuition. Negatively,
what God will not command to do, the boundaries within which God commands us,
are indeed given in Scripture. Positively, however, we are to hear God's command in
the situation. Barth gives very little guidance to how one hears this divine command.
The reasons for this are discussed above.
The second problem is closely related to the first: divine-command morality




within a group. As Barth stated that God speaks God's command to a concrete
person in a concrete situation, discussion may occur concerning whether a certain
decision falls within the boundaries for human activity set out by God in the Bible,
but within those boundaries there is no way to determine which option is the morally
correct one.
The assumption that underlies Barth's divine-command morality is that God's
activity in the world requires persons to respond by obeying. God's activity,
understood as command, is gracious activity:
The one Word of God is both Gospel and Law. It is not law by itself and
independent of the Gospel. But it is also not Gospel without Law. In its
content, it is Gospel; in its form and fashion, it is Law. It is first Gospel and
then Law. It is the Gospel which contains and encloses the Law as the ark of
the covenant the tables of Sinai. But it is both Gospel and Law.331
While it is true that God's command to us is God's gracious activity, it does not
include all forms of God's grace to us. There are other ways in which God
demonstrates his graciousness to the world, ways which may be seen in the radio and
newspaper. These demonstrations call for a response from us and, in such a way,
may loosely be termed "commands" or "law." However, this is clearly not what
Barth has in mind when he writes
A command - that is, the command in the strictest sense, the command of
God - is a claim addressed to man in such a way that it is given integrally, so
that he cannot control its content or decide its concrete implication. A
command is a demand and not merely a theoretical exposition of the form
which it may take. It comes to us, therefore, with a specific content,
embracing the whole outer and inner substance of each momentary decision
and epitomising the totality of each momentary requirement. It does not need
any interpretation, for even to the smallest details it is self-interpreting. Only
when the command has this character is it obviously a question addressed to
us and demanding the response of our actions - the action of every moment
with its concrete characteristics... Only then do we stand in a relation of
responsibility, of obedience or disobedience, to Another, to a transcendent
332Commander and Judge.
331
(Barth 1957), 51 1.
332 (Barth 1957), 665.
154
Yet, it seems that God's activity in the world requires the response of obedience.
This seems to limit the nature of God's activity to one of command. Barth argues that
God's activity in the world for ethics is one of commanding. This has two further
problems. Firstly, it seems to limit God's potential for activity in the world. The
Trinitarian model Barth uses does allow for some differentiation concerning God's
command in the world - when it is understood as the command of God the Creator,
God the Reconciler or God the Redeemer. Yet, this difference is logical and not
ontological; there is only one command ofGod. There are indeed times when God's
activity must be understood as command, to which we respond either with obedience
or with disobedience. There are also, however, other times where God's action is not
a command and may therefore require a different kind of ethical response. For
example, God's work to sustain God's world should lead us to respond by also
working to sustain the world. This, however, is not a general principle for Christian
ethics that would be understood casuistically; rather it is a response to God's
gracious activity in the world. God remains the subject; our activity is a response to
God's prior activity. This is the second problem with this Barth's ethics: it fails to
acknowledge our nature as humans. As created beings, we are dependent on God's
graciousness for all that we have. However, God has created us with significant
abilities to understand our world and to shape it. It is in war that we can clearly see
the human potential for destruction and creation. We have created the atomic bomb
with its tremendous destructive force. We have also made huge advances in
medicine, in technology, in farming and in many other areas. In this point, Barth fails
to remain realistic about human nature; humans are limited and dependent on God
for their very being but, within that dependency, we can act in significant ways.
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War
Barth is brutally realistic in his description ofwar. He convincingly argued
that war may not be an inevitable result of sin. It must be seen as opus alienum to the
nature of the State. However it is at least always a potentiality. Barth admonished the
State not to have "standing armies:
It is only... as the Church has a good conscience that it is doing its best for a
just peace among states and nations, that it can and should plead for the
preservation of peace among states and nations... The Church can and should
raise its voice against the institution of standing armies in which the officers
constitute per se a permanent danger to peace... It exists in this aeon. Hence
it is not commissioned to proclaim that was is absolutely avoidable. But it is
certainly commissioned to oppose the Satanic doctrine that was is inevitable
and therefore justified, that it is unavoidable and therefore right when it
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occurs, so that Christians have to participate in it...
This must be rejected as unrealistic. It has been argued that it is in this point that
Barth must be strengthened and Christians must work to oppose and preparation for
war in peacetime. David Clough has written that when we notice that
.. .Barth considers that in peacetime we must devote all our energy to
peacemaking, and that preparation for war demands substantial human and
economic resources, we have a persuasive case that Christians cannot support
preparations for the exceptional case in which they may be called upon to go
to war: they are too busy with the emergency of peace to prepare for the
distant and unlikely prospect ofwar, and know that war preparations are
incompatible with serious attempts to build a peaceful order. This means
there is no mandate to prepare for war. There remains the almost unthinkable
possibility that God will call Christians to engage in large-scale killing of
their fellows, but this Grenzfall case no longer transforms the rest of the
existence of the Christian. It is true that a nation governed on this basis will
be less likely to succeed in war if it is ever called upon to fight, but the
Christian vocation is to peacemaking, not to amassing state-of-the-art tools




manufacturing these armaments or to full-time training in using them without
qualms.334
The rejection of a standing army and Clough's extension of Barth's argument must
be rejected as unrealistic. This must be rejected for two main reasons: firstly, in the
current situation war remains a possibility. It may be at some future time that war is
no longer a possibility, but until that point standing armies remain a necessity as, and
this is the second reason, the nature ofmodern warfare and the skill required to
effectively fight a war means that the members of the military be sufficiently trained
to use the technology of war. Although war is opus alienum to the state and signifies
the failure of all States to be true to their opus proprium, it remains the case that we
live in a fallen world of imperfect States. Were war to be eliminated in some distant
time, there would be other areas affected by human sinfulness, as we live in the
already but not yet of the Kingdom of God, which can only be brought about by
God's action and not our own. Realism requires recognizing the pervasiveness of
human sin and the nature ofmodern warfare. We will have cause to return to this
point in the final chapter.
A further problem with Barth is his failure to discuss what, in the just-war
tradition, has been called ius in hello, how one is to act in carrying out military
action. Barth argues that the decision to act must be carried out resolutely and
joyfully if God is commanding you to act. He also argues:
Much is already gained if we only do at last soberly admit that, whatever may
be the purpose or possible justice of a war, it now means that, without
disguise or shame, not only individuals or even armies, but whole nations as
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such, are out to kill one another by every possible means.
This is a realistic description ofwar, however, as Barth provides nothing about how
one is to carry out a war, it leaves him open to the charge that when we believe God
has given the command to go to war, that war is to be carried out as a total war.
,4 From an unpublished paper by David Clough, Fighting at the Command ofGod: Reassessing the
Borderline Case in Karl Barth's Account ofWar in the Church Dogmatics, presented to the post¬






H. Richard Niebuhr argued in an undated essay (but apparently from some
time in the mid to late 1930's) that
The distinctive difference between Barth and the Social Gospel is not that
eschatology takes precedence over Kingdom ofGod in his thought but that
divine action, which eschatology symbolizes, takes precedence over human
action...
The real question which Barthianism raises for us then is not about Kingdom
of God and eschatology but about the relation of human action to divine
action in human history, According to a popular interpretation of
Barthianism, emphasis on divine action not only excludes the human
initiative in determining the goal of existence for both God and man [,s /c], but
also all significance of human action. Barth's statements on politics are then
regarded as unconnected with his theology. But Barth's own statements,
particularly in the second volume of his Dogmatik, indicate that this
interpretation rests on a misinterpretation or on the use of a different
understanding of the nature of human action than he employs. Christian
action is to he understood not as parallel to divine action in the common
striving after a common telos, nor as counter-action to God's action, but as
response to the divine activity which precedes, accompanies, and awaits
336human action in history.
As discussed above, Barth developed this "divine activity which precedes,
accompanies, and awaits human action" into the threefold command of God the
Creator, Redeemer and Sustainer, where the prior divine action to which persons
ethically respond is understood as command. He wrote:
The task of theological ethics is to understand the Word of God as the
command of God. Its fundamental, simplest and comprehensive answer to the
ethical problem is that human action is good in so far as it is sanctified by the
.
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Word of God which as such is also the command ofGod.
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Thus, concrete individuals are understood to be responding to the concrete command
of God in their concrete situation. The individual can either respond obediently or
disobediently. Niebuhr's understanding ofGod's primary activity is much broader
than Barth's and includes God's activity of command but is not limited to it. Ethics
must be theocentric, but there are other activities of God in the world besides
command which call for a different response. Thus, although starting from a similar
position regarding the priority of divine activity, Barth and Niebuhr's ethics are
radically different. For Niebuhr, the activity of God that is relevant for ethics is not
limited to divine command and the human response to God's prior activity allows for
more human input, as Niebuhr wrote concerning war:
War does not come upon men solely by their will, for they do not desire it,
but its judgments are not visited upon them or its sacrifice demanded of them
by arbitrary power. Human intention and action lead to war and all human
conflict is carried on with human will and consent.
As there is something in war that God does to man so there is something that
men do to God in their action upon each other. It is this aspect of human
action that the church seeks to interpret.338
It is therefore important to understand firstly God's action in history and then our
proper response to it. This shows some of the strengths ofNiebuhr's position and
also some of the weakness.
God and History
As shown above, Niebuhr differentiates between internal and external history
in his discussion ofGod's activity in history. External history is objective and
impersonal, dealing with the relationship between events and concepts; internal
history is personal and participatory, it deals with values and norms. This is one of
o Q Q
the major weaknesses in Niebuhr's position - the existence of and our ability to
know of a purely impersonal, objective history has been much questioned in much
recent thought. Even Niebuhr's example of the American Declaration of
338
(Niebuhr 1943), 167-168.
339 For a discussion and critique ofNiebuhr's understanding of history, see (Harvey 1966), 230-242.
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Independence, quoted above, is flawed. Both Lincoln's understanding of the
declaration and that of the Cambridge Modern History provide interpretations of the
document, albeit interpretations done from a different perspective and addressed to
different audiences. Niebuhr rightly points out that the difference is not one of
accuracy - the "the terms the external historian employs are not more truly
descriptive of the things-in-themselves than those the statesman uses and that the
former's understanding ofwhat really happened is not more accurate than the
latter's."340 In fact, all human understanding is limited by time and place, making
knowledge of things-in-themselves impossible, as Niebuhr rightly argued:
No other influence has affected twentieth century thought more deeply than
the discovery of spatial and temporal relativity. The understanding that the
spatio-temporal point of view of an observer enters into his knowledge of
reality, so that no universal knowledge of things in themselves is possible, so
that all knowledge is conditioned by the standpoint of the knower, plays the
same role in our thinking that the idealistic discoveries of the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries and the evolutionary discovery of the nineteenth played
in the thought of earlier generations.341
The "things-in-themselves" or "ultimate reality" of the event refers to the objective
event in itself, and is a third category for any occurrence in history. Niebuhr argues
that we have no access to this, yet maintains the distinction between internal and
external history. Even when internal and external history is understood at the most
basic level of personal, participatory history that forms me as an individual and
impersonal, non-participatory history of objects and relations observed objectively,
this distinction has problems. The relationship of external to internal history is never
clarified, nor is the relation between alien internal histories, which, according to
Niebuhr, belong to the category of external history and one's own internal history.
Some aspects of alien internal histories may well provide constructive criticisms for
one's perspective. Yet many aspects of this understanding of one's own group will
be incompatible with one's internal history; it may well be that another group's
understanding of Christianity is simply wrong, that it therefore cannot be subsumed






whom an internal history belongs - when discussing Christian internal history, does
one include Roman Catholic, Orthodox and Protestant groups? Although there are
significant overlaps between these groups, there are also no less significant areas that
are exclusive to each group. This becomes even more complicated when one further
divides the Protestant groups into denominations. Van Harvey summed up this
problem well when he wrote:
The difficulty with the overly restrictive division between internal and
external history is that it obscures the complexity of standpoints. For any
given perspective... contains a number of logical types of assertions.
Perspectives are field encompassing... because perspectives are so inclusive
and field-encompassing, they frequently overlap. One might say that internal
histories contain many external elements just as external histories are not
lacking some of the characteristics of inner history.342
In fact, Niebuhr subsumes within external history the internal histories of other
persons and groups, making the distinction still more confused. On the one hand, he
seems to define external history as objective, non-participatory history contrasted by
internal history, which is subjective and participatory. On the other hand, he tends to
use external history to refer to any history that is not an individual or group's internal
history. This is further confused by the fact that, according to Niebuhr, it is a
Christian obligation to bring external views of the church into the church's internal
history as a critique of the church. Indeed, as God is active in all history, this
provides a divine criticism of the church. Yet, certain values and interpretations that
other groups use to interpret Christianity may be incompatible with the Christian
internal history, making it impossible to incorporate parts of alien internal histories
into Christianity.
One can maintain much that is good in Niebuhr's presentation if one replaces
the hard distinction between internal and external history with a more perspectival
approach. Rather than using Niebuhr's categories, we need to speak of a spectrum of
perspectives for understanding history. Ifwe strive to view history more objectively,
as the author of Cambridge Modern History did, we must bracket off, as it were our




escape from ourselves to view a thing or event an sich. Yet we may strive for this
perspective to a greater or lesser extent, depending on our audience and our intention.
In other circumstances, we may speak from a different perspective. A good example
of this ability to change perspectives is that of a pastor, who may use Jesus' parable
of the Good Samaritan in a sermon, in counselling and in a lecture to seminary
students. In each of these circumstances, the pastor is interpreting the same parable,
but in significantly different ways. Thus, in the sermon she may refer to the
importance of community and helping out those who are in need of assistance,
regardless of our prejudice. In counselling she may refer to her experience of needing
to let others help her and how this lesson is important for relationships. To the
students, she may choose to discuss the fact that it is only found in the Gospel of
Luke and the relevance of Jewish law and custom for interpreting this story. In all
three cases, it is the same person interpreting the same story, although in radically
different ways. In the case of the sermon, she is interpreting the parable socially,
possibly interpreting her personal experiences by means of the parable in order to
indicate something about the nature of the Christian life with others before God; in
the second case she is interpreting the parable much more personally as a way of
changing an individual's attitude and behaviour; to the seminary students she would
attempt to bracket out the personal in order to discuss the objective characteristics of
the parable. In the same way, Lincoln may well have spoken about the Declaration of
Independence in a radically different way than he did in the Gettysburg address.
Understanding our interpretations of history as being perspectival and on a spectrum
rather than categorizing them as internal and external thus provides a more helpful
way of dealing with the ability of a person or group to look at themselves from a
different perspective. We will have cause to return to this again in the final chapter.
Niebuhr's use of the terms "external history" and "objective" is also
problematic especially when discussing the location ofGod's activity in history. Is
God's activity found in external or internal history? When, however, we -cease
differentiating internal and external history as personal and impersonal, subjective
and objective, and move to a more perspectival interpretation we are helped in this
matter. Then God's action is understood to occur in what Niebuhr termed ultimate
reality, yet the interpretation of that history remains a personal and subjective task.
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This model is close to what Barth posits in his essay, quoted and discussed above.343
However, Barth differs from Niebuhr in what this "reading" means. Although Barth
never developed this idea, for Niebuhr s ethics it is central. Once we modify the
distinction between internal, subjective history and external, objective history, we
can locate God's activity in activity in the "ultimate reality." Niebuhr wrote:
I am trying to think about war and peace from the only point of view that is
available to me, which is that of a man whose thoughts are very far from
being divine; but it is that of one who has been persuaded that if he is to make
any sense out of his experience and life he must always try to discover the
universal in every particular and respond to it. Further, it is the point of view
of one who has been required to seek in ever particular that universal being
and action which Jesus called Father. Hence my problem is not that of
looking with God on the world but of finding God in the world, or rather that
of understanding how to stand in the presence of God as I stand in the
presence of every individual event, good or evil.344
For Niebuhr, as discussed above, individuals make sense out of experience (both
their own and those of others in their own time and in history) by using symbols to
interpret them. The life, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ provide the central
symbols for interpretation to the Christian church. This provides for one of the main
differences between Barth and Niebuhr. Niebuhr argued that this allows room for
apologetics, as we attempt to make sense of our experiences and situation on the
basis of our centre of value. The apologetic question is how well we succeed in
understanding our experience. For Barth, as discussed above, all apologetics is
rejected. We will return to this use of apologetics in the final chapter.
Human Ability
One of the main strengths ofNiebuhr's ethics, related to his use of
apologetics, is the recognition of humanity's significant yet limited abilities, t his is
also one of the main differences from Barth's position; for Barth, ethics involves
343 See the discussion immediately preceding this section and the discussion on Barth. The reference




listening for God's command and then acting or not acting on it. The command
determines what good human action is in any situation. Human action is determined
solely by God's free decision and is either obedient and good or disobedient and evil.
For Niebuhr, on the other hand, humans respond to God's activity in any situation.
Good is determined by the relationship of our activity to God's prior acting. This
allows good to be determined by God and not by us while allowing for creative
action on our part in response to God's action. It maintains that we are created by
God with the ability and obligation to interpret events and then respond accordingly.
Our interpretation of events is based on our centre or centres of value. This is where
we sin, by having inadequate centres of value. Niebuhr defined three different
systems for this, the first two of which are sinful: polytheism: where we have
different centres of value for different situations; henotheism: where we take a
limited, created God and elevate it to the supreme good; and radical monotheism,
where the centre of value is not one reality amongst many others but is the principle
of being itself or, in Christian terms, God. Douglas F. Ottati describes Niebuhr's
understanding of evil in social terms. Ottati wrote:
Niebuhr's early prophetic judgment... was that modern Western culture is
caught up in idolatrous faiths that bring with them a train of bad
consequences. The idolatries are variant forms of "anthropocentrism" that
place human beings at the center of things, so that a human community,
activity, or desire becomes a limiting, distorting, and even dangerous center
of value (The Church Against the World, 1935, p. 136). Thus, nationalism
teaches people that their own country is the most valuable reality, while
capitalism insists that their own economic production is prime power and
source ofmeaning. Racism takes a particular ethnic group as the center of
meaning and value.345
Good is therefore understood as having an adequate centre of value. Similarly to
Barth, this is because having a centre of value that is one part of reality is idolatrous,
putting part of the created order onto God's throne and, thereby, making human
beings the arbiters of good and evil. People, indeed, all that has being, is thus




we are. This forces us to expand our area of concern and to envisage all that has
being as having value. Quoting Ottati on Niebuhr again:
Here [in Niebuhr's radical monotheism] the power by which all things are,
becomes the center of value. The community ofmoral concern is no closed
society, but extends to the entire community of being, and so there is no
privileged or "in" group. Whatever participates in the community of being
has value. To promote the well-being of this community is good; to injure or
repress it is bad.346
Consequently Niebuhr's understanding of human action and the related
understanding of evil provides for an accurate way of understanding human and
group behaviour.
A person's actions can help determine her or his life, but we do not control
our life. As discussed above, persons do not want to go to war yet war comes about
as a result of their actions and the responses of others to those actions. Niebuhr's
ethics is thus a reflection of the interdependent nature of our life. Our actions are
responses to actions upon us and done in anticipation of responses to our responses.
The question of the nature and relative importance of our action is not developed by
Niebuhr. He has been charged with quietism347 for his insistence that God is
objectively active in the world and that humans, corrupted by sin, can do nothing. He
wrote as early as 1932:
Man's task is not that of building Utopias but that of eliminating the weeds
and tilling the soil so that the kingdom of God can grow. His method is not
one of striving for perfection or of acting perfectly, but of clearing the road
by repentance and forgiveness.348
This "eliminating the weeds and tilling the soil" seems to lend credence to the charge
of quietism. In doing so, he is rejecting nineteenth century optimistic liberalism, with




See, for example (Fox 1996). "Richard's despairing passivity, like his brother's restless activism,
had intellectual as well as psychological roots... For Richard the war [World War II] revealed the
inscrutability of God's purpose, the futility ofhuman striving to transform the world. God himself





avoid what he terms ditheism - believing that God's action in history and, at the
same time human action can bring about the desired end - Utopia or, in Christian
terminology, the kingdom ofGod. However, Niebuhr is not arguing that humans can
do nothing, rather, he is arguing that humans can and must act responsibly, but that
humans are limited creatures who can act but only within a limited field of activity.
Moreover, in our acting we limit other persons and objects possibilities for activity.
We must act fully in the knowledge that our acting is sinful and requires repentance,
but act we must.
Niebuhr provides us with tools then to interpret war. As with Barth, Niebuhr
argues that ethics cannot provide us with hard and fast rules that determine how we
should act. Niebuhr agreed with Bonhoeffer's view from his Ethics and quoted by
Barth:
An ethic cannot be a book in which there is set out how everything in the
world actually ought to be but unfortunately is not, and an ethicist cannot be a
man who always knows better than others what is to be done and how it is to
be done. An ethic cannot be a work of reference for moral action which is
guaranteed to be unexceptional, and the ethicist cannot be the competent
critic and judge of every human activity. An ethic cannot be a retort in which
ethical or Christian human beings are produced, and the ethicist cannot be the
embodiment or ideal type of a life which is, on principle, moral.349
This is an inevitable but unfortunate truth. Ethics can help us to interpret events and
respond appropriately to them and help us to understand our own decisions.
However, ethics cannot make the decisions for us. Niebuhr's use of the symbol of
Jesus' crucifixion and of God's judgement to interpret war aids us in our own
decision making concerning the appropriate use ofmilitary force. They point to the
fact that war is a call for all to repent of their self-centredness. God's judgement falls
upon the relatively innocent to call all to repent of their sins. For Niebuhr, as for
Barth, this renders any kind of self-righteousness in war impossible. War comes
about as a result of sinful human actions in peacetime. The call to repentance is
therefore not a call to pacifistic inactivity; it is rather a call for more appropriate
activity in peacetime, so that war may become less likely. In the final chapter, we
349 (Bonhoeffer 1955), 236.
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will see how Barth and Niebuhr provide assistance in building a contemporary ethic
ofwar.
Summary and Conclusion
Barth and Niebuhr complement each other's thought and help us in our
understanding of the ethics of war. As the world has changed since World War Two
ended in 1945, we cannot simply appropriate either Barth or Niebuhr's ethics without
significant modification. Yet an understanding of their thought is important for our
ethical thought concerning war. In the final chapter, I will discuss what I term a
hopefully realistic ethic. In that discussion, we must take several points from both
Barth and Niebuhr into consideration. These points can be categorized into three
headings: the doctrine of God, the understanding of human existence and the
understanding of the ethics ofwar.
God
God must remain subject in all theological and ethical thought. God's activity
must therefore be understood as primary to all human activity. This is the beginning
point for almost all of both Barth and Niebuhr's thought and means that only God
can determine good and evil, as good must be understood relationally to God as
subject and not as object. This theological point must be central for any theological
ethic.
This leads us to the question ofGod's activity in human experience or, in
other words, in history. Both Barth and Niebuhr clearly argued that God is active in
history and that we can experience this activity. For Barth, God's activity that is
relevant for ethics is limited to command. This command is understood in three
different ways, as that of the Creator, Redeemer and Sustainer, but the nature of the
act remains the same. This seems to contradict Barth's insistence that God is free to
be Godsself. Niebuhr, on the other hand, has argued for an ethics of response to
God's prior activity. This allows for the first point, that God's activity is primary,
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without limiting the nature of that activity in the world. God is active in the world
commanding us, but also judging and redeeming us. These activities require
responses that are not obedience in the narrow sense of the word, but are none the
less compelling for human action.
The question of the location ofGod's activity was discussed above in the
section on Niebuhr's understanding of God and history. It is important to note that
God's action is not limited to the occasional miraculous occasion that changes the
direction of history. Rather, God is active in all of the finite aspects ofGod's
creation. This gives reason to hope and partially provides for the hopefulness of
hopeful realism. The question remains whether we have eyes to see the divine
activity in our experience. The next question is how we can fit our activity in with
God's. In some cases, where God's activity is understood teleologically, or as aiming
for some goal, we ought to attempt to work toward the same goal. In other cases,
where God's activity is understood to be judgement, we ought then to repent of what
God is judging in us. In determining what God is doing and what the best response to
that activity, we must discuss this with others both within our society and without, so
as to gain the best understanding possible. This, however, leads us to the next
subsection on the nature of humanity.
Humanity
Realistically understood, humans have tremendous abilities to work in and
change the world, but, at the same time, are limited to what they can do. Theology
and ethics must take this fact into consideration, if they are to be realistic. One needs
only look at the way the world has changed in the last century to see evidence of this
fact. There have been tremendous achievements in many different areas, including
communication, medicine, transport and information technologies. We have sent
people to the moon; people with diseases that in the past were inevitably fatal, like
diabetes, can now be treated and lead relatively normal lives; news reporting now
occurs as it happens, rather than weeks or even months after the events. This
demonstrates our ability to change our environment and experience while giving still
further cause to hope. Yet, this century also demonstrates the limits of our abilities.
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There have been two world wars and countless others; racism, xenophobia, religious
intolerance, and bigotry are still prevalent in our experience; people starve,
homelessness, drug use and addiction are still with us, the list goes on. We need to be
aware of this aspect of human experience in order to formulate an ethic that is true to
and meaningful for that experience.
Our experience demonstrates that, although we can influence much of our
life, there are also significant areas we cannot control. We live in a web of relations
with persons and things that play a decisive role in our lives. Indeed, the very fact of
our existence lies in things over which we have no control. The actions of other
persons limit our possibilities for action. Our responses to these actions, in turn, limit
others. Natural events occur over which we have no control and yet can change the
course of the history of individuals and of nations. We live in, to use Niebuhrs
terminology, a triadic realm of human activity, in which we respond to prior actions
upon us, while anticipating responses to our response. An ethics that assumes that we
can control our existence, or denies our ability to nonetheless shape our experience,
must be rejected.
Barth described the limitedness of humans when he describes those
boundaries within which moral action must take place. For Barth, God commands us
within these boundaries, never outside of them. Thus murder is never the command
ofGod, nor is dishonouring your parents, nor coveting. Although the limitation of
God's ethical activity in the world to command should be rejected, these boundaries
remain, as there are limits to what we can do and to what we ought to do. The fitting
action to what God is doing in any situation will never involve transgressing the
boundaries for human activity. Thus, an offensive war in order to gain greater wealth
or security for one's nation is never the fitting response. The crossing of these
boundaries involves persons in sinful activities and has tragic results for themselves
and for others.
Humans seek to make sense of their experience and, in so doing, use centres
of value to provide a link for their various experiences. As we have such a varied
experience, as Niebuhr clearly demonstrated, we also have varied centres of value -
we all fall guilty to the sin of idolatry by taking one finite element of our experience
and elevating it to the source ofmeaning for our lives. Niebuhr terms this henotheism
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and contrasts it with polytheism. However, it seems truer to say that we are all poly-
henotheists, in that we elevate various finite things to sources ofmeaning in different
situations - it peacetime, I may have as my centre of value my class, or my race, or
even just my geographic region; should peacetime become wartime, I may well have
my nation as the centre of value, or democracy or freedom. These values may well be
good and noble things, the danger occurs when we elevate their status to a source of
meaning - when a nation's relations with a country are solely determined by that
nations value to my nation. This type of idolatry leads to brokenness in relations
amongst different nations and different people. For Niebuhr, this is one of the most
basic types of sinfulness, and this century seems to provide considerable support for
this position.
Ethics of War
Both Barth and Niebuhr agree on the necessity of a realistic understanding of
war. Barth is clear that war is wrong except at the boundaries of what is morally
allowed. There are certain illusions about war that can no longer be maintained, such
as that war is a matter for only a few - professional soldiers and rulers, and the rest
are not involved. Modern warfare has destroyed this idea, as a whole population
suffers during war and is, directly or indirectly, responsible for the military action.
The illusion that wars are fought for higher ideals, such as democracy or freedom,
also must be discarded. Barth argues that wars are fought for prestige and economic
reasons. That seems to be too narrow an understanding for the reasons a nation goes
to war - economics clearly does play a large role in why a nation goes to war, but, as
people's motives are always mixed, so too are the motives of nations. Wars occur
because of a hugely complex array of factors, to limit them to economic or idealistic
reasons fails to account for this.
The just-war theory is based on an illusion that also must be rejected - that
we live in a moral universe where good is rewarded and evil punished. Although
Barth and Niebuhr's rejections of the just-war tradition differ somewhat, they do
agree in this point. The idea that a just nation (or group of nations) punishes an unjust
nation must be based on this type of moral understanding of the universe. The
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relationships between nations are so complicated, however, that it is impossible to
point to one event or one nation and state that that was the cause of the war. No
nation involved in a war can claim to be absolutely just, nor can any nation claim to
be acting as the instrument ofGod's judgement on an evil, unjust nation. All nations
are responsible for the situation that leads one nation to go to war against another. As
Niebuhr so eloquently stated, God's judgement in warfare is against all nations. A
nation may find itself in circumstances where it has to go to war, but that nation is
also responsible for the situation. It may be relatively just, in comparison with its
opponent, but that does not mean that it is absolutely just. One of the strengths of
Niebuhr's argument that war is the judgement of God is this point: God calls all
nations to repent of their sinfulness in this judgement. An ethic ofwar must reject
any attempt by any nation to prove its absolute goodness, regardless of the relative
justice of its fight.
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Chapter 5: A Hopeful Realist Ethic ofWar
Based on Barth and Niebuhr's discussions of World War Two, we can build a
theological social ethic of "hopeful realism."350 This model will help in
contemporary ethical decision-making concerning war and can also be applied to
other issues. Barth's understanding of theological ethics, including his rejection of
anthropocentric ethics, as discussed above, is convincing. His use of anhypostatic -
enhypostatic Christology to allow God to act through mundane things provides a key
for ethical thinking. His divine-command ethics seems less compelling, as it does not
seem to offer assistance in ethical decision-making or allow room for moral
discussion and argument. This is especially true in situations where two (or more)
persons or groups are convinced of their view and are willing to fight to defend it
against the threat offered by opposing views, as is the case with war. Niebuhr's
ethics, on the other hand, provides a way to understand the ethics of war that is
consistent with Barth's theology, but avoids the pitfalls of a divine-command
morality. Unfortunately, Niebuhr did not develop his ethics ofwar systematically. As
the world situation has changed since World War Two, we cannot merely appropriate
either Niebuhr or Barth without significant modification. However, we can develop
an ethics ofwar that is indebted to Barth's theology and Niebuhr's ethics yet is also
relevant to the current situation.
The term "hopeful realism" is clearly related to both Barth and Niebuhr's
thought. In Barth, it can be seen as early as his use of the dialectic of God's no and
yes to the world. In essence, God's no indicates the realism and God's yes the hope.
If God says yes, this means that God is concerned for the world and active in the
world, so we cannot be without hope, we cannot give up on what God refuses to give
up on. The no, understood as realism, recognizes the pervasiveness of sin in the
world. Barth does seem to limit his realism to this negative view of human abilities,
as discussed above. Realism must take human sinfulness into account but, in order to
350 The term, hopeful realism comes from a recent book by Douglas Ottati: (Ottati 1999). Much of
what is written in this chapter is informed by this book, and Ottati's previous two books, (Ottati
1995); and (Ottati 1989) Ottati, however, has not applied hopeful realism in the way that I seek to do
here.
172
be truly realistic, it must also take human abilities into account. Barth's
understanding ofGod's yes to the world can be understood in this case as hope. In a
beautiful section from the Church Dogmatics, Barth described Mozart's vision of the
creation and God's yes to it:
As though in the light of this end, he [Mozart] heard the harmony of creation
to which the shadow also belongs but in which the shadow is not darkness,
deficiency is not defeat, sadness cannot become despair, trouble cannot
degenerate into tragedy and infinite melancholy is not ultimately forced to
claim undisputed sway. Thus the cheerfulness in this harmony is not without
its limits. But the light shines all the more brightly because it breaks forth
from the shadow. The sweetness is also bitter and cannot therefore cloy. Life
T S 1
does not fear death but knows it well.
Because God acted decisively in the human Jesus, there is hope for the world. Barth
in his later thought limited God's activity in history to the life of Jesus. God's grace
allowed Jesus to unveil and veil God's activity. This led later commentators on Barth
to accuse him of an undue Christocentrism. However, prior to the development of his
account of election in the Church Dogmatics, Barth's theology was firmly based on
the revelation of God in Jesus Christ, yet was more Pneumocentric. Barth did not at
that point limit God's revelation so clearly to Jesus Christ, but allowed for God to be
active in revealing Godsself throughout history. God's revelation is always consistent
and must be judged by the revelation in Jesus Christ as witnessed to in Scripture. But
God is active in the world, therefore Christians can never be without hope. This is the
hopefulness that is always present in Barth's theology and which we must account
for in any contemporary ethic.
Hopeful realism is also closely related to Niebuhr's ethics of response. For
Niebuhr, God is active in all of the historical events. As God is understood in
Trinitarian terms, as the One who creates, redeems, and sustains the world, we can
never be anything but hopeful. Niebuhr stated:
The great anxiety of life, the great distrust, appears in the doubt that the
Power whence all things come, the Power which has thrown the self and its
companions into existence, is not good. The question is always before us, Is




with the goodness of integrity? Is it good as adorable and delightful... But
our second great problem is whether it is not forever defeated in actual
existence by loveless, thoughtless power. The resurrection of Jesus Christ in
power, is at one and the same time the demonstration of the power of
goodness and the goodness of power.
Realism is hopeful because it is trust in God; God is active in the world and has not
given up on it, therefore hopeful realism refuses to give up on what God refuses to
give up on. This hope has two components. Firstly, it is hopeful because God who is
good has created us with significant abilities to work toward reconciliation in the
world. It is not, however, disappointed by the fact that we cannot bring about a
perfect world, we are always surrounded by brokenness and sin because, and this is
the second component, because it trusts in God's ability to bring about God's
kingdom in the world. Until then, we must use our God given abilities to, in H.
Richard Niebuhr's words, "eliminate the weeds and till the soil so that the kingdom
of God can grow."353
Hopeful
This kind of realism is hopeful, because it believes that God is active in the
world as Creator, Redeemer and Sustainer. God does not occasionally act to
miraculously redirect the course history is taking, but in all of the process and events
that occur, as discussed above. As Niebuhr rightly pointed out, it is only bad
theologians who are not willing to accept that God is active in the activities of finite
beings. We need to look for what God is doing in a given situation and make the
fitting response to God's action. With regard to war, Niebuhr describes finding hope
amidst a tremendous tragedy:
We see through the use of the great parable how bodies are being broken for
our sake and how for the remission of our sins the blood of innocents is being
shed. Not with complete clarity, to be sure, yet as in a glass darkly, we can






in which, by great travail ofmen and God a work of redemption goes on
which is like the work of Christ. We learn to know what we are doing and
what is being done to us - how by an infinite suffering of the eternal victim
we are condemned and forgiven at the same time; how an infinite loyalty
refuses to abandon us either to evil or to nothingness, but works at our
salvation with a tenacity we are tempted to deplore. The story of Jesus, and
particularly of his passion, is the great illustration that enables us to say,
"What we are now doing and suffering is like this."354
As discussed above, Jesus' passion enables us to understand war as both judgement
and crucifixion - but judgement cannot be separated from redemption nor can
crucifixion be separated from resurrection. If we believe that God is active in all of
the events in the world and that God's activity is transformative, then we must
remain hopeful. The question however, briefly touched upon above, of locating this
activity of God, must now be more fully discussed.
Niebuhr differentiated between external and internal history and then located
God's activity in internal history while not denying God's presence in external
history. I argued above that we should reject this distinction in favour of a more
perspectival understanding of history. According to this model, there is an ultimate
reality, to use Niebuhr's phrase, which includes objective history an sich. We,
however, do not have access to this God's-eye view ofhistory; we can only see part
of this ultimate reality. Our seeing always involves an interpretation of the ultimate
reality. This understanding is closely related to Niebuhr's discussion of human
activity as discussed above. It has four elements: first, all of our actions are
responses', second, our responses are responses to our interpretations of prior action
upon us; third, we are accountable for our actions in that we must act in anticipation
of responses to our action; fourth, all of our actions are done in social solidarity with
others, in other words, in a continuing discourse. This continuing discourse provides
a major check on our actions, as others respond to our actions, approving or
disapproving of them.
Locating God's activity in ultimate history allows for a plurality of
interpretations of this activity. Since the first question of ethics must be what is




many sources as possible to understand what is happening. We cannot limit these
sources to Scripture or the Church or Christians. They provide a tool that helps us to
interpret these events and a standard of judgement for understanding our options in a
given situation, but we cannot discover what we ought to do solely by reading the
Bible. Indeed, we will need to refer to as many different sources as possible -
including different religious perspectives, non-religious perspectives, historical,
economic, political, anthropological and other sources. This does not mean all
information is relevant or correct, as we check it against our own and other's
interpretation and weigh the different interpretations out against each other. These
checks are not limited merely to our contemporaries but must include those who have
gone before us in our tradition. Thus, Christians must look not only to other
contemporaries facing the same or a similar situation, but also to those throughout
history who have interpreted their situation so that they and their interpretations and
decisions have become a part of our tradition. We also cannot limit ourselves to those
within our tradition, but must also look to those outside of it to see how they
interpreted their situation and responded to it. Ifwe believe God is active in history,
then we cannot limit that activity to one particular interpretation of it. Others
interpret their history and situation in a different way, yet may still be responding to
God in their decisions. In looking to these sources, contemporary and historical, from
our tradition and from outside of it, we then have a basis on which to make moral
decisions.
Not all of the sources we look to will be helpful or true for our situation. In
this dialogue between different sources and traditions, we must be careful in what
use to inform our decision-making. There must be consistency within the sources we
use, with a priority being given to our own tradition. It may be that our tradition is
wrong, and that we need to change part of our heritage. Some examples of this
include the Church's position with regard to slavery and the role ofwomen. The
tradition must be flexible enough to allow for growth. Yet, our decisions remain our
decisions, so that ifwe belong to a specific tradition such as Reformed Christianity
or Hinduism or Islam, we ought to respond to our interpretations of events in a way
that is consistent with those from our tradition who have gone before. For Christians,
the primary authority from our tradition is the Bible. The exact nature of that
176
authority is different for different members of Christian traditions. Nevertheless, our
thinking must be informed in a decisive way by that source.
It is easier to look back for God's activity in history than it is to see God's
work in current events. This is unfortunate, but does not release us from the
obligation of attempting to see God's activity around us and respond to it. It may be
that we merely strive to understand what is happening and try to respond accordingly
in the hope that, by so doing, we are responding to God's activity. It is this that
Luther has in mind when he says, "Be a sinner and sin boldly, but believe and rejoice
in Christ even more boldly."355 Hope is graceful hope, because it depends not on
human ability or understanding, but on the good God who is faithful to God's
creation.
Realism
Both Barth and Niebuhr remain realistic in their theology and ethics in
recognizing human sinfulness in the world and in recognizing the destructive nature
ofwar. This is crucial for any ethics that attempts to take the situation seriously for
ethical decision-making. This realism also includes their description ofwar. As Barth
put it:
To handle morality neither skillfully nor unskillfully, but to realize soberly
and realistically that actualisation of the will to power is what politics and
especially war is all about, is the first concrete task of ethical reflection on
war. This does not mean that war is ethically condemned but that it is seen in
its true reality. This must be the presupposition ofall else. Obviously we will
accept the ethical possibility ofwar less lightheartedly when we tell ourselves
- when the nations learn to tell themselves - that it is not so much for the so-
called supreme values but for coal and potash and the rest that soldiers have
to shoot at one another as "enemies." We may still have to accept the need for
this, but probably, as is to be desired, with greatly damped-down enthusiasm.
... The second ethical task is to realize no less relentlessly that the actualising
of the will for power in war - there may be other forms - means that soldiers
(certainly at the risk of their own lives, but that is not the point) must
diligently and carefully shoot at enemy soldiers.356




Thus realism must include a realistic appraisal of the situation. This requires that we
look to as many sources as possible in order to understand our situation. In the case
ofwar, this requires us to look to all possible sources for information, including
military, historical, religious, anthropological, and sociological sources. We must
also listen to what different persons and groups who are involved in the situation are
saying. At the same time, we need to be aware that not everything we hear is truthful
or relevant to the situation. Thus we need to balance out the material and compare it
to other material in order to reach an informed understanding of the circumstances.
This involves looking at the sources to see how reliable they have been in the past
and understanding what their perspective is on the current situation. These facts have
to be verified or disproven in dialogue with others. There are two reasons for this:
firstly, all perspectives on ultimate reality are biased by our own point of view - no
one has a God's eye view of events, all our knowing is relative. That is not to say
that our knowledge is merely a construct, but that our knowledge is not absolute. At
the same time, we all to a greater or lesser extent colour our understanding of events
in order to make our point more forcefully, leaving out information that may not
support our view. This may or may not be intentional, we may be deceiving
ourselves or we may be using propaganda to deceive someone into supporting our
position.
Realism also involves an honest appraisal of ourselves and our reasons for
acting in a certain way. We must constantly ask ourselves why we are acting in a
certain way in a given situation. As sinfulness is so persuasive, we must repent of
those actions where we have acted sinfully and then change our actions. Realism
requires that we acknowledge that we are no more righteous than anyone else. This is
especially true in times ofwar, when the temptation is almost irresistible for one
State to portray itself as "righteous" against the evil of the "unrighteous" enemy.
Such an understanding of war ignores the fact that all States are guilty of acting
during peacetime to bring about a situation that can only be solved by war. In such a
situation, it is true that one side makes the final act that leads to the outbreak of a
"hot" war, but all States act during the "cold" war during peacetime so that military
action becomes inevitable. One can argue that the cause ofWord War Two was the
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German invasion of Poland, to which the British and French responded by declaring
war, but that is a distortion of the events leading up to the war. One must look further
back in history to find the manifold causes that led up to the war, including the
problems from the Franco-Prussian War, World War One and the Versailles Treaty
that ended the Great War, the problems with German reparations during the Weimar
Republic and the events of the 1930's. The outbreak of the Second World War thus
does not provide an opportunity for anyone of the Allied nations to demonstrate their
righteousness, it rather shows their narrow-sightedness and sinfulness. Opposed to
this self-aggrandising self-understanding, as Niebuhr put it, in all of the Allied
actions in this war
... there will be in them no effort to establish a righteousness of our own, no
excusing of self because one has fallen less short of the glory of God than
others; there will be no vengeance in them. They will also share one positive
characteristic: they will be performed in hope, in reliance on the continued
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grace ofGod in the midst of our ungraciousness.
Symbolic Understanding of Life
As discussed above, human beings attempt to organise their experience by
means of symbols. Niebuhr wrote:
What is the general idea in such interpretation of ourselves as symbolic more
than as rational animals? I believe, this: that we are far more image-making
and image using creatures than we usually think ourselves to be and, further,
that our processes of perception and conception, or organizing and
understanding the signs that come to us in our dialogue with the
circumambient world, are guided and formed by images in our minds. Our
languages, we are reminded, are symbolic systems.35
Flumans attempt to interpret their world, their own experiences and their choices by
means of patterns they find in their experiences and in the history of groups they






of value, as described above in the section on Niebuhr's ethics. Most people are
polytheists in that they have many different centres of value for different situations.
These centres tend to involve loyalties, such as a parent's love for their child or a
doctor's concern for the medical well being of his or her patients. This centre than
leads us to discover patterns in our experience, such as the medical doctor who sees a
pattern in our ability to treat illness by means ofmedication discovered through
scientific research. Some of these patterns are then used to illumine other experiences
and become symbols, such as the symbol of the Fatherland for a patriot or the
symbol of nature for the environmentalist: all experiences are understood by means
of this symbol, so that a situation and the possibilities for action within that situation
are interpreted to be good or bad on the presumed effect it will have on one's country
or based on the effect it will have on the environment. The use of these symbols
requires that we use our imagination in seeking to understand the situation, as
Niebuhr discussed, and this is like the scientist who understands certain phenomena
by means of others. Most people have many different symbols for different situations
and may well use more than one to illumine any situation, as the working person who
is trying to decide whether to take a job in a different city. They would look at the
result of a choice for their own career and for their social life; if they have a family,
then the symbol of their family's well being would also be considered. The symbols
we use do not tell us what we ought to do in any situation; they rather - like Barth's
understanding of the Ten Commandments -provide boundaries within which human
activity ought to take place. However, unlike Barth's boundaries, the symbols also
have a positive influence on our moral decision making as they provide us with tools
to better understand ourselves and our world, so that we can choose the more fitting
response to God's action. The question is what symbols does a person use to organise
reality and how appropriate are they. There are four main checks to these symbols:
they must be open to modification; they must be sufficient to explain our experience;
these symbols must be confirmed, modified or rejected by other members of our
community; the symbols must also be subject to criticism from those who do not
share in our community and its symbols.
Firstly, the symbols we use to interpret reality must be open to modification.
There are two interrelated reasons for this: a rigid, closed system would require that
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we can completely understand not only a specific situation, which is in itself a
problematic assumption, but also that we understand all situations that have occurred,
are occurring and will occur. Even if one used symbols that related only to specific
types of events, this would be a daunting task. Such understanding is clearly not
possible, as we are not capable of this level of knowledge. At the same time, a rigid
system fails to account for unexplainable and random elements inherent in every
situation. In use, we would tend to impose these types of symbols onto a situation
and exclude thereby aspects of that situation which do not fit the symbol, rather than
using the symbol to help us make sense of what is happening. At best our
understanding of any situation is limited, as are the patterns we see in it and the
symbols we use to understand it; therefore, the symbols we use must always be
subject to further modification.
The second point is clearly related to the first: if the symbols we use do not
enable us to better understand our experiences and history, they must either be
modified or discarded. If a symbol does not help us understand what is happening, it
would seem to follow, that pattern is not present in our experience. The purpose of
these symbols is to illumine our experiences and the options open to us in a given
situation. If they fail to do this, they lose their value as symbols and must be
discarded or modified, or else they become idols. The symbols are therefore also to
be judged pragmatically. Again, as with the first point, this must be the case because
of our limited ability to comprehend our experiences and choices.
The symbols we use are determined in community with others and must
therefore be subject to their criticism. This clearly follows from the first two points:
ifwe cannot fully comprehend a situation because of our limited epistemological
ability, we therefore must strive to better understand the circumstances. In order to
this, we ought to talk to as many other persons as possible who either are facing the
same situation or have dealt with a similar situation in the past. We also need to look
to historical sources to better understand the situation and to better judge the
appropriateness of our symbols. In examining our symbols in conversation with
others, we learn how better to understand our situation, our options and are aided in
our moral decision-making.
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The criticism of our symbols ought not be limited to those who belong to the
same group and use the same symbols as we do. Rather, we need to be open to a
variety of different perspectives. This enriches our understanding and the symbols
we use. However, we should not merely accept other symbols with our own. There is
room for a kind of apologetics here as we strive to find symbols that better help us
with moral decision making. The discussion must be neither simple acceptance of
other's symbols nor an absolute intolerance of them, but a constructive dialogue
between persons with different understandings and perspectives on reality. There are
incompatible perspectives and symbols, there are also evil symbols that lead to the
destruction of communities. There are also a large number ofmerely different
symbols that help those who use them to understand life and to make choices in the
situations they face. It is important in all circumstances, but especially in a conflict
situation, to understand the symbols people are using. Only by doing so can one
make a fitting response in that situation.
Christian Symbols
The central conviction for theological social ethics is that God is active in
history. It is to God's primary activity that we must respond in order for our action to
be considered good. This divine activity is not merely occasional miraculous
"course-corrections" of human history; God rather acts through the actions of other,
finite beings. The question for Christian ethics is therefore: "How do we interpret
God's activity in the current situation?"
The symbols we use to interpret reality must therefore remain theocentric,
consistent with the conviction of God's activity in history, yet be accessible to
human understanding. Therefore, these symbols must be revealed to us, not
determined by our understanding. Niebuhr's definition of revelation seems
applicable here:
Revelation means for us that part of our inner history which illuminates the
rest of it and which is in itself intelligible... In his Religion in the Making
Professor Whitehead has written such illuminating sentences and one of them
is this: 'Rational religion appeals to the direct intuition of special occasions
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and to the elucidatory power of its concepts for all occasions.' The special
occasion to which we appeal in the Christian church is called Jesus Christ, in
whom we see the righteousness of God, his power and wisdom. But from that
special occasion we also derive the concepts which make possible the
elucidation of all the events on our history. Revelation means the intelligible
event which makes all other events intelligible.359
As discussed in the fourth chapter, we need to modify Niebuhr's understanding of
internal and external history, so that rather than speaking of that "part of our inner
history," we would prefer to say "that event in ultimate reality that we, from our
perspective, understand as illuminating the rest of it." Nonetheless, this provides us
with symbols that we can use to understand reality while avoiding anthropocentrism.
This is especially true ifwe bear Barth's anhypostatic - enhypostatic Christology in
mind. Thus, God acted in Jesus in "ultimate reality," but that can only be understood
when one is given the faith to see or, to continue using perspectival language, when
one receives by grace the ability to share in the perspective that allows for Jesus to be
unveiled as the Son of God. From this revelation ofGod, our own experiences are
illumined and we are aided in our understanding of ourselves and our relations with
others.
Therefore, Christians must make some additions to the above criteria. The
most important is that the symbols we use must be given to us by God and not of our
own making; in other words, our symbols must be theocentric and not
anthropocentric. As both Barth and Niebuhr compellingly argue, it is an usurpation
of God's authority when we believe that we can determine good and evil; the
symbols we use provide tools for understanding our circumstances and, thereby, for
seeing the evil and good in our situation. Thus, the symbols we use must be revealed
by God to us, yet in such a way that we can rationally use them to understand
ourselves and our world. As we use the symbols, our understanding of them
increases and we learn better how to fittingly respond to God's activity. This use of
the symbols then become a part of the tradition and a part of the revelation, as later
generations look at prior uses of their symbols. In this way, the Christian centre of
value, to use Niebuhr's term, remains the God who is revealed to us in Jesus Christ




this revelation but cannot become in themselves the centre of value, as the symbols
would then become henotheistic idols.
A further criterion is that the symbols we use must support and nourish
community and not destroy it. This is an extension of the above criteria concerning a
community's criticism of the symbols we use and how we use them. Since Christians
understand the world and all that is in it as God's creation, all of creation has value
because it is God's creation. Douglas Ottati refers to this as "God's great
commonwealth of being." This has major ramifications for any discussion about
war, as we will see below. All of creation has value not because of its use or any
other intrinsic property, but because of the God who created it and all reality. Any
symbol that denies or damages the fellowship must be rejected; those that support
this commonwealth are to be encouraged.
It follows from this that any symbols that encourage us to abdicate our
responsibility in the world must also be rejected. We can have been given, by the
grace of God, significant abilities to shape the world, as the invention of nuclear
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weapons demonstrates. Ifwe understand all that is, including ourselves, as being
created and sustained by God, then all being is interrelated in "God's commonwealth
of being" and we must acknowledge this interconnectedness. As we acknowledge
that God has given us significant abilities to interact with our environment, we need
to use these abilities responsibly.
Hopeful realism acknowledges the fact that humans have the ability to shape
their environment and change what is happening, but also acknowledges that human
abilities are limited. The kingdom of God will only be brought about by God's
activity, not our own. This means we act in order to build a better world only in
response to God's reconciling activity in the world. Our action is witness to God's
action, as Niebuhr put it:
360 See (Ottati 1999)43 and 105-107.
j61 Gordon Kaufman argues that "The stark fact of total human responsibility for the earthlyfuture of
humanity, which a potential nuclear catastrophe symbolises, calls into question all this traditional talk
- held together so tightly and meaningfully in the symbol of the divine sovereignty - of God's power
and purposes and love as the proper and only adequate ground for hope in our desperate situation."
See (Kaufman 1985) 8. We do not agree with Kaufman that the traditional symbols of God's love and
providence, indeed of a personal God, should be rejected; however, as Kaufman rightly indicates, our
ability to create nuclear weapons (our ability is clearly not limited to that, but it provides a potent
symbol of our potential) does require that we rethink the tradition symbols in Christian theology.
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Man's task is not that of building Utopias but that of eliminating the weeds
and tilling the soil so that the kingdom of God can grow. His method is not
one of striving for perfection or of acting perfectly, but of clearing the road
by repentance and forgiveness. That this approach is valid for societies as
well as for individuals and that the opposite approach will always involve is
in the same one ceaseless cycle of assertion and counter-assertion, is what I
am concerned to emphasize.362
Sinful activity, however, will also always be a part of our experience until God
brings God's kingdom into being. Douglas Ottati described this when he stated that
the contemporary witness to the gospel
.. .will claim that sin and grace, judgment and reconciliation belong together.
It [hopeful realism] will insist that we ought not deceive ourselves and yet
that we ought never to give up hope. It will say that we ought to denounce
and restrain corruption, but also that we ought to announce and pursue
promising possibilities for genuine communion and renewal. It will push us
to move beyond a naive optimism and defensive pessimism. It will encourage
us to become hopeful realists.363
We must therefore act in the world to bring about genuine reconciliation, while
recognising that we never can succeed and trusting that God will bring about God's
kingdom in God's own time. We thus hope that our activity will bring about good
and trust that God will act within history to bring about God's kingdom.
Sin, understood on this basis, involves a constricting of one's area of concern.
Ifwe believe that all being has value on the basis of its relationship to God, and ifwe
believe that God is active in history working for reconciliation, then we cannot limit
our area of concern to simply ourselves, our family or our nation. This, in Niebuhr's
terms, henotheism is idolatrous as we take one created and finite aspect of our
experience and make it the centre of value by which everything else is judged. As
this centre is finite, it must exclude parts of the universe. In this way, henotheism is
also unrealistic, as it cannot provide us with assistance in interpreting all of our
experience. As Christians understand all being as created by God and dependent on






see all of reality as belonging to the commonwealth of being. God thereby also
enables us to interpret all of our experience without exclusion. As sinful beings
whose vision and understanding is limited by idolatrous henotheism, we are unable
to perfectly interpret our experience and respond appropriately to God's activity in it.
If we argue that God, the source of all being, is our centre of value, we can no
longer judge value as value to us, but must recognize that everything has value
because of its relationship to the good God who gave it being. In terms ofwar, we
can no longer say that a particular war is not our concern, as we have no economic or
military interests in that area. This does not mean a nation must intervene in all wars
occurring at this moment in history; it does, however, mean that a State must look at
all military actions occurring and decide what, if anything, ought to be done. There is
no war that can be ignored simply because it is in an area of the world that has no
relevance to this State.
Hopeful realistic ethics does not replace teleological ethics, nor does it
replace deontological ethics. It rather includes them as appropriate responses to
certain types of action upon us. Deontological ethics, in order to be theocentric and
not anthropocentric, cannot provide us with a list of rules we can use to determine
the proper action. Barth's rejection of this kind of casuistic ethics is persuasive.
However, as Barth also argues, there are certain boundaries within which our action,
if it is to be good, must take place. Consequently, there are certain actions that are
not moral under any circumstances. With regards to war, any offensive military
action used for the aggrandisement of one's own State at the expense of another or
for vengeful reasons is clearly immoral. It is also important, as will become evident
below, that any violation of treaty obligations must also be rejected. This does not
allow any other State to claim to be righteous in going to war as a response to
another State' military, self-aggrandising activity. No one individual nor State can
claim to be speaking for God nor to be righteous before God.
It is important to remember that God acts within history and not from the
outside; God does not occasionally change the direction of history by a supernatural
act. God is rather in the process of history as discussed above, this is the reason
realism must remain hopeful. Since, as Niebuhr persuasively argued, the first ethical
question must be "What is happening?" and the moral action is any situation is the
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response the fits with God's prior activity, this question can be further specified for
Christians to be "What is God doing in the current situation?" It may be, as Barth
argued, that God is commanding us to go to war in a given situation. There is,
however, the prior question of how we come to that conclusion or, in other words,
what is happening in the current situation that leads us to the conclusion that God is
commanding us to go to war. It is to this question that Barth fails to provide a
convincing answer.
With the above discussion in mind, we now turn to the ethics ofwar.
The Ethics ofWar
As Christian symbols must be based on God's revelation in Jesus Christ as
discussed above, the symbols can best be understood in Trinitarian terms under the
subheadings ofGod the Creator, God the Redeemer and God the Sustainer.
God the Creator
All being is understood as valuable because of its relationship to God. In
other words, the understanding ofGod as Creator provides us with one symbol for
understanding war which has implications for our actions, both ad bellum and in
bello, the symbol of concern for being in general. It is important to note that this is
not a criterion for determining what we ought to do; it rather ought to be a
characteristic for our thinking with regard to war. In considering whether or not to go
to war, we must consider the results of our action or inaction for those involved. This
includes not just the people involved, but also environmental issues, a concern which
increased dramatically in importance after the invention of atomic and chemical
weaponry. We must attempt to foresee what the result of a possible action will be.
Since we are limited, finite beings, we cannot know what will occur as a result of our
action, yet we must at least attempt to the best of our ability to determine what would
probably happen. It is here that we can see how hopeful realism, as is the case with
Niebuhr's ethics of response, does not replace teleological ethics but subsumes it as
187
one part of its ethical thinking. The moral response in a given situation is the
response that is fitting with God's activity in the situation.
"Because Christians understand that all that is has been created by God, they
also believe all being has value and is interdependent with all that is. We cannot
absolve ourselves of moral responsibility because of a lack of national interest in a
given conflict. Our national security, our economic well-being, or the lives of the
citizens of our State, can not be given any greater moral weight than other threatened
beings, including other States and individuals, or the environment, or the
impoverishment of others. In this sense, teleologic ethics remains relevant to moral
reasoning concerning war, as we must consider what the results of a given action or
inaction will be for the well being of all who will be affected by any given action.
This also means that we must not consider ourselves as the centre of value, as this
would in Niebuhrian terms be a form of henotheism and a constriction of our area of
concern; in Barthian terms this would be idolatrous.364
Concern for being in general also provides Christians with a very strong
desire to avoid war. It is hard to reconcile the destruction that war brings with it with
a concern for all that is. Pacifist here are right in recognising that the brutality and
destruction that war involves is inconsistent with the Christian understanding of God
as Creator. Yet, there are times when the only way to preserve life is by destroying it.
This is the tragic nature of sinful human existence. There are times when the decision
to go to war is the faithful response to God's action. But it is a decision that is never
to be taken lightly or self-righteously.
God the Reconciler
As "in Christ God was reconciling the world to Godsself," (II Corinthians
5:19, NRSV) our actions must be fitting to God's action of reconciliation. This
~'64 Richard B. Miller makes a similar point concerning Niebuhr in his article, "H. Richard Niebuhr's
War Articles: A Transvaluation of Value" when he writes: "Niebuhr's dissatisfaction with the
Christian discourse about the war in the 1930s and 1940s led him to chart an alternative course, one in
which repentance to divine judgment, not moral action, is axiomatic." (243) Although we agree with
Miller that Niebuhr wants to displace the self from the centre of our moral reasoning, this is a
reinterpretation of moral action and not a displacement of it in favour of repentance to divine
judgement. See: (Miller 1988)
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provides a further symbol for our thinking concerning our response to war. In
situations of conflict, we must strive to foster reconciliation amongst the adversaries.
Understood in this way, the Treaty of Versailles can be understood as evil, leading to
alienation amongst peoples. Teleologically, it does not seem not only to be an
inappropriate response to God's reconciling activity in the world, it is directly
opposed to it.
Niebuhr used two symbols to understand war: the judgment ofGod and
Jesus' crucifixion. Judgment must be understood not in terms of vengeance or
retribution but as "the corrective action of a God who is loyal to his creatures."365
The judgment is, as discussed above, not directed to one State which is to be
punished by another, but against the sinfulness of all States. One of the main
problems with the traditional just-war theory is its assumption that one State is just in
its decision to go to war to punish an unjust State. Ifwe follow Romans, "...all have
sinned and fall short of the glory of God" (Romans 3:23, NRSV) then any
understanding ofwar that involves one just State punishing an unjust must be
rejected. In war, God is passing judgment on all humanity, not just the people of one
nation. In practice, it is hard to see how this could be otherwise. The just nation must
assume that the entire population of the unjust nation is to be punished - including
those who had no say in the events which lead up to war, such as children, as the
suffering brought about by war strikes not only those in power or those who bear
arms, but the entire population. At the same time, the population of the just State also
suffers as a result of the war. God is judging all humanity in war, regardless of the
relative justice or injustice of a nation. It is true that World War Two started when
Nazi Germany invaded Poland in 1939. It would however be wrong to say that that is
the sole reason for the outbreak ofwar. The question a nation needs to ask itself in
that time is what have we done to bring about this state of affairs, of what must we
repent in response to God's judgment. The decisions a State makes concerning war
must be based on this repentance, not on any feeling of self-righteousness.
War, as Niebuhr rightly noted, is like crucifixion in two main ways. Firstly,
there is an intermixture of justice and injustice amongst both victims and the




Roman Empire; the third was not guilty of the charge against him but, even there,
ambiguously as Jesus did come to bring about a new kingdom. The crucifiers
included Roman soldiers who were obeying orders, Jewish leaders who were trying
to the best of their ability to serve Israel and other leaders who wanted to maintain
the status quo and, thereby, their own power. Similarly, as Niebuhr wrote:
War is like that - apparently indiscriminate in the choice of victims and
victors, whether these be thought of individuals or as communities.366
Thus, in Jesus' crucifixion and in our experience ofwar, we are faced with the fact
that the universe we live in does not seem reducible to one which is ordered by a
system of retributive justice.
War is also like crucifixion in that it does not make for moral indifference. It
is as a result of our sinfulness that God's Son was crucified; it is also as a result of
human sinfulness that wars occur, with all of the suffering they bring with them.
Rather leading us to moral indifference, war shows the importance of our moral
decisions by the results that our decisions have. If through a State's action or inaction
an indiscriminate number of people, regardless of their relative moral goodness, are
going to suffer, we need to take our decisions very seriously.
We cannot understand God's redemption as being limited to any one nation
or group, as "...in Christ God was reconciling the world to Godsself, not counting
their trespasses against them, and entrusting the message of reconciliation to us." (II
Corinthians 5:19) Redemption involves a restoration of the proper relationship
between God and humanity and humans with each other and the world. This
reconciliation is fulfilled only in Jesus Christ; our action can only be witness and
response to God's reconciling action in Jesus Christ. Our action, however, is
nonetheless important. In war, we must not seek vengeance but to rebuild
relationships in the light of God's reconciliation in Jesus Christ. Failure to do so can
have tragic results, as the Treaty of Versailles so vividly shows. We will return to





Finally, we must also understand war in the light of God's sustaining activity.
As above, God's activity in the world means that Christians must remain hopeful, as
they believe that God will bring about God's will for the world. Thus war is not and
can never be considered the normal state of affairs in the world but only a not-
inevitable result of human sinfulness. As such, we must act in hope because we are
convinced that it is God who sustains God's good creation; we do not. We can
witness to the activity, but we are not and can never consider ourselves to be the
primary actors in this sustaining of the world. This is the reason for Christian's hope,
as discussed above.
This understanding ofGod is clearly related to the understanding ofGod as
Creator. It is perhaps most relevant to decisions made about the conduct within a
war. If God is the Sustainer of all Creation, we must be very careful about destroying
any part of God's good creation. Our decisions must be done in concern for the
continued existence and well-being of all that is, not just a limited part of it. As
discussed above, it may be that we have to go to war, which results in the destruction
of much of the world. But that decision must be made out of a concern for the well-
being of creation.
Actions in war that wilfully destroy creation must therefore be considered
wrong. With regard to nuclear weapons, it is hard to see how their use could be
justified, as both Barth and H. Richard Niebuhr recognised. Understanding God's
activity as that of sustaining creation provides an aid to decision making for ius in
bello moral decision making, as our actions ought to destroy as little as possible or
necessary to accomplish. This concern must not be limited to the effect my actions
have on my nation or people, nor may it be limited to human being, but as we
consider God the Sustainer of all being we must also be concerned with all being, not
just one limited part of it. As God sustains all ofGod's creation, we must act in such
a way that also is sustaining for it. This is never more true than during times ofwar.
Using these symbols, then we can interpret situations of conflict. One of the
strengths of this understanding is that as the situations change, the application of the
symbols can also change. This is not to say that the symbols are determined by the
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situation, but that as we use them in conversation with others we learn how better to
appropriate them and their meaning for our understanding of the world. As situations
change, different elements of the symbols are emphasized to a greater or lesser
extent. Since Barth and Niebuhr wrote concerning World War Two, the political
situation has changed dramatically. There are no longer several States of relatively
equal power, but various constellations of power dominated by the one remaining
super-power. The military decisions of the United States today carry are far greater
weight than the military decisions of any other power. At the same time, there has
been far more terrorism in the world, including within the United States. These types
of activity tend to target civilians in order to achieve political concessions. Wars are
no longer started escalating threat and counter-threat, culminating in a declaration of
war from one power to another, but tend to result from a gradual escalation of
terrorist, guerrilla actions against a group within the same State. Most military
actions today are not "classic" wars between relatively equal powers but civil wars,
to which other States may respond with a "peace-keeping" military action. We now
turn to one recent example of such a situation, the conflict in the former Yugoslavia.
The Holocaust
Any discussion of the ethics ofwar following World War Two must make
some account of the events of the Holocaust. That event has come to divide
theological and ethical reflection into pre- and post-Holocaust thought. There are two
main issues to be discussed here: what impact does the suffering of the Jews and
others under the Nazi regime have for a contemporary understanding of humanitarian
military intervention; and (2) if one is to argue for a hopeful realist ethics, where can
we find hope in the events of the Holocaust.
In any discussion of the Holocaust, we must remain aware of the danger of
merely "remembering" or "memorialising" the Holocaust - true repentance requires
a change in our current actions. Both of these terms - "our" and "current" are vital.
It is easy to understand the evil of the Holocaust as being perpetrated by Adolf Hitler
and the Nazis, or even just as being a German evil from which the Allies saved the
world. As Niebuhr argued, God's judgement should not be understood as a
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judgement against the other, but against us. We have to repent. If the Holocaust is
understood as a German event, then there would seem to be very little for non-
Germans to learn from it. On the other hand, ifwe understand the Holocaust as an
occurrence within human history and, therefore our history, we then not only can but
must learn from it. There have been many good books written on this367
Not all of the victims of the Holocaust were Jewish, others - Roma and Sinti,
Jehovah's Witnesses, Communists, Gays and Lesbians also were persecuted and
killed by the Nazis.368 One must also not forget that the euthanasia policy of the
Nazi's was first used on mentally handicapped persons. That is not to say that the
Jews were not central to the Nazi's death-camp policy nor to deny in any way that
the Jewish suffering under Nazi Germany was so great as to be indescribable today.
For reasons discussed in the section on Barth, one of the reasons the Nazis
persecuted the Jews was the Jewish belief in their being chosen by God. The Nazi
policy succeeded in almost eliminating the Jewish presence in Europe. This must
never be forgotten. However, there is a danger in politicising the Holocaust by
understanding it solely as a "Jewish" event;369 the suffering of other groups must also
be remembered. When this broader understanding of the victims of the Nazi's
persecution is used, the understanding of the nature of the evil that led to this
suffering is necessarily also broader. The root cause of the suffering of the Jews may
well have been anti-Semitism; when the victim is seen as not only having been the
Jews, but also these other groups, then we must look deeper for the cause of this
suffering. One of the roots of this evil is a type of thinking in which we understand
others as external and separate from ourselves and our "group" - be it a group based
on racial, religious, national or sexuality differences. From this initial separation into
groups, it is a small step to believe that one's own group is better than the others.
This broadening of the understanding of the victims of Holocaust also broadens its
relevance today.
367 For example, (Feld 1994), which argues for a return to holiness even in events such as the
Holocaust; (Jones 1999) discusses the issue of individual responsibility in "large-scale historical
event."
j68 For information about the Roma victims, see the website
http://wvvw.geocities.eom/Paris/5121 /holcaust.htm: for information about the gay and lesbian victims,
see (Schoppman 1999) and (Grau and Schoppmann 1995).
'69 This point has been much contested in recent discussions concerning memorials to the homosexual
victims ifNazi persecution. See, for example (Cowell 1996) and (Jackel 2000).
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There are other dangerous ways in which many memorialise the Holocaust Although,
as many argue, the purpose ofmemorialising the Holocaust is to sensitise us to the
dangers of genocide and, hopefully prevent it from reoccurring, it is also the case that
by memorialising the Holocaust we desensitise ourselves. Many reprehensible
actions by governments can be ignored because they are not as horrible as the
Holocaust was. In some cases, these memorials are used to cover our own sins. A
memorial is erected to the Holocaust in Washington D. C., although there is no
memorial to the slaves in pre-Civil War America. The author Peter Novick made this
point in a recent television program concerning the interpretation of the Holocaust:
One ofmy criticisms of the focus on Holocaust memory in the United States,
and this is very different from Holocaust memory in Germany, is that it's cost
free for Americans. There is this enormous and very well done Holocaust
museum in Washington. There is no museum of slavery. What would we
think of the Germans if they said, well, the Holocaust was this a really
terrible thing, but what is really important is that in Berlin we build a
T70
monument to American black slavery.
The purpose of remembering the Holocaust must be for nations to repent of their
own sins and change their present actions. This starts on an individual level in the
schools, where one studies the Holocaust to learn about the self and the other and
371how to relate to the other. Others have made similar arguments about current
political and military intervention, such as Elie Wiesel at the opening of the
370
(Yule 1993)
371 For one excellent example of this type of program, see the Facing History and Ourselves website:
http://www.facing.org/facing/fhao2.nsf. This is an organisation that teaches pupils about the
Holocaust in such a way that they learn about themselves and the other. From the website:
For students, the journey officially begins with an exploration of the complex issues around individual
identity, starting with such questions as: Who am I? How do I define myself? How do I define others?
They learn how identity is linked to decision-making, and to discuss the impact that choices made by
individuals have on society. The journey then broadens to an exploration of identity as it relates to
groups and nations. How does a nation define itself? Who decides who belongs and who doesn't?
With that foundation, students learn how issues of identity and membership, inclusion and exclusion,
play out at one particular moment in history. During this part of the journey, students engage in a
rigorous investigation ofGermany's transition from a democracy to a totalitarian regime. They see
how the Nazis rose to power, culminating in the horrors of the Holocaust. Throughout, students
confront the moral questions inherent in this history and discover that even the smallest choices can,
indeed, make a difference.
Focusing on the role of the individual in history, students then consider the question: Who was
responsible?
Finally, they reflect on their own roles as citizens in a democracy, and embark on what we hope is a
life-long commitment to responsible participation in the world, to continually asking, "How can I
make a difference?"
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Holocaust Museum in Washington D. C. Wiesel spoke immediately after President
Bill Clinton and, about halfway through his speech, said
Mr. President, I cannot not tell you something. I have been in the former
Yugoslavia, last fall. I cannot sleep since what I have seen. As a Jew, I am
saying that. We must do something to stop the bloodshed in that country.372
The Holocaust and Humanitarian Military Intervention
As both Niebuhr and Barth argued, humanitarian intervention is morally a
possibility but not a moral obligation. It may be that other means are better for aiding
those being unjustly oppressed. Whether or not to intervene militarily must have as
one of its primary concerns realistically aiding those who are suffering. A
henotheistic methodology that argues for or against humanitarian intervention on the
basis of the benefit our country will attain is clearly therefore to be rejected. In the
same way, our relationship with the peoples involved can also not be of primary
importance - it may well be that a nation with whom we have a good relationship is
oppressing a group with whom we have a poor relationship. The decision concerning
intervention must be made realistically; there may be cases (as Manchuria was for
Niebuhr) where one may want to intervene but that intervention may be useless or
even counter-productive. There can be no fixed rules concerning military
intervention, such as that when genocide is threatened, we must intervene militarily.
Other responses to humanitarian threats may well be preferable. South Africa
provides a good case for this. Military intervention was not seriously considered as a
response to apartheid, as it is difficult to see how this would have helped alleviate the
suffering there. Nonetheless, a response from the international community was
necessary in the face of such a racist system. The complete boycott seems to have
been the proper response as it led, albeit over a long period of time, to the eradication
of apartheid.
As an aid to determining the proper response to a humanitarian crisis, one
must ask what has caused a government or group to seek to destroy a particular
372 Shown on the television program (Yule 1993).
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ethnic group. This is important as Barth discussed concerning World War Two in
that the Nazi decision to classify Jews as non-human and other groups as sub¬
human374 was symptomatic of the demonic in the Nazi government and was not
itself, as evil as it was, the actual demonic. The Nazis rejected the existence of the
Jewish people on ideological grounds, and had the capability (technological and
moral) to carry out their will against the Jewish people. The understanding of the
nature of the government that is oppressing a group of people is important as an aid
to deciding about the use of force.
Hopefulness in the Light of the Holocaust
Discussing hopefulness in relation to the Holocaust is very dangerous. Those
who did not themselves experience that tragedy must be careful in any discussion of
hope. Hope cannot be described as an obligation to the victims of the Holocaust.
Those who did not experience the terror of the Holocaust have no right to tell those
who did about the hope they should have had. The events in the Nazi death camps
defy description, and any attempt to ascribe some hope to those events fails to see
this reality clearly. How, then, are to discuss "hopeful realism" in the shadow of
Auschwitz?
Christian theology maintains that God is present in all history; therefore, God
was present in the suffering of the Holocaust. This presence does not mean causing
the event to happen, nor creating a greater good out of the suffering. These types of
understanding make the suffering to be less than real suffering. If it is argued that
God caused the Holocaust to happen, then either God is the author of evil or the
Holocaust was not evil. Christianity historically has argued that God is good, thereby
rejecting the argument that God can cause evil. If it is argued that the suffering of the
Holocaust brought about some greater good, such as the founding of Israel or the
United Nations or some technological advancement, the suffering of the innocent
373 See the discussion of the "Ethics of World War Two" in the chapter on Barth above.
374 (Rubenstein and Roth 1987), 5: "The Nazis planned brutal treatment for groups they labeled
'subhuman,' such as the Slavs and Gypsies, but to advance their aims they degraded the Jews to
'nonhuman' status."
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becomes instrumentalised to serve others. No benefit, however great, can justify the
suffering of innocent persons. It may be that God is present as Elie Wiesel described
a well-known passage from his book Night.
One day when we [Jewish prisoners in Auschwitz] came back from work, we
saw three gallows rearing up in the assembly place, three black crows. Roll
call. SS all around us, machine guns trained: the traditional ceremony. Three
victims in chains - and one of them, the little servant, the sad-eyed angel.
The SS seemed more preoccupied, more disturbed than usual. To
hang a young boy in front of thousands of spectators was no light matter. The
head of the camp read the verdict. All eyes were on the child. He was lividly
pale, almost calm, biting his lips. The gallows threw its shadow over him.
This time the Lagerkapo refused to act as executioner. Three SS
replaced him.
The three victims mounted together on the chairs.
The three necks were placed at the same moment within the nooses.
"Long live liberty!" cried the two adults.
But the child was silent.
"Where is God? Where is He?" someone behind me asked.
At a sign from the head of the camp. The three chairs were tipped over.
Total silence throughout the camp. On the horizon, the sun was setting.
"Bare your heads!" yelled the head of the camp. His voice was raucous. We
were weeping.
"Cover your heads!"
Then the march past began. The two adults were no longer alive. Their
tongues had swollen, blue-tinged. But the third rope was still moving; being
so light, the child was still alive. ...
For more than half as hour he stayed there, struggling between life and death,
dying in slow agony under our eyes. And we had to look him full in the face.
He was still alive when I passed in front of him. His tongue was still red, his
eyes were not yet glazed.
Behind me, I heard the same man asking:
"Where is God now?"
And I heard a voice within me answer him:
"Where is He? Here He is - He is hanging here on this gallows. ..."
375That night the soup tasted of corpses.
God's presence, to those outside the suffering, may be interpreted as God's judgment
and a call to repentance - our sinful actions have results in the world, we need to
repent of the evil we have done. The fact that we can at least in theory repent of the
evil we have done in the past, in such a way as to change our present actions, is one
375 (Wiesel 1960), 71-72.
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way, as Niebuhr argued, that God is present in the Holocaust. This does not
instrumentalise the suffering of the innocent by arguing that God is not responsible
for causing them to suffer in order to call the nations of the world to repentance. The
death and destruction that occurred in the Nazi camps and, indeed, in the whole war
was brought about solely by us. It was our sinfulness, our moral failing that caused
that suffering to happen. The suffering of the innocent during the Holocaust is a
judgement of our sinfulness. There is no way to escape this. Yet, Christians
understand this judgement to be God's judgement and, therefore, to be not merely
judgement but also a call to repentance. We can only interpret the Holocaust as
"hopeful" today when we truly repent of the sinfulness that led to the Holocaust.
Repentance necessitates a change our current action - not only do we admit that our
actions in the past were morally wrong and had disastrous consequences, but we
must change our current activity in order to prevent another Holocaust from
occurring. It is in this way that the Holocaust is properly remembered and that, in the
light of the Holocaust, we can be hopeful.
The Balkan Conflict
History
To better understand how this hopefully realistic ethic ofwar functions in the
modern situation, we will now look at the Ten Day War between Slovenia and the
Serb dominated country of Yugoslavia and the events that led up to it. It is important
to mention that we are not here attempting a complete analysis of the events in this
very tangled affair. That would require a dissertation in itself. Our purpose here is
much more limited: we will look at the events that led up to this conflict and see how
a hopefully realistic ethic may have assisted in the decision making that took place. It
is also important to note that, as H. Richard Niebuhr clearly stated, a State ought not
claim to speak for God to another State. As Christians believe God is active in
history through the actions of finite beings, we do believe that one State's actions do
have meaning for what God is saying in any situation. However, no State (nor
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individual) has the right to claim to speak for God to another State through their
action nor, and this is more relevant for the following discussion, ought any State
claim to be able to decipher what God is saying to another country in a given
situation. It would, for example, be wrong for the United States and the United
Kingdom to have declared that their actions in World War Two were God's acts of
judgement against the evils ofNazism, thus justifying the carpet bombing campaign
towards the end of the war. It would also have been wrong for a neutral country, such
as Switzerland, to categorically state that the Allies are God's instrument of
vengeance against the evils ofNazi Germany.
The reasons that led to the outbreak ofwar in Yugoslavia are difficult to
trace. The country itself was formed in 1918 after World War One, when the Allies
dismantled the Austro-Hungarian Empire. It was originally called "The Kingdom of
Serbs, Croats and Slovenes," a name which foretold the future problems of the
country. The name was changed in 1929 to Yugoslavia. The differences between the
different nations include cultural and religious traditions, with the Serbs being mostly
Orthodox Christian, the Croats and Slovenians mostly Roman Catholic and a
significant number of Moslems amongst the other nationalities (especially the
Albanians). During World War Two the country originally declared neutrality, but
after the Nazis invaded in 1941 and partitioned Yugoslavia, a puppet government
was set up under the leadership ofAnte Pavelic, a Croatian nationalist, and his
supporters, called Utashas or Ustase. They declared the Independent State of Croatia.
They set up concentration camps that interred Serbs and other opponents. It was
Pavelic's declared intention to create a racially pure Croatia, free of Serbs - he
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sought to "kill a third, expel a third, convert a third (to Catholicism)." Serbian
nationalists, who fought a guerrilla war against the Ustase, were known as the
Chetnicks. A third group, the communists, led by Tito, fought against both the Ustase
and the Chetnicks was known as the Partizans and was made up mostly of Serbs and
Montenegrins but had significant participation from Croats, Macedonians,
Slovenians, Albanians and Moslems. This is the group that eventually succeeded in




Yugoslavia that included six republics: Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia,
Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia.
The political situation in Yugoslavia was completely dominated by Tito from
the end ofWorld War Two up until his death in 1980. Although Communist, Tito
broke with Stalin in 1948 and tried to steer a course between West and East during
the Cold War. This brought in large amounts of financial support from the West,
which brought about a "prosperity that was beyond its means.' At the same time,
Tito repressed any expression of national identity inside of Yugoslavia in order to
maintain his own power and avoid any upraising that may have led to civil war. This
was problematic, as the Serbs formed a significant majority within Yugoslavia (there
were twice as many Serbs in Yugoslavia as there were Croats, the second largest
nation), which Tito continually had to play one off against the other:
In his eternal battle to keep the nations on an equal footing, Tito ruthlessly
suppressed any expression of resurgent nationalism. Enforcing his doctrine of
"Brotherhood and Unity," he carried out purges of Serbs, Croats and
Muslims, Slovenes, Macedonians and Albanians, balancing his repression of
any one nation against that of the others. Nationalist were forced into exile,
where they nurtured their resentment in expatriate communities that proved
fertile breeding grounds for extreme nationalism. Or they were jailed...
I
Tito's Yugoslavia was divided by the different nationalities within Yugoslavia but
these nations were united in their loyalty to Tito:
By the time of the promulgation of the 1974 constitution (Tito's last), the
country was decentralized to an unprecedented extent. Yet while Tito was
alive, that decentralization was notional, rather than real; there were no
doubts about who held the reins of power. Tito was himself a one-man single-
party state...
Tito was frequently likened to a great oak tree, in the shade of whose
immense branches nothing else could grow. In his last years, no heir apparent
emerged. Wary of appointing a successor, Tito created a hopelessly
inefficient inheritor of his mantle: the collective head of state which was to
replace him was an eight-member presidency, comprising one representative
from each of the six republics, and one from each of Serbia's two
autonomous provinces, Vojvodina and Kosovo. The presidency of this body
would rotate annually between its members. As head of state, the eight-






It was hoped that the division of Serbia into three provinces would counteract the
huge Serbian majority in Yugoslavia. It failed to do so. This division, however, did
have the negative effect of making many Serbs feel that they were discriminated
against, so that the catch-phrase "Weak Serbia, strong Yugoslavia" was accepted as
axiomatic by almost all Serbs. Each of the republics was responsible for their own
territorial army, while the Yugoslavia People's Army (JNA) remained under the
command of the collective head of state. This made the JNA the only group that
transcended the republics boundaries. Originally, they did in fact seek to save
Yugoslavia as a political unity; they were later completely taken over by the Serb
leader Milosevic.
With the end of the Cold War, Western economic support collapsed and, with
it, the economic stability of Yugoslavia. Thereafter, the nationalism, that had always
been latently present, flared up in a violent way. Starting in 1987, Slobodan
Milosevic played the Serbian nationalist card in order gain popular support and then
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to maintain his power. He was a leader in the Communist Party who had
engineered their takeover of the nationalist cause. When, in April 1987 there was
Serbian unrest in Kosovar city of Polje, Milosevic was sent there by the Serbian
President Stambolic. As the Kosovo Serbs demonstrated violently against the
supposed Kosovar aggression, Milosevic addressed them with the sentence: "No one
should dare to beat you." The crowd's mood changed as they began chanting "Slobo,
Slobo." This made Milosevic the protector of Serbs everywhere and provided him
with the support he needed to assume political leadership of Serbia. Initially, he
sought to maintain Yugoslavia under his leadership. To do so, he first assumed
leadership of the communist party then sought to reunite the Serbian province of
Vojvodina to Serbia. After doing so, he was able to portray himself as the protector
ofYugoslavia against the forces in Slovenia and Croatia that sought to destroy the
379
Many people have reported that Milosevic himself does not appear to be a Serbian nationalist.
MishaGlenny, who interviewed Milosevic in 1991, described the meeting: "When I introduced
myself [to Milosevic] in Serbo-Croat, he drew back a little surprised, 'Oh, you speak Serbian?'
Instead of commending me on learning this as most Serbs do, he asked: 'Why did you learn Serbian?'
I explained to him that I had done some post-graduate study in Prague where I learned Czech and
since acquainting myself with Yugoslavia, I had taught myself Serbo-Croat as an adjunct to my
understanding of the country. A Serb nationalist would have immediately warmed to a Serbian
speaker - an autocrat like Milosevic, however felt uncomfortable with it. The interview was
conducted in English." See (Glenny 1996) 126-127.
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nation by declaring their independence. By so doing, he was able to win the support
of the JNA. This would later allow him to take over absolute control of the JNA so
that they became, in effect, the Serbian Army.
The collective presidency of Yugoslavia failed after Milosevic became
President of Serbia. On May 15, 1991, the Croatian president, Stipe Mesic should
have become Yugoslavia's president as a result of the normal rotation among the
eight member collective presidency. His election was blocked through Milosevic's
influence. The country was thus left without a president. As this crisis continued to
simmer, Slovenia and Croatia headed toward independence. In a referendum in
December 1990, Slovenians overwhelmingly voted for independence. In May 1991,
over 90% of Croats also voted for independence. The collective presidency met
several times to attempt to resolve the situation to no avail. All sides merely asserted
their own positions in these meetings. Milosevic's position is summed up by Silber:
Unity is the holy grail of modern Serb nationalism; all Serbs in a single state.
Milosevic did not dispute the right of the Croats or the Slovenes to secede.
But he insisted that the Serbs ofCroatia had the same right to secede, in turn,
from Croatia, and that the break-up of Yugoslavia would necessitate a
redrawing of the borders. The internal borders of Yugoslavia had been drawn
in 1945.
The two crises together put Yugoslavia in a very dangerous situation. As the JNA,
the only pan-Yugoslavian group committed to maintaining the country, was
commanded by the collective President, the fact that there was no President meant
that there was no commander-in-chief of the Yugoslavian army. There was no one,
therefore, who could command the military to intervene in the case of a republic
declaring independence. At the same time, Slovenia and Croatia were rapidly
preparing to declare their independence.
As the situation reached its climax, James Baker, the United States Secretary
of State arrived in Belgrade.
The GulfWar, in the words of the then-President George Bush, had




free world." All sides in Yugoslavia's conflict set great store on Baker's visit;
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all sides wanted to see him.
Unfortunately, all sides were disappointed. Baker seems to have been ill prepared
for the situation in Yugoslavia. The United States' policy was that the unity and
integrity of Yugoslavia must be maintained. Baker met with the leaders of all 8
republics, but seemed to feel that if Mesic could take office as the President of
Yugoslavia, the situation would be defused. Momir Bulatovic, the President of the
Republic ofMontenegro, described his meeting:
When I first met Mr. Baker I said "Tell me what you want from me." He was
confused about how to start the conversation with me, until they brought him
his briefing book. I looked into it to see what it said about Montenegro. I
peeked into it and there were just two lines:
the smallest republic in Yugoslavia.
"2 O'j
a possible fifth vote for Mesic.
The meeting with the federal Prime Minister, Ante Markovic seems even more
remarkable, as Silber describes it:
According to the former Defence Minister, Admiral Branko Mamula, who
was Veljko Kadijevic's most trusted advisor throughout the crisis that led to
war, Baker told Markovic to "wrap the Slovenes gently on the knuckles."
Markovic has been silent about his role in the run-up to Slovenia's ten-day
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war; neither man has confirmed that the phrase was used.
Baker's visit resulted in nothing and the United States stayed out of Yugoslavia for a
considerable time after this occurred. Baker would later say concerning Yugoslavia:
"We don't have a dog in this fight."
Croatia, differently from Slovenia, went down a more sinister road toward
independence. In 1971, Tito crushed the Maspok, a nationalist movement in Croatia
which was led by members of the Communist party and sought to create an
independent Croatia. The leaders were imprisoned or went into exile, only to return








Democratic Union (HDZ). This political party, which was legalised in December
1989, was led by Franjo Tudjman, a historian and formerly a General in the
Yugoslavian People's Army (JNA). They argued that the Serbs had far too much
influence in Yugoslavia, so that the only option for Croatia to maintain itselfwas for
the republic to declare their independence. Thus, the more Milosevic fed Serbian
nationalism, the greater the calls in Croatia became for independence. Ivica Racan,
the Communist chief in Croatia, stated:
Milosevic's aggressive policy was the strongest propaganda for Tudjman.
Milosevic was sending his gangs to Croatia, where they were dancing and
singing: 'This is Serbia' which provoked and liberated the national pride and
the nationalist reaction of Croats which was effectively used by Tudjman.384
Tudjman invited the expatriate Croats to the HDZ Congress in February 1990,
securing financing for the upcoming campaign and demonstrating the party's
political direction. Many of the expatriates had been forced out of the country after
Tito clamped down on the Maspok; others were Ustase who fled Yugoslavia after
World War Two. The HDZ beat Racan's renamed Communist Party, the Party of
Democratic Change, in elections in 1990. This, understandably, made the Serbs
nervous and pushed them toward Milosevic. When Tudjman was later quoted as
saying: "Thank God my wife is not a Jew or a Serb," the Serbian fears were
strengthened.
The situation in Croatia was exacerbated by a significant population of Serbs
in Knin and in other, rural areas. In fact, some of the more rural villages around Knin
had populations that were almost 100% Serbian. These rural, mostly uneducated
Serbs, responded to Tudjman's resurgent nationalism in fear, which was played on
by Serb nationalists in Croatia in the Srbska Demokratska Stanka (the Serbian
Democratic Party in Croatia). The SDS was originally led by Jovan Raskovic, a
moderate, who spoke at a rally of 10,000 people in a small town south ofZagreb.
Belgrade radio reported:
384
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Addressing the crown, Jovan Raskovic... said that the Serbs respect the
Croatian people's rights to their sovereign state, but they [the Serbs] demand
in that state an equal position for the Serbian and other peoples. The Serbs do
not want a second state in Croatia, but they demand autonomy... the Serbian
people in Croatia should be allowed to speak their language, to write their
script, to have their schools [cheers], to have their education programs, their
o o r
publishing houses and their newspapers.
In the nationalistic climate following the rise to power of Milosevic and Tudjman,
Raskovic was soon forced out of the leadership of the SDS and replaced by a much
more rabid Serb nationalist, Milan Babic. Babic sought an independent Serbian state
in the area controlled by Croatia. He enlisted the support of those areas of Croatia
where Serbs were in the majority and were sympathetic to him. Those areas where
Serbs were in the majority but that did not support him were cajoled and threatened
into supporting Babic and the SDS. Where that was not successful, force was used.
Once the current crisis was resoled, Babic and Croatian Serbs caused another
catastrophe, far worse than the situation in Slovenia.
Slovenia, economically the strongest and most western of the republics,
declared its independence from Yugoslavia in 1991 under the leadership of Milan
Kucan. After an almost unanimous vote of the Slovenian Parliament on 25 June
1991, the Slovenians took control of the borders, air traffic and ports. Kucan had an
agreement with Tudjman in Croatia that they would declare independence at the
same time so that, together, they could fight the JNA by pooling their information
and military resources. Although Tudjman declared independence at the same time
as Slovenia, the Croats reneged on the other parts of this agreement, so Slovenia was
left to fight the JNA alone. The JNA attempted to retake control of the borders on the
26th of June. There was a brief conflict, which became known as the Ten Day War.
This was the beginning of the end of Yugoslavia.
The United States argued that this was a problem for the Europeans, one that
they had to deal with. The Europeans, after the negotiations were successfully
concluded that would turn the European Community into the European Union, were
happy to meet the American demands. At a meeting of the European Community
foreign ministers on 23 June, they agreed not to recognize any unilateral declarations
385 Quoted in: (Little 1996) 95
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of independence. As the then British Prime Minster John Major put it: "The first
prize is to hold the federation together in Yugoslavia." The troika of the European
Community- consisting of the foreign ministers of the last, current and next
president of the EC; at this time, Jacques Poos of Luxembourg, Hans van den Broek
of the Netherlands and Gianni de Michaelis of Italy - went to Belgrade to negotiate a
cease-fire. Jacques Poos was head of this delegation, as Luxemburg had the EC
presidency until the 1st of July, at which point Van den Broek took over as the Dutch
took over the EC presidency. Silber and Little describe their visit:
They came - in the phrase ofmany a subsequent mediator - to "bang heads
together," as though the conflict was caused by no more than some ill-
defined, but frequently alluded to Balkan temperament, a south Slavic
predisposition - either cultural or genetic - toward fratricide. They behaved
as though all they had to do was to persuade the belligerents of the folly of
war. They failed to recognize that, in some circumstances, the resort to war is
far from irrational. It was, for President Kucan's Government on that fateful
night, a profoundly rational, and indeed the only, way to achieve what they
wanted.387
The troika arrived in Belgrade in the late evening, met with the Croat and Slovene
leaders and asked that they revoke their declarations of independence. The Slovenes,
who felt they were doing well in the war, refused to do so. After negotiating
throughout the night, the troika left believing that they had arranged a three-point
cease-fire. The Slovenes and Croats would put their independence on hold for three
months; the JNA would return to their barracks and Mesic would take his turn as
head of State. However, the Slovenes, who felt they were doing well in the war,
claimed that they had not agree to this cease-fire, which in any event failed to
address the central problem ofwho would control the borders, air-traffic and ports.
The fighting continued.
It was at this point that public opinion began to turn in favour of the
Slovenes, who were portrayed as a westward-leaning country standing up to an evil
communist monolith. Markovic, the prime minister, withdrew his support from the
JNA, making it appear that the JNA was acting on its own authority without any
386




government mandate. When a member of the JNA's general staff demanded Slovenia
cease hostilities or face 'decisive military action,' it only confirmed the impression
that the military was out of control. By June 30th, Serbia withdrew its support for the
JNA's attempt to hold the country together. When General Kadijevic stated that there
were only two options left: full scale military intervention in Slovenia or withdrawal
of the JNA and recognition of Slovene independence, Milosevic's representative,
Borisav Jovic stated that military intervention was not an option:
I remember well that day because it was a day when I first announced our
new policy. It was very clear to me that Slovenia had seceded, and that it
would be useless to wage war there. The only thing I thought which we
should do was to defend the Serb populated territories in Croatia because they
wanted to stay in Yugoslavia. Concerning Slovenia, I said that we could not
use a war option in Slovenia.388
Thus Milosevic, who had always been more interested in a Greater Serbia than in a
united Yugoslavia, focused his attention on the Serbs in Croatia. In order to do this,
the JNA had to be reigned in. Milosevic therefore told Jovic to stop blocking the
election of Mesic. When the EC troika returned to Yugoslavia on the 30th, Jovic
made it appear that Serbia, with great reluctance, was giving in to the European
pressure to have Mesic elected. Silber and Little describe this meeting:
Late into the evening, the troika sat with Milosevic in the Federal Presidency,
painstakingly trying to extract from him a "concession" he had already
decided to make. Meanwhile the Federal Presidency members were
assembling in the same building, a few doors down the corridor, and
preparing, finally, to elect Mesic as President. Mesic himself had come to
Belgrade on the understanding that his election would now go ahead. Finally,
close to midnight, the Federal Presidency met formally, in the presence of the
three EC foreign ministers. Jovic made great show of opposing the election of
Mesic... He asked for a formal guarantee that Europe would respect the
territorial integrity of Yugoslavia, and demanded that the troika press Mesic,
as President, to work to restore the constitutional order, including the return
of Slovene border-crossings to the Yugoslav federal authorities. His position
could not have been more disingenuous. Only hours earlier he had
announced, in the closed session of the Defense of the Constitution, that
Serbia was now in favor of Slovene secession. Every Yugoslav in the room




When midnight struck, the Presidency of the European Community changed
hands. A domineering Van den Broek forced an obviously reluctant
Milosevic to clink glasses with him. Jacques Poos handed over to Hans Van
den Broek. "You see," said Van den Broek, "this is how democracy works. I
will chair the meeting now because I have taken over. Similarly, you should
elect Mesic." In return, he promised: "... and I will make a public statement
saying that Europe supports the unity of Yugoslavia." With a great
demonstration of reluctance, the Serb members agreed [to elect Mesic]. In the
small hours of July 1, Mesic was finally elected head of country which, in the
eyes of those who elected him, no longer existed. A comprehensively out-
maneuvered, but determinedly optimistic EC troika declared that further
too
progress had been made.
Thus, Milosevic was able to make it appear that he was giving in to the European's
demands, when in fact he was using them to further his own goals in Croatia.
The JNA, however, had not given up on preventing Slovenian independence.
On the 2nd of July, an armoured unit attempted to move up from its camp near the
Slovenian border with Croatia. The Serbian forces attacked it, causing the JNA to
attempt to reinforce it with another armoured column from Croatia. This column was
also attacked as it tried to cross the border into Slovenia. The JNA then ordered air
strikes against the Serbian forces, who were forced to flee. General Blagoje Adzic,
the JNA's chief of staff, spoke to the nation on television, criticizing the federal
government for allowing Yugoslavia to disintegrate and stating that the JNA would
wage war until it had regained control of the country. He also stated: "We will make
sure that the war that has been forced upon us is as short as possible."390 At this
point, a convoy of 180 armoured vehicles left Belgrade en route to Slovenia.
According to Little and Silber:
The convoy never reached Slovenia, nor was it ever intended to. Its real
mission was to take up positions near the Croatian border with Serbia for the
coming war against the Croats.391
The German foreign minister, Hans Dietrich Genscher, was on his way to visit the
Slovenian capital when these events occurred. His train had to stop, and then turn








American politicians, felt that JNA was running wild and had to be stopped. Kucan,
the Slovenian president, played into these fears by speaking of an imminent invasion
by the JNA. The JNA was humiliated.
On the 4th of July, the Federal Presidency of Yugoslavia reasserted its control
over the JNA and negotiated a cease-fire. Slovenia was told to return all border
crossings to the JNA and return their own military units to barracks. The Slovenes,
sensing that public opinion was firmly on their side and knowing that Milosevic
would oppose further intervention, did neither. Instead, they reinforced their units
and strengthened their defenses. On the same day, the SPS recognized Slovenia's
right to peaceful secession, but crucially, as later events would show, not Zagreb's.
The Slovene secession was formally recognized on the 8th of July at a summit
meeting on the island of Brioni. The EC troika met with the leaders of Slovenia and
Yugoslavia (including Serbia). After some heated negotiations, it was agreed that the
Slovenian police would control the borders, but the profits from this would go to the
Yugoslav federal reserves; the JNA would return to barracks within Slovenia and the
Slovenian forces would be deactivated and return to base. Although the declaration
of independence was still valid, they agreed to a three-month cooling off period
before implementation. The lone voice still arguing for the unity of Yugoslavia was
Ante Markovic, the last Prime Minister of the Yugoslav Federation:
Van den Broek convened a session of all the delegates at eight p.m. HE
presented the four-point proposal, saying: "This is what the EC backs. Take it
or leave it." Only Ante Markovic, who saw clearly that the proposal spelt the
end of Yugoslavia and the death of his own efforts to hold it together,
objected. Van den Broek, exasperated, called a break. He brought Markovic
and Kucan together. Markovic spelt out his objections to the plan, Van den
Broek asked Kucan whether Markovic's ideas were acceptable to the
Slovenes. Kucan said they were not. "Very well," said Van den Broek, "we
will go back to the original proposal." When Markovic again objected, Van
den Broek stormed out of the room muttering, in English, according to




Although this four-point agreement was signed by all parties, none of its provisions
was actually carried out and Slovenia was able to maintain their independence from
Yugoslavia and the JNA.
During these negotiations, the Slovenian and Serbian representatives on the
federal council met and agreed that the JNA would be withdrawn from Slovenia,
granting Slovenia absolute independence from Yugoslavia and freeing up the JNA
forces stationed there for the coming war against Croatia. The Federal Presidency
agreed to this on the 18th of July. The only member to vote against this "temporary"
withdrawal of the JNA from Slovenia was Stipe Mesic, the Croatian representative.
He knew what these military units were going to be used for. Croatia had declared its
independence before they were prepared to face the consequences, so that they could
secede at the same time as Slovenia. Their failure to keep their agreements with
Slovenia forced them to attempt their secession alone, with disastrous results.
Analysis
This description of the events leading up to the 10-Day War between
Slovenia and the Yugoslav Federation is very brief, but it is sufficient to help show
how a hopefully realistic ethic ofwar can help guide ethical decision-making. One
danger in this kind of analysis is the problem of history. We now know more about
the events in the former Yugoslavia, so that it is easy to second-guess those for
whom the coming tragedy was still unknown. It is, however, true that there were
warning signs as early as 1987 when Milosevic first rose to prominence. These signs
were ignored. At the same time, our knowledge of these events and their
repercussions is far less clear than concerning the events leading up to World War
Two. Our interpretation of these events cannot be as clear or logical as we could
wish it to be. As discussed above, events seldom fit into a coherent, logical and
easily discernable pattern; they rather tend to be far more fluid and incoherent,
requiring we do a great deal of work in order to make any sense of them. Christian
ethics thus has far more in common with poetry than with mathematics, in that we
look as much at the seemingly unrelated elements of a situation and attempt to make
some sense of them as a help to our own decision-making and actions.
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One of the most striking points to be made about this brief description of the
events leading up to the 10-Day War is how the nature ofwar has changed since
World War Two. For Barth and, to a somewhat lesser extent, Niebuhr war was a
matter of an unambiguous matter of nation against nation, usually prefaced by a
declaration ofwar from one side against the other. This is demonstrated by the
traditional just-war theory criterion that war must be declared by a legitimate
authority. This criterion can be traced as far back as Augustine, who wrote:
The natural order which seeks the peace of humankind, ordains that the
monarch should have the power of undertaking war if he thinks it
advisable.393
Thus, it has been the case for a long time that war only be fought between recognized
States, whose leader has the legitimate authority to declare war. Although their have
always been civil wars, the majority ofwars leading up to and including World War
Two were fought between belligerent nations. In time since World War Two, the
nature ofwar has changed so that, even in modern supporters of the just war theory,
the criterion of legitimate authority is recognized as problematic at best.394 The
reason this criterion is difficult to apply is that war is now seldom just a matter for
sovereign States, but often involves various groupings within a political State. This is
clearly a problem in the situation is Yugoslavia, where the problem of legitimate
authority was never clarified. The authority ought to have rested with the president of
Yugoslavia; Mesic, however, who should have been president at this time, was
prevented from taking office leaving no legitimate authority to command the
Yugoslav military. In such a situation, it is difficult for outside negotiators to know
with whom they ought to negotiate with. It also demonstrates some of the difficulties,
discussed above, with both Barth and Niebuhr's understanding ofwar. In World War
Two, the two sides were quite clearly distinguishable - the Axis, led by Germany;




See, for example, (Coates 1997), esp. 123-145 and (Walzer 1977), esp. 53-54. Walzer argues that
States have the right to defend themselves against aggression because aggression challenges rights
that are worth dying for. These rights are "territorial integrity" and "political sovereignty" and are
derived by the State from the natural rights of individuals. It is difficult to see how to apply this to
civil wars, as in the case of the 10-Day War.
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after the fall of France the Free French who were based in the United Kingdom, the
United States and various other nations. For especially Barth, but also for Niebuhr, it
was clear which side was morally right and which side wasn't. In the situation of
Yugoslavia, it is not clear what the sides are let alone which side is morally right.
This means any discussion of the ethics ofwar in the contemporary context cannot
be quite so clear-cut as the discussions surrounding World War Two.
A further difference in war today compared to the past is that most wars, at
least for Western Powers such as the United Kingdom and the United States, are
wars of intervention not of self-defense. The threat to Britain posed by Nazi
Germany was clear; the United States only actively entered World War Two after the
Japanese attacked the US military at Pearl Harbor. Although the economic interests
of these nations may be involved in areas like Kuwait, and possibly in Yugoslavia,
the existence of the nation itself is not threatened. Barth made this a condition for
God to command a nation to go to war, yet in the contemporary situation it is
difficult to apply that to situations like Yugoslavia. This is a basic premise of the
just-war theory, which must be significantly modified if it is to be used with
reference to wars of intervention, or so-called humanitarian intervention.395 Michael
Walzer, a contemporary proponent of the just war theory, argues that
Humanitarian intervention is justified when it is a response (with reasonable
expectations of success) to acts that "shock the moral conscience of
mankind..." Any state capable of stopping the slaughter has a right, at least,
to try to do so.396
Walzer makes no attempt to try to argue this on the basis of the criteria of self-
defense, which as discussed above, justifies a State's decision to go to war. It appears
that we are left with a blanket justification of a nations leaders decision to use force
to "stop the slaughter." This argument does not appear to offer any assistance to the
leaders of the United States and the European Community with regard to Yugoslavia.
God's judgment can be seen in the war on the population of the former Yugoslavia-
the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. The war, to a large extent, came about as a result of
what Niebuhr terms henotheism; the Serbs, Slovenians, and Croats were all primarily
395 See (Walzer 1977), 101-108.
396 (Walzer 1977), 107-108.
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concerned with their own status and their own ability to control their political
actions. As a result each group sought their own good ant the cost of the others. The
10-Day War, therefore, can be interpreted as God's judgment against the henotheism
of the various groups in Yugoslavia; in other words, against the type of idolatry that
believes one's race is the center of value against which everything else is to be
judged. The Serbs felt that they had to be oppressed, as they formed the majority of
the population in Yugoslavia, in order to make for a strong, united country; the
Croats felt they were oppressed by the Serbian majority of the population of
Yugoslavia; the Slovenes, who see themselves more as a part ofwestern Europe than
eastern, felt that they had been forced into a confederation with backward, eastern
races. Each group's expression of distrust and hatred of the other group strengthened
that other group's fear and loathing of the first, which, in turn, strengthened their
fears. This dynamic of hatred goes back to the beginning of the country, when it was
known as The Kingdom ofSerbs, Croats and Slovenes. It was forcefully suppressed
by Tito during the post-World War Two period and, after Tito's death in 1980, was
used by various leaders, such as Milosevic and Tudjman, to bolster their own
political power within the country. This created a vicious circle of hatred, where
Milosevic's calls for a Greater Serbia created an atmosphere of animosity between
ethnic Croats and Serbs living in Croatia, which Tudjman used by inflaming the
Croats against the Serbs, which then was used in turn by Milosevic. The war that
resulted from this can be interpreted as God's judgment against such idolatry, and the
suffering of the many relatively innocent people of all ethnic groups in this tragedy is
God's call to all of us to repentant of such henotheism.
As Niebuhr discussed in his article "The Grace ofDoing Nothing," God's
action in history is a call for each nation to engage in self-analysis. The western
powers, especially the United States and the European powers, are also guilty of the
sin of henotheism. This results in a destruction ofGod's good commonwealth and
leads different types of conflict - some "hot" and some "cold." In the aftermath of
the Cold War, this attitude became readily apparent. President George Bush's
argument that the United States had won the Cold War, thereby saving the world
from the evils of a socialist dictatorship clearly demonstrated this attitude, as does
the American understanding of the situation in Yugoslavia as a European affair that
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needs to be solved by Europeans. Jim Baker's statement that "we don't have a dog in
this fight" is a crude demonstration of the same attitude. The henotheistic propaganda
of the Cold War era, together with western economic policy to Yugoslavia, helped
create the situation that led to the tragedy of Yugoslavia.
The Cold War economic policy of the West, especially the United States,
toward Yugoslavia created an artificially high standard of living within Yugoslavia.
When the Eastern Block collapsed and the Cold War ended, the West no longer felt
they needed to support Yugoslavia and withdrew most of their economic aid. This, in
turn, increased the tensions amongst the ethnic groups dramatically and hastened the
coming catastrophe in the nation. Had the West not used economic means to garner
Yugoslav support during the Cold War, or not have withdrawn that support so
quickly with the end of that conflict, the tragedy may have been averted or, at least,
somewhat softened. Throughout the period leading up to the war, the leaders who
sought to negotiate some sort of peaceful settlement seemed inadequately prepared
for the task. The American Secretary of State, James Baker, was unaware of the
nature of the situation, ignorant of who he was talking to and of the role of each of
the republics within the Yugoslav Federation. He, along with the other western
leaders, seemed to be looking for a quick fix to this situation and believed that the
solution lay forcing the republic, most importantly Serbia, to allow Mesic to start his
term as president of the Yugoslav Federation. In so doing, Baker and the others
failed to pay attention to the statements ofMilosevic, Tudjman and Kucan and to the
events occurring within Yugoslavia and fuelled the fear that the United States,
together with Germany, wanted to gain a warm water port by breaking up
Yugoslavia and then gaining control, or at least influence, with an independent
TQ7 . .
Slovenia. This made Serbian resentment to the Slovenes greater, and reinforced
the JNA's view that Yugoslavian unity must be maintained against the threat from
the west. The carelessness of the west in attempting to diffuse this situation was
counter-productive and irresponsible, as no one appeared to realise the complexity of
the situation. War is a tragedy, but the Yugoslavian Republics - especially Serbia,
Croatia and Slovenia, were convinced that it was the only way to get what they
wanted. The failure ofwestern leaders to realise this and give the situation the care it
397 See (Little 1996), 113.
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required only served to make the situation worse. As Barth rightly pointed out, all
nations share in the responsibility of creating a peace in which one nation, or ethnic
group, feels that the only way to obtain what it has been deprived of in peacetime is
by going to war. It is therefore highly ironic, given that the west was at least partially
responsible for the situation in Yugoslavia, that James Baker can say: "We don't
have a dog in that fight."
Again, the suffering of the relatively innocent in the Yugoslavian conflict is a
call for repentance to the West. In attempting to further our own ends, we have
created violent situations. We sell weapons to countries and republics, yet claim to be
innocent when those weapons are used. When we no longer have any interests - and
our interests are normally economic - we pull out of the area and leave whoever is
left to fend for themselves. This is sinful, as we exacerbate situations for our own
interests and are at least partially responsible for the suffering that comes as a result
of our action or inaction. It is also sinful because it is irresponsible - our area of
concern is too narrow, we are as guilty as those in Yugoslavia of henotheism. We
appear to be willing to allow others to suffer as long as we "don't have a dog in that
fight." Repentance requires a change in attitude, and this is an area where the
Western powers clearly need to change their attitude and practise.
Judgment is clearly one way of interpreting the events ofwar and helping
prevent future situations that may develop into war, but it is not of assistance in
determining what course of action to take in the current situation. It is here that using
the symbols of God the Creator and Sustainer provides some assistance. Part of both
of these symbols is the presumption against war. War may come about, but it ought
to be in spite of our best efforts rather than because of them. Our efforts therefore
ought to be to support those elements in a situation that are striving to solve that
conflict peacefully. In the situation leading up to the 10-Days War, there were not
many people who were working towards peace but there were a few. One of these
was Ante Markovic who, as Prime Minister of the Federation ofYugoslavia, brought
in market reforms and improved the economic situation in Yugoslavia greatly. His
concerns about the Brioni agreement were ignored by the EC troika. He attempted to
warn the parties to the negotiation that this agreement would not prevent war, merely
change the battlefield from Slovenia to Croatia. As he foresaw, this agreement, and
215
the secret agreement between Serbia and Slovenia to withdraw all of the JNA units
from Slovenia, brought the coming war between Serbia and Croatia moved a large
step closer. Had we listened to his analysis of the situation and the effect the Brioni
Agreement would have, we might have attempted to work out a better agreement that
could have prevented the coming conflict. Instead, the troika was blind to the nature
of the situation and Serbia's intentions; they were then completely manipulated by
Milosevic.
What could the negotiators have done differently throughout this crisis? In
reading the accounts of these negotiations, one is struck by both the arrogance and
ignorance of the Western politicians involved in the negotiations. They acted as if
they knew what the problem was and the best way to solve it. They acted
patronizingly to all of the natives, as it were, and failed to grasp the nature of the
crisis. As discussed above, one crucial element of hopefully realistic ethics is the
importance of getting as clear an understanding as possible of any situation. That
means that those involved in a crisis can never assume that they know the answers,
especially when they come from outside of a situation and attempt to help settle it
peacefully. The EC troika and the American Secretary of State needed to firstly listen
to those involved and then, in discussion with them, seek to solve the problems in the
country peacefully by working with those involved, not by dictating terms. They also
needed to recognise those forces within Yugoslavia who were truly working for a
peaceful solution to the problems facing the country and those who sought their own
gain from the situation. Milosevic had, as early as 1988 made clear his goal for a
Serb-dominated Yugoslavia. He worked toward this goal by firstly reuniting the Serb
province of Vojvodina, which had been separated from Serbia in the 1964
constitution, with Serbia. He succeeded in doing so as a result of the so-called
"Yoghurt Revolution" in 1988. This should have at least caused western politicians
to be suspicious. His further actions within the government, including the situation
regarding the presidency of Mesic, also demonstrated his desire for a Yugoslavia
dominated by a Greater Serbian State. This desire was reinforced by the Serbian's
belief that Croatia was the cradle of their civilisation. Historically, the Serbs clearly
felt they had a greater claim on Croatia than on Slovenia. The west seemed to ignore
Milosevic's statements, policy decisions and military activity throughout the period
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leading up to the 10-Day War. One failure of the west was to adequately study the
situation before seeking to act for peace. They needed to at least attempt to gain an
understanding of the nature of the political situation and the players within that
situation, they also needed to look at the history of the region and the hatreds
between the various populations, then, and only then, should they have sought to
negotiate any kind of agreement in Yugoslavia.
That analysis should have included looking at the people involved in the
negotiations and identifying those who are truly interested in working toward peace.
Unfortunately, in Yugoslavia, such people were rare. As mentioned above, one such
person was Ante Markovic. The conflict would have probably been hindered had we
supported his reforms more when he was in office, rather that pulling out almost all
of our economic aid to the region and leaving him alone to attempt to reform the
Yugoslav economy and society. We certainly should have shown more
understanding regarding his rejection of the Brioni Agreement. Another force that
was constantly misunderstood by the West was the Yugoslav People's Army. They
certainly were not a benign force for the good, but they were also not the demon
portrayed in the press. In fact, they were the one force that truly acted to maintain the
unity of Yugoslavia. Although it is true they sought to do so by force, it may be that
they had no choice given the nature of the political situation. It may have been
possible to attempt to assist the JVA in helping preserve the peace. It may also not
have been possible, but the portrayal of the JVA as war mongering demons was
counter-productive to any attempt to bring about a peaceful settlement of the conflict.
It would also have been helpful had the Western leaders not simply assumed
that no one wanted war. There are times, and this was in all probability one of them,
where the leaders of a nation feel that the only way to acquire what they want is by
going to war. In such a case, war is the logical solution to the problems the
leadership of a nation perceives in their relations with their neighbours. Negotiating
with people who are not opposed to war or even want to go to war, is far different
from negotiating with persons who want peace. It must be more than just "banging
heads together." The negotiators, in order to reach a peaceful solution, must either
force the sides to compromise or offer enough support to one side in the dispute that
the other is not willing to go to war for fear of the results. In either event, it is
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difficult to see how the negotiations can be successful without the use or the threat of
using military forces, such as NATO or other military units. Since both sides desired
a military solution, it appears that the only way of resolving the conflict involved the
EC agreeing to police the area with enough military strength to prevent either side
from going to war. However, this option was rejected from the very beginning by the
West as being impossible to carry out. It is therefore difficult to see how a war
between Serb-led Yugoslavia and Slovenia could have been prevented, without
leading to a war in Croatia.
Given the confused nature of the situation leading up to the 10-Day War,
determining the best, or moral, course of action is extremely difficult. Looking back,
it appears clear that there was no intervention that did not involve a significant
military operation could have prevented the 10-Day War and the following wars. In
the tangled web of that situation, there were no clear answers about what the right
thing was for the Western Powers to do. A hopeful realistic ethic that attempts to
view the people and events leading up to that conflict provides some assistance in
moral decision making about the best response to that situation, but it - and no ethics
can, as both Barth and Niebuhr argue - can not give us the one moral option. It helps
us to understand what is happening, and in so doing, helps us to decide what we
ought to do. It does this without becoming anthropocentric in its ethics, as any good
we could do in that situation is only good in response to God's prior action. At the
same time, it recognises our significant (but limited) creative ability to act. It shares
more with poetry, in that it looks at the interrelatedness of people and events and
attempts to understand what is happening by applying the symbols of the Christian
tradition to those events in order to see what God is doing. We then, using our God-
given ability, respond to God's action in a fitting way. This all is done under God's
grace, with the recognition that how we interpret the events and respond to what we
perceive to be God's action in them may be wrong. Hopeful realism is hopeful
because it trusts not in our human ability but in the good and gracious God who
chooses to be in relation with God's good creation.
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